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Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) is understood as a difficult category to work 
with in various contemporary mental health settings. Additionally, to date, there is a 
dearth of research on this topic in Counselling Psychology. Therefore, the aim of this 
study is to explore how Counselling Psychologists (CoPs) and other Psychological 
Practitioners (PPs) discursively construct ASPD and to investigate any discursive 
power games that may be implicated in therapeutic practice accounts. Ten semi-
structured interviews were conducted and a Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA) 
was applied to the data. The findings of the analysis produced five distinct therapeutic 
subject-positions: “Dangerous to Know”, “Damaged Goods”, “The White Collar 
Psychopath”, “Resisting to Psychiatric Norms” and “Critical Questioning”.  Overall this 
analysis argues that ASPD is a problematic construct as it is produced by these 
participants as multiple, power laden and opaque. Additionally, these therapeutic 
subject-positions highlight how ASPD is variously produced in specific therapeutic 
contexts, such as medium secure units and private practice/ corporate environments. 
Such findings may contribute to raising awareness among CoPs and other PPs by 
making visible the power relations and contextual influences implicated in particular 
ASPD therapeutic accounts.  Finally, it is also proposed that this Foucauldian gaze 
may be applied in other practice areas, to enable critical thinking in relation to potential 
uses of psychological knowledge, practice and research. 
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The problem of ASDP in Counselling Psychology: An Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction to Chapter One 
This study is about developing a critical discursive space for Counselling 
Psychologists (CoPs) and other Psychological Practitioners (PPs) in relation to 
constructions of ASPD in therapeutic work.  It is also about the knowledge-power 
nexus and ASPD as a discursive site as relevant to Counselling Psychology. Such a 
discursive approach focuses on language as discourse with a particular interest in 
illuminating any power dynamics implicated in therapeutic talk in relation to ASPD. 
Thus, inheriting a discursive qualitative approach this study will attempt to address the 
main research question: “How do PPs construct ASPD and what are the discursive 
power relations, if any, in PPs’ therapeutic accounts regarding ASPD?”.  
In order to answer the above research question, a Poststructuralist 
epistemology influenced by Foucauldian ideas (Foucault, 1961; 1972; 1977; 1982; 
1988) will be employed to interrogate and critique the participants ASPD ‘truth claims’. 
Epistemologically, this study assumes that the construct of ASPD cannot be known 
empirically, but rather it is understood as a socially constructed object of knowledge 
(Gergen, 2001; Burr, 2003). This perspective also argues for a critical and reflexive 
approach in relation to the wider ASPD discourses, ‘truth claims’ and therapeutic 
practices, as well as for the interrogation of any possible discursive power relations 
operating within therapeutic accounts. 
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To realise the objectives of this research inquiry, ten UK professionally trained, 
accredited and practicing CoPs and other PPs with self-identified ASPD clinical 
experience were interviewed. The participants were asked to share their knowledge, 
understanding and experience of ASPD and their therapeutic practice with such 
clients. The interview transcripts were analysed using FDA. The main focus of the 
analytic inquiry was to critically explore and contest the participants professional talk, 
to investigate the discursive constructions of ASPD, to consider how PPs positioned 
themselves or were positioned in their therapeutic accounts of ASPD and to identify 
any power relations implicated. 
In this Chapter, I will firstly problematise ASPD and provide a rational for this 
study. Secondly, I will contextualise this study within the Counselling Psychology 
domain and briefly refer to the Poststructuralist epistemology that embeds this thesis. 
Thirdly, I will introduce some central analytic Foucauldian ideas that are relevant 
throughout this study. Finally, I will offer an overview of the study aims and the possible 
contribution of this research to Counselling Psychology and the wider profession.  
 
1.2 The problem of ASPD and the rationale for this study 
The aim of this section is to problematise the therapeutic construction of ASPD 
and provide sufficient justification for the rationale of this study.  Following this, I argue 
that ASPD can be understood as a discursively constructed object that is difficult to be 
defined and known empirically. As an object of discourse ASPD carries social meaning 
that is changeable historically and culturally. I further suggest, that the analytic 
approach taken by this study will enable the exploration of linguistic limitations of the 
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diverse ASDP expert knowledges and highlight any possible power relations 
implicated in professional talk about ASPD. 
To begin with, I propose that ASPD is a complex phenomenon, hard to define 
as it has been valorised in variable and mutable ways through history. The term ASPD, 
as an official diagnostic category in the DSM is relatively new. It was firstly introduced 
in the DSM-2 (APA, 1968) and its linguistic development through time reveals the 
complex historical conceptual changes ASPD has undergone. Linguistic terms such 
as ‘moral defect’, ‘psychopathic inferiority’, ‘psychopathic personality’, ‘criminal 
personality’, ‘psychopathy’ and ‘sociopathy’ have been historically attached to what 
now is referred to as ASPD (Mish, 1996; Thomas, 1997; First & Tasman, 2004). It has 
been suggested that the definition of antisocial behaviour against (anti) the societal 
norms (social) (Mish, 1996; Thomas, 1997) is inconsistent, changeable and value-
laden (Cooke, 1998) and I would also argue discursively power-laden. For example, 
by defining ASPD in relation to societal standards, changes in the law would redefine 
the conceptualisation of ASPD and consequently the ways in which individuals 
labelled as ASDP are treated, managed and regulated by legal authorities and the 
mental health system.  
Although considerable attention and effort has been invested in defining and 
grasping the nature of ASPD by numerous disciplines, such as criminology, psychiatry, 
psychology, sociology, philosophy, ASPD still remains “somewhat of an enigma in 
etiological and descriptive terms” (Andrade, 2008: 329). Perhaps this great difficulty 
emerges even before definition, as there seems to be a great confusion at the very 
basic level of terminology (Jones, 2012). Whilst Antisocial Personality Disorder, 
Dissocial Personality Disorder, Psychopathic Personality, Psychopathy and 
Sociopathy seem to be used interchangeably in the literature (Andrade, 2008), a 
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number of researchers have made distinctions between ASPD and psychopathy and 
have argued that psychopathy is a distinct disorder that overlaps with, but it is 
distinguishable from ASPD (Hare, 1996; Hare et al, 1996; Patrick, 2005; Semple, 
2005; Skeem et al, 2011). Perhaps, this terminological confusion is a testament to the 
opacity and mutability of the ASPD phenomenon, and thereby its problematic ‘nature’ 
within contemporary psychological and therapeutic knowledge and practice.  
Despite the diverse perspectives of ASPD, the medical/psychiatric domain has 
been and continues to be highly influential on shaping contemporary knowledges and 
practices related to ASPD (Ascoli et al, 2011). It is within this domain that ASPD has 
been mainly conceptualised, described and categorised. In this context, the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM) (APA, 2013) constitutes the primary 
diagnostic tool, which is used widely in mental health services where many 
Counselling Psychologists practice. Whilst DSM, the ‘psychiatric bible’ (Kutchins & 
Kirk, 1993), comprises an official ‘lingua franca’ (Wylie, 1995) for clinicians across the 
world and offers a formal system for categorising and naming psychological difficulties 
(Marecek & Hare-Hustin, 2009), it produces truth claims about normality and 
abnormality and as many have argued pathologises human experience and human 
suffering (Caplan, 1995; Cooper, 2005; Davies, 2013; Frances, 2013). Thus, the DSM 
and the diagnostic processes in mental health contexts are mainly informed by a 
modernist positivistic epistemology that challenges the very humanistic values that 
embed the profession of Counselling Psychology.  
Furthermore, leading mental health organisations and professional bodies that 
are directly linked to Counselling Psychology through the standardisation of 
psychological practices and treatment seem to espouse the positivistic ideas under 
which the psychiatric model thrives. This is evident in how ASPD is defined and 
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described in official published documents. In the latest edition of the DSM-5 (APA, 
2013), ASDP is defined as, 
a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others 
that begins in childhood or early adolescence and continues into 
adulthood. This pattern has also been referred to as psychopathy, 
sociopathy, or dissocial personality disorder’ (p. 659)1.  
 
Furthermore, the World Health Organisation (WHO) (1994) International 
Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD) tenth edition 
(ICD-10) states that 
Dissocial (Antisocial) Personality Disorder, usually coming to attention 
because of a gross disparity between behaviour and the prevailing social 
norms2 
 
Similarly, to the DSM-5 and ICD-10 definitions of ASPD, the official website of 
the NHS states, 
Antisocial personality disorder is a particularly challenging type of 
personality disorder, characterised by impulsive irresponsible and often 
criminal behaviour. Someone with antisocial personality disorder will 
typically be manipulative, deceitful and reckless, and won’t care for the 
people’s feelings (retrieved September 2016) 
 
whilst the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) (2009) 
guidelines suggests that, 
People with antisocial personality disorder exhibit traits of impulsivity, 
high negative emotionality, low conscientiousness and associated 
                                                           
1 See Appendix 1: Table 1, DSM-V Diagnostic Criteria for ASPD. 
2 See Appendix 2: Table 2, ICD-10 Diagnostic Criteria for Dissocial Personality Disorder. 
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behaviours including irresponsible and exploitative behaviour, 
recklessness and deceitfulness. This is manifest in unstable 
interpersonal relationships, disregard for the consequences of one’s 
behaviour, a failure to learn from experience, egocentricity and a 
disregard for the feeling of others (p. 4). 
 
The above official definitions and descriptions of ASPD seem to be resourced 
by the wider dominant psychiatric discourse and thus form a particular disciplinary 
regime (Foucault, 1980) by determining ASPD in relation to standards of normality and 
abnormality. These definitions seem to reduce ASDP to binary categorical 
understandings, such as normal/abnormal, sane/insane, good/bad, and fail to address 
the complexity of this construct. These contemporary understandings and definitions 
of ASPD stem back to the early 19th century where the emergence of moral insanity 
signified the conceptual broadening of mental health illness to include notions of 
dangerousness. The historic constructions of ASPD category will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter Two.  
In addition to the dominant medical/psychiatric knowledges, there is a diversity 
of theoretical perspectives available within the current psychological literature and 
research in relation to ASPD that provide variable discursive resources for Counselling 
Psychologists to draw upon. Within this diversity, psychodynamic perspectives (Freud, 
1917/1957; Bowlby, 1969; Kernberg & Caligor, 2005) cognitive-behavioural models 
(Shapiro, 1965; Beck & Freeman,1990), humanistic approaches (McCulloch, 2012) 
and social-constructionist theories (Parker, 1999) offer different constructions of ASPD 
which result in different therapeutic applications3. For example, some classical 
psychodynamic perspectives view ASPD as a result of an undeveloped superego 
                                                           
3 These expert knowledges will be explored in detail in Chapter Two. 
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(Freud, 1946) and a domination by the infantile id and its pleasure principles 
(Friedlander, 1945), whilst from a cognitive-behavioural perspective, ASPD is 
described in terms of cognitive styles characterised by deviant, egocentric and 
impulsive mental templates (Beck & Freeman, 1990).  
The various theoretical conceptualisations of ASPD, as demonstrated above, 
illustrate the opacity and mutability of this phenomenon as well as the multiple 
conceptual and discursive contradictions within contemporary psychological 
knowledges. Thus, this thesis proposes that a poststructuralist discursive approach 
will enable the interrogation of the linguistic ambiguities of ASPD constructions and 
any possible discursive power relations in terms of what it made visible or constrained 
for the Counselling Psychology and the wider therapeutic profession.  
 
1.3 ASPD and Counselling Psychology 
In this section, it is proposed that the problematic nature of ASPD as a 
psychological construct needs to be considered in relation to the Counselling 
Psychology profession. Counselling Psychology is a relatively new field in the wider 
psychological and psychotherapeutic professional domain. It was firstly constituted as 
a separate section of the British Psychological Society (BPS) in 1982 (Woolfe et al, 
2010). Whilst Counselling Psychology has been criticised by many for its vagueness, 
Woofle et al (2010) propose that Counselling Psychology is, 
a broad church, committed to exploring a range of approaches to inquiry 




Furthermore, in the Professional Practice Guidelines for the Division of 
Counselling Psychology it is stipulated that, 
Counselling Psychology has developed as a branch of professional and 
psychological practice strongly influenced by human science research 
as well as the principal psychotherapeutic traditions (BPS, 2005: 1). 
 
These guidelines suggest that Counselling Psychology draws both from 
phenomenological models of practice as well as the traditional scientific psychology, 
with research aiming to ‘marry’ the scientific demand for empirical enquiry with the firm 
values grounded in the primacy of the counselling relationship (BPS, 2005). Hence, 
Counselling Psychology is situated within competing paradigms (Blair, 2010). On the 
one hand, working within medical and scientific settings means that Counselling 
Psychologists have to grapple with positivistic and empirical ideas. On the other hand, 
Counselling Psychologists are expected to value subjectivity and intersubjectivity, 
meaning making, the therapeutic relationship, pluralism and anti-discriminatory 
practice (BPS, 2005). This epistemological tension is highlighted in the term ‘scientist-
practitioner’ (Woolfe et al, 2010), which is often used in reference to Counselling 
Psychologists (Blair, 2010) and encapsulates the central challenge of negotiating 
opposing ideologies in the practice of the profession. 
 One main area where this epistemological tension becomes central is working 
with diagnosis. This tension is also a central concern for this thesis, since one of the 
main analytic considerations is how practitioners understand the diagnostic construct 
of ASPD and how they practice therapeutically with it. The medical/psychiatric model 
adopts a positivistic approach to diagnosis in mental health by evidencing symptoms 
of mental disorders using the DSM. However, this approach comes to conflict with 
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Counselling Psychology as it challenges its grounding principles and values of by 
taking a non-holistic view of the client and reducing human experience to a cluster of 
symptoms. Therefore, Counselling Psychologists who find themselves working with 
the diagnosis of ASPD, are unavoidably located in the heart of these competing 
ideologies. 
Indeed, Counselling Psychologists are expected to navigate through competing 
epistemologies and practice pluralistically or integratively upholding humanistic values 
whilst engaging with evidence-based practice (Larsson et al, 2012). Rizq (2007) notes 
that the ethical premise of Counselling Psychology is invested in challenging 
modernist assumptions about human experience - both within medical and humanistic 
perspectives and in valuing post-modern ideas such as pluralism. Pluralism 
subscribes to the idea that knowledge is relevant and that there are many versions of 
reality and multiple truths out there (Cooper & McLeod, 2012). Hence, by embracing 
a pluralistic approach to knowledge and truth, Counselling Psychology calls for the 
consideration of contradictory epistemologies.  
Following this premise, a poststructuralist approach to this research, that 
maintains a non-essentialist approach to knowledge and truth, has been chosen, in 
order to critically investigate ASPD as an object of discourse as well as the potential 
power-laden positioning of practitioners who work therapeutically with such a 
diagnostic category. The poststructuralist epistemology that embeds this study will be 





1.4 Language and the Foucauldian gaze 
The philosophical work of Michael Foucault (1926-1984) on discourse, power, 
knowledge and subjectivity has been highly influential and useful to Psychology 
(Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008) and his contribution is of particular interest to this 
study. Foucault used archaeological (1961) and later genealogical (1977b) methods 
to highlight the discursive formations and events that produced knowledge in different 
historical periods and to uncover the relationship between truth, knowledge and power 
(Schirato et al, 2012). He analysed the social construction of madness (Foucault, 
1961), discipline (Foucault, 1977), and sexuality (Foucault 1978; 1984; 1986) and 
became best known for his ideas concerning the discursive power and subjectivity 
(Foucault, 1982).  
More specifically, his ideas about madness and badness (Foucault, 1961; 
1977), in relation to psychiatric expert knowledge, are of great relevance to this study. 
Foucault saw madness as located in a specific cultural space shaped by the wider 
societal discourse. He exposed the monopoly of the psychiatric regime in defining 
normality and abnormality (Foucault, 1961) and its legitimisation in regulating 
individuals who were deemed as mad. Foucault (1977) also explored the historic links 
of madness, criminality and evil as well as the constitution of institutions, such as 
asylums and prisons, and proposed that madness became a discourse of fear.  
Furthermore, one of the most important of Foucault’s contributions, which is of 
paramount importance for this study, was his ideas concerning how subjects produce 
themselves or are produced discursively and take up certain speaking positions which 
may express distinct power relations and forms of knowledge (Luke, 1999; Schirato et 
al, 2012). Following this, I discuss Foucault’s central ideas on the role of language and 
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its constitution of knowledge. More particularly, I will present his ideas on discourse, 
power-knowledge nexus, forms of resistance and subjectivity. 
 
1.4.1 Foucauldian concept of discourse. 
Discourse has been widely defined as “a group of ideas or patterned ways of 
thinking which can be identified in textual and verbal communications, and can also 
be located in wider social structures” (Lupton, 1992: 145). From a Foucauldian 
perspective, discourse is understood as a set of ideas, attitudes, courses of action, 
beliefs and practices that systematically construct the subjects and the worlds of which 
they speak (Parker, 1994; Lessa, 2006). Discourses do not just describe ‘objects,’ but 
rather they “systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 1978:100) 
enabling or constraining certain understandings and knowledges and dictating what 
can be said, by whom, when and where (Weedon, 1987; Parker, 1992).  
Discourses become available through language and play a powerful role in 
shaping subjective experience. Hence, language becomes a medium by which we 
come to understand ourselves and the world around us. For example, discourses that 
are legitimised as ‘expert’, such as the ‘psychiatric’ or ‘psychological’ discourse, seem 
to be authorised in defining what is normal or abnormal, healthy or pathological. A 
mere example of that is homosexuality, which was included as a mental health 
disorder in DSM-1 (APA, 1952) and was later removed from DSM-2 (APA, 1968) in 
1973 (Drescher, 2015) in accordance with the American Psychiatric Association 
referendum outcome. Drapetomania (which was used to describe slaves’ 
uncontrollable urge to escape) and kleptomania (which explains the compulsive 
shoplifting and originated with the invention of large department stores) (Marecek & 
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Hare-Mustin, 2009) are two further examples of how the expert DSM discourse 
pathologised the individual whilst the role of social processes in the development of 
human distress remained unacknowledged. 
 Expert discourses, such as those mentioned above, privilege certain aspects 
of reality whilst simultaneously obscure others. From a poststructuralist 
epistemological perspective, ‘objects’, such as ASPD, do not wait to be ‘discovered’, 
rather they are constituted by complex power relations and socially produced 
discourses. This is highly relevant to this thesis which aims to interrogate the 
discourses related to ASPD and explore what is made visible or excluded in ASPD 
therapeutic accounts.  Thus, ASPD will be analysed as a discursively constructed 
object that carries social meaning, specific to the context Counselling Psychology.  
 While in most contemporary mental health contexts, ASDP is considered as a 
‘real’, objective category of disorder, in this analysis, it is suggested that this ‘disorder’ 
is constructed. From this perspective, personality disorders are products of historical, 
social and cultural perceptions and meanings (Marecek & Hare-Mustin, 2009; Sloan, 
2009; Ascoli et al, 2011). Therefore, concepts of personality always reflect a historical 
form of individuality (Seve, 1978) associated with a particular order (Sloan, 2009). 
Mainstream psychological understandings of ASDP pathologise personality in 
association with what is widely perceived to be socially acceptable or unacceptable. 
Additionally, these understandings of ASPD privilege individualistic perspectives and 
leave social justice issues, such social inequality, unchallenged (Sloan, 2009). Thus, 
this thesis suggests that it is of critical importance for Counselling Psychologists, and 
other psychological practitioners, to become aware of the ways they are discursively 
constructing ASDP as well as any possible implications (if any) this may have for their 
therapeutic work with such clients. 
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1.4.2 The power/knowledge nexus and forms of resistance. 
 
The notion of power (also termed as biopower) is the most important conception 
in Foucault’s work as it forms the analytic basis of discourse (Powers, 2007). 
Formulating and studying the question of power relations (MacLeod & Durrheim, 2002) 
in terms of “power at its extremities...where it becomes capillary” (Foucault, 1980: 96) 
has been central to the Foucauldian project, which aimed to investigate the practices 
of power “where it installs itself and produces real effects” (Foucault, 1980: 97). 
Foucauldian power is not understood as “singular, unidirectional, reified phenomenon” 
but as a “network of interacting forces that are goal-driven, relational and self-
organised” (Powers, 2007: 28). This kind of power, 
is not exercised from the exterior; it is not possessed by an individual, 
class or group, nor is it centralised in the law, economy or state. Rather 
it is immanent to everyday relationships including economic exchanges, 
knowledge relationships, sexual relations, etc. (MacLeod & Durrheim, 
2002: 43). 
 
Hence, power is not something that is held by a group of people or another but 
“it incites, it induces, it seduces [and] passes through the hands of the mastered no 
less than through the hands of the masters” (Deleuze, 1988: 71).  
 Foucault’s concept of power shifted between his early work on institutions 
(Foucault, 1961; 1963; 1977) and his later work on sexuality and governmentality 
(Foucault, 1978; 1984; 1986). In the early stages of his work Foucault proposed a 
judicial model of power and he explored how the creation of modernist disciplines and 
their principles of order and control ‘disindividualise’ power. Bentham’s Panopticon, 
which was a central architectural feature in the prisons at the time, became Foucault’s 
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model for describing this regulatory function of power in different institutions. The 
Panopticon, Foucault (1977) writes, 
…is an important mechanism, for it automatises and disindividualises 
power. Power has its principle not so much in a person as a central in a 
certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes; in an 
arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the relation in which 
individuals are caught up (p. 202). 
 
Indeed, Bentham’s aim was to create an architectural structure that could 
function on its own regardless of who was operating it; “any individual can operate the 
machine: in the absence of the director, his family, his friends, his visitors, even his 
servants” (Foucault, 1977: 202). 
A central concept in the Foucauldian view of power is that of resistance, which 
is understood as inherent and integral property of power relations (Schirato et al, 
2012). As Foucault (1978) wrote,  
where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather 
consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in 
relation to power (p. 95).  
 
In his early model of juridical and strategic power, resistance as a practice was 
seen as subjugated to the employment of power relations. This kind of resistance to 
such dominating power was entitled as ‘tactical reversal’ (Thompson, 2003) and 
individuals who mobilised such resistance were perceived as defiant and caught up 
within domineering power games. Here, Foucault argued that resistance “is always 
reactive and, as such, restrictive” (Thompson, 2003: 120), engaging in a direct struggle 
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with hegemonic forces leaving two options available: either comply or reject this force 
(Thompson, 2003).  
Later in his work, the Foucauldian project turned its focus on understanding the 
ethic and confessional self and more specifically the particular mechanisms or 
techniques, which individuals use to manage, shape and regulate their own bodies 
and thoughts (Schirato et al, 2012). Foucault (1982; 1984) called this concept of power 
‘governmental power’. In this model, power “operates not by force, but by knowledges 
that are to be implemented by the self, on the self…to produce truth of the self” (as 
quoted in Frank, 1998: 335). A new element on this understating is freedom 
(Thompson, 2003). He writes, “power is exercised only over free subjects, and only 
insofar as they are free” (Foucault, 1982: 221). This model of power suggests that 
people construct themselves through the socially available discourses, for example 
psychological discourses (Parker, 1999) and hence they conform with prevalent norms 
and eventually become self-regulated subjects. 
In this governmental model of power, Foucault (1988) developed a more 
nuanced form of resistance, which he called ‘technologies of the self’. Here, Foucault 
(1988) was concerned with how people become ethical subjects through their own 
means and how subjects came to conduct themselves without getting caught up in a 
state of domination (Schirato et al, 2012). The practice of critique was seen as central 
to this process of ‘self-formation’, of ‘becoming’ a subject. Hence, in this model 
resistance is not solely concerned with the subjugation of antinomic forces and 
structures. Rather, resistance as a form of critique, forges new forms of life and 
existence and cultivates new types of agency that enable us to govern ourselves 
(Thompson, 2003). Indeed, “the work of critique…is self-formation” (Thompson, 
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2003:123), and through this practice individuals are seen to expand new ways of 
thinking and being (Sharpe, 2005).  
These Foucauldian models of power and forms of resistance are central to this 
thesis and will be employed to make visible any possible power games that may 
operate in the participants’ therapeutic accounts of ASPD. Additionally, issues of 
power are highly important in Counselling Psychology. This is evident in the HCPC 
(2015) standards of proficiency, which require all practitioner psychologists to 
Understand the power imbalance between practitioners and clients and 
how this can be managed appropriately (p. 7). 
Be able to recognise appropriate boundaries and understand the 
dynamics of power relationships (p.7). 
 
I propose that engaging with critical examination of possible power relations in 
therapeutic talk is of paramount importance for Counselling Psychologists and other 
Psychological Practitioners. Sawicki (1991) cautions us that no discourse is inherently 
liberating or oppressive and that “behoves us as practitioners not to blindly follow (or 
merely seek to refine) practice prescriptions, but rather to scrutinise the institutional 
and disciplinary knowledges by which we are positioned” (Kaye, 1999: 35). Thus, 
espousing the Foucauldian project, this study calls practitioners to consider the wider 






1.4.3 Foucault and Subjectivity. 
The last Foucauldian idea that is of analytic concern for this study is subjectivity 
and more specifically the ways in which various ASPD constructions make available 
certain subject-positions. From a Foucauldian perspective, people in general become 
subjected to socially constructed ‘objects’ of knowledge (Foucault, 1982) through 
discourse. Thus, it is possible the ways in which ASPD is constructed may influence 
how therapists think and practice with such clients, and thereby their subjective 
experience.  
More particularly, the Foucauldian subject is understood as being “subject to 
someone else by control or dependence, and subject to his own identity by conscience 
and self-knowledge” (Foucault, 1982: 781). In Foucault’s view, subject-positions are 
“positions from which subjects are authorised to speak, and which shape the 
discursive practices they express, the power relations they effect and forms of 
knowledge upon which they draw” (Schirato et al, 2012). Hence, subject-positions are 
made available through discourse, and when taken up there may be consequences 
for subjective experience (Davies & Hare, 1990; Hanna, 2014). 
For example, psychologists speak from a particular position of authority that 
legitimises them to express judgements about clients’ psychological experiences. 
Their discursive positioning may influence how they experience and relate to their 
clients as well as their professional identity. Hence the variable ways in which ASPD 
may be constructed may influence how PPs think, feel and relate towards clients 
labelled as ASPD and also how PPs think, feel and relate to their own selves as 
practitioners. This may consequently have implications for their therapeutic identity 
and subjective experience.  
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Furthermore, in a Foucauldian context, subjectivity is perceived as ever-
fluctuating and changeable (Foucault, 1980). A ‘subject’ can change its position by 
repositioning themselves discursively in relation to the ‘truth claims’ they speak of and 
thus, they can effect a changing relationship with themselves (Butler, 2005). Hence 
this study aims to investigate the therapeutic subject-positions that are made available 
discursively in the PPs’ therapeutic accounts of ASPD and highlight what is or is not 
made available through professional talk. It is proposed that by adopting such a critical 
gaze, the linguistic limitations and possibilities in relation to the ASPD construct will be 
exposed.  
While the interrogation of the connection between discourse and subjectivity is 
highly speculative (Willig, 2013; Hanna 2014), it is nonetheless seen as critical for 
understanding power relations, and thereby it is central in this thesis. The Foucauldian 
subject-positions will be further considered in Chapter Three (Methodology and 
Method) and in Chapter Four (Analysis). 
 
 
1.5 Overview of the aims and the potential contribution of this study 
In this introductory Chapter, I have discussed some of the concerns and 
challenges of the ASPD construct and I have made an argument of why the ASPD 
problem is worthy of being investigated. Additionally, I have argued that the aim of this 
study is not to uncover a truth or an objective reality about ASPD and the therapeutic 
practices related. Rather, this thesis will attempt to create a critical and reflexive space 
where multiple and diverse understandings of ASPD can be explored and possible 
power relations implicated within the PPs’ professional talk can be investigated.  
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Within a contemporary context where diverse and often competing expert 
knowledges influence psychological knowledge and practice, I propose that it is 
important for Counselling Psychologists, as well as all Psychological Practitioners, to 
consider and expand the possibilities and limitations of their position in the profession.  
BPS (2005) states that, 
It is the responsibility of all Counselling Psychologists to encourage and 
develop the philosophy of Counselling Psychology (p. 2). 
 
In addition, HPCP (2012) guidelines suggest that CoPs are expected to “reflect 
critically on their practice and consider alternative ways of working” (HPCP, 2012:13). 
It is my hope, that this thesis will encourage practitioners to think critically and think 
differently about the discursive influences they are subjected to as professionals and 
consequently how they come to influence their clients through their knowledge and 
professional standing.  
 
 
1.6 Introduction to the chapters of this thesis 
Having introduced the rationale, the main research question, the 
epistemological positioning and the methodological approach for this study, the 
following chapters will address specific issues to support the overall argument that 
was discussed above. In Chapter Two, I will critically review the relevant literatures 
adhering to Foucault’s genealogical approach to knowledge. In Chapter Three, I will 
discuss the poststructuralist epistemology and the methodology and method that were 
adopted to conduct this study. In Chapter Four, I will examine the research findings in 
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detail using an FDA approach to interrogate PPs’ ‘truth claims’ about ASPD and its 
therapeutic applications. Finally, in Chapter Five, I will conclude this thesis by offering 
a discussion about the implications of these findings and the contribution of this study 
in the Counselling Psychology as well as in the wider therapeutic community that is 



















ASPD understandings and therapeutic practices: A Genealogy and Critical 
Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction to Chapter Two 
Accounts of ASPD are ubiquitous and pervasive within the domain of 
Counselling Psychology and the aim of this Chapter is to explore the multiple 
constructions of ASPD as well as to problematise them within the context of 
psychological therapies and mental health.  More specifically a critical, discursive and 
socio-historical approach will be applied to: a) trace the pre-psychological ASPD 
understandings from the ancient times to the 20th century and b) critique contemporary 
constructions of ASPD drawing upon, psychodynamic, cognitive-behavioural and 
humanistic knowledges as these orientations are fundamental for most Counselling 
Psychology trainings in the UK (Woolfe et al, 2010). Furthermore, relevant knowledges 
such as the biomedical model, the DSM-5 (APA, 2013) and the social constructionist 
perspective will be considered. Exploring and critiquing these multiple knowledges of 
ASPD and the relevant therapeutic practices is a central objective of this thesis as 
Counselling Psychologists are trained and then practice within an integrative or 
pluralistic framework (Woolfe et al, 2010). 
 This critical inquiry of the literature will be informed by a Foucauldian 
genealogical perspective (Foucault, 1997b), which suggests that ASPD is seen as 
constituted in multiple and mutable ways through socio-historical situated discourses. 
More particularly, from a Foucauldian perspective, a genealogical inquiry uncovers the 
historical relationship between truth, knowledge and power (Schirato et al, 2012) and 
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is of great importance for this study. Hence, a main objective of this chapter is to 
explore the historic influences on the discursive formation of contemporary 
knowledges in relation to ASPD in order to “trace its decent” (Malson, 1998: 47) into 
its present ‘truth claims’. Such a genealogical method to knowledge focuses on the 
diverse conditions that make certain ideas possible or not possible (Foucault, 1977b; 
Hook, 2007), and thereby challenges prevalent contemporary norms. Thus, this 
particular genealogical inquiry aims to highlight the social constructed knowledges 
related to ASDP and reveal their contingency, as well as interrogate any possible 
power relations implicated in the various ASPD accounts highlighting what is produced 
as ‘true’ or ‘false’ and in whose interest.  
 
2.2 Pre-psychological accounts of ASPD 
 In this section, the pre-psychological constructions of ASPD and related 
practices will be traced back to the ancient times through to the Middles Ages, the 
Enlightenment Era, the 19th and 20th century. It is important to acknowledge that 
although this section is divided chronologically for structural purpose, there is no 
simple way to identify chronological stages as they “overlap, collide and reappear in 
different guises” (Rimke & Hunt, 2002: 61). Hence, it is expected that the conceptual 
shifts of ASPD through time may be blurry and not as clear cut as the chronological 





2.2.1 Ancient Mesopotamian and ancient Greek ASPD understandings and 
practices 
Modern medical and psychiatric conceptualisations of ASPD can be traced 
back to the early 19th century but there is very limited earlier literature on this topic 
(Bertman, 2003; Abdul-Hamid & Stein, 2013). Some historical and archaeological 
evidence suggests that early understandings of ASPD were evident in ancient 
Mesopotamia and ancient Greece. Apparently, the first account of ASPD is found in a 
series of cuneiform tablets known as Surpu in ancient Mesopotamia (Abdul-Hamid & 
Stein, 2013). Surpu was a set of religious incantations used by spiritual healers to heal 
the sick (Reiner, 1958). This healing took place through beseeching the Gods to 
“forgive and release the sick, downcast patient who suffers as a consequence of his 
moral or cultic offences” (Abdul-Hamid & Steiner, 2013: 674).  
 In this religious text, the sick was described by a list of antisocial traits and 
behaviours that seemed to be a close description of the current contemporary 
conception of antisocial and psychopathic individuals (Kinnier-Wilson, 1965). Kinnier-
Wilson (1965), an archaeologist writes about this Surpu text, 
 
here is the Babylonian psychopath - the pathological liar, the swindler, 
the kleptomaniac, the gossip monger, the social misfit, the sexual, the 
murderer - an unmistakable picture (p. 924). 
 
This religious text was studied and compared to DSM and ICD descriptions of 
ASPD (Abdul-Hamid & Stein, 2013) and it was concluded that there are striking 
similarities between the Mesopotamian and contemporary descriptions of ASPD. From 
a discursive and socio-historical perspective, it is particularly interesting that what 
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seems to have been described as ASPD in ancient Mesopotamia was understood as 
a spiritual illness, which suggested that antisocial individuals at that time were seen 
as possessed and thus in a sense evil. This discursive construction of ASPD 
authorised the institution of religion to make claims upon those seen as ill and evil as 
well as their ‘healing’ through spiritual practices, such as Surpu, perhaps a form of 
ancient exorcism.  
Furthermore, some descriptions of the characteristics that now inform 
contemporary conceptions of ASPD are found in Ancient Greece (Millon et al, 2003). 
Theophrastus (371 BC-287 BC), a student of Aristotle, who was well known for his apt 
descriptions of personality types (Chisholm, 1911), described in his book Characters, 
The Unscrupulous Man, seemingly a close description to current understandings of 
the ASPD. He wrote, 
The Unscrupulous Man will go and borrow more money from a creditor 
he has never paid…When marketing he reminds the butcher of some 
service he has rendered him and, standing near the scales, throws in 
some meat, if he can, and a soup-bone. If he succeeds, so much the 
better; if not he will snatch a piece of tripe and go off laughing (cited in 
Widiger et al, 1991: 63).  
 
Early Greeks also introduced the medical practice of Humorism, which not only 
replaced the ancient theories about demonic possession (Bennet, 2003) but also 
became one of the first systems to explain differences in personalities (Millon et al, 
2004). Hippocrates (460 BC-370 BC), the father of medicine, proposed that all disease 
(physical or mental) stemmed from an excess or imbalance among four bodily 
humours: yellow bile, black bile, blood and phlegm (Bennet, 2003). Hippocrates further 
identified four corresponding temperaments: the choleric, melancholic, sanguine and 
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phlegmatic that centuries later were associated with particular personality traits by 
Galen4 (Steiner, 2008). The most relevant to the genealogical inquiry of ASPD is the 
choleric temperament that was associated with irascibility, impulsivity, aggression, 
egocentricity (Eysenck, 1967; Childs, 2009) some of ‘prevalent’ characteristic in 
contemporary descriptions of ASPD. 
In contrast to the ancient Mesopotamian accounts, it seems that ancient Greek 
accounts described illness as having a biological base. In that context, different 
personality styles as well as difficulties were constructed as a problem of the body. 
The dominance of the medical discourse legitimised the ancient Greeks medical 
doctors to define personality health and illness and to perform medical practices such 
as bleeding and purging as a way of treating personality problems. Hence, the 
materiality of the body was privileged over the mind which seemed to be subsumed in 
the human physicality.  
 
2.2.2 Madness in Middle Ages (5th-15th Centuries) 
 Despite the paucity of historic evidence about ASPD descriptions, 
understandings and practices during the Middle Ages and the Enlightenment Era (see 
section 2.2.3), in accordance to the genealogical stance taken by this study, relevant 
knowledges and practices about madness and dangerousness5 during these historic 
periods are of immense importance as they might reveal some of the prevalent 
discursive resources that later informed modernist ideas about ASPD.  
                                                           
4 The choleric temperament was associated with irascibility, the sanguine temperament with optimism, the 
melancholic temperament with sadness and the phlegmatic temperament with apathy.  
5 See section 2.2.3. 
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Modernist discourses about madness accounts in the Middle Ages, highlight 
contradictions in terms of how madness was understood and managed during this 
historic period (Harper, 1997). Some paint a cruel, unreasonable and superstitious 
picture of medieval insanity perceptions and practices (Zilboorg, 1941) whilst others, 
including Foucault (1976), argue that madness was a ‘free trade’. Foucault (1976) 
writes in his earliest work, Mental Illness and Psychology, that madness in Medieval 
Times “was allowed free reign; it circulated throughout society, it formed part of the 
background and language of everyday life” (p. 67). Such contradictory accounts reveal 
the complexities of the historic influences on the formation of contemporary 
psychological knowledges.   
 In Middle Ages in Europe, where Christian society perceived the world to be 
under a constant struggle between good and evil, conceptions of madness were a 
combination of the divine, diabolical, magical and transcendental (Roffe, 2013). 
Christian formulations of madness saw it as a “moral malady” (Roffe, 2013: 27) or a 
punishment for a sin or a test of faith. Christian ideology endorsed spiritual remedies 
for madness such as fasting, prayer and exorcism (Laffey, 2003). Thus, madness at 
that time, was heavily defined and regulated by religion institution. 
 Despite the significant influence of Christianity on understandings of insanity 
this was not the only prevalent perception, especially in medieval England (Roffe, 
2013). There is remarkable evidence to suggest that a biological understanding of 
mental illness was also popular (Kroll & Barchard, 1984; Roffe, 2013). The medical 
practice of Humorism6 was still common during the Middles Ages and practices such 
as blood-letting and purging through laxatives were used to balance the bodily fluids 
                                                           
6 See Chapter Two Section: 2.2.1  
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in order to treat mental illness (MacDonald, 1981). The construction of madness as a 
body disorder also legitimised the regime of classical medicine to perform basic 
treatments - dietary, herbal and surgical (Clarke, 1975).  
The recognition of mental illness as a body disorder also enabled the state to 
intervene in the regulation and management of the mentally ill (Roffe & Roffe, 1995). 
Although in medieval England family was seen as the primary source of care for those 
deemed as lunatics, sometime during the reign of Henry III (1216 -1272) the crown 
assumed the right to guard the mentally ill, whose families could not look after (Roffe 
& Roffe, 1995). As historic critics argue, this was not a medieval welfare system but a 
“predatory feudal kingship extending its rights to wardship where personal service 
could not be rendered” (Roffe, 2013: 27). Perhaps this predatory nature of the crown’s 
interest in the regulation of the mentally ill was highlighted in the process of 
assessment which was open only to those who had personal or real estate.  
The historic landscape in the Middle Ages reveals that similarly to ancient times 
madness seemed to be defined and regulated by the dominant disciples of religion, 
classic medicine and, additionally, the state. Perhaps the domination of those forces 
was symbolised in the foundation of Bethlem (later renamed as Bedlam) in 1247 by 
Henry II, which was the first psychiatric institution of its time (MacDonald, 1981). 
Bedlam7, meaning chaos/uproar, possibly highlighted the chaos and uncertainty about 
madness and its management during these times. 
 
 
                                                           
7 ‘Bedlam’meaning chaos/uproar, is thought of having entered the English language coming from the hospital 
Betlem. 
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2.2.3 Madness and dangerousness in the Enlightenment Era (16th to 18th 
Centuries) 
 During the Enlightenment period a major intellectual shift took place: from 
religious orthodoxy to scientific inquiry. By the end of the 17th century and into the 
Enlightenment with the scientific discourse influencing the formation of new ideas, 
insanity was increasingly seen as an organic physical phenomenon rather than a 
spiritual matter (Porter, 2002). The humoral theory, that was prevalent for centuries, 
gave way to new systems of classifications and categorisations that constructed 
human experiences in its totality as an object of the uprising scientific discourse. With 
the scientific valorisation of objective reason or unreason, madness was objectified as 
a natural object worthy of study and treatment by the leading entrepreneurs of that 
time, the medical doctors. 
 Foucault (1961) himself, studied conceptions of madness during Renaissance, 
and argued that although the mad were depicted in art as possessing a kind of wisdom, 
the wider societal response to them at the time was that of confinement. Hence, the 
mad became outcasts to be marginalised. Foucault (1961) described this process as 
the ‘Great Confinement’ and wrote, 
...modern man no longer communicates with the madman [...] There is 
no common language: or rather, it no longer exists; the constitution of 
madness as mental illness, at the end of the eighteenth century, bears 
witness to a rupture in a dialogue, gives the separation as already 
enacted, and expels from the memory all those imperfect words, of no 
fixed syntax, spoken falteringly, in which the exchange between 
madness and reason was carried out. The language of psychiatry, which 
is a monologue by reason about madness, could only have come into 
existence in such a silence (p. 27). 
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Foucault (1961; 1976) saw the social forces as an extra-judicial mechanism at 
the forefront of confinement, that was legitimised and invested in order to eradicate 
the mad who in this process of exclusion they became the ‘other’.  
The ‘Great Confinement’ led to the management of populations through the 
birth of the asylums. Asylums were considered at the time as a significant advance in 
medical practice and a great ‘philanthropic gesture’ that promoted more humane 
treatment of the mad (McNay, 1994). However, in Foucault’s view, asylums constituted 
a more insidious form of control over the mad that was exercised through the 
deployment of a judgemental and moralising ethos (McNay, 1994). Foucault also 
argued that during the same time madness or mental disorder came gradually to 
include dangerous people which was not only significant in “the history of criminal 
psychiatry, but also for the history of psychiatry tout court and ultimately for the human 
sciences” (Foucault, 2003: 113). This shift legitimised the psychiatric domain to 
gradually establish its involvement in managing and treating not only the mad and but 
also the dangerous. 
This gradual convergence of concepts of madness and dangerousness is highly 
relevant for this study as it lays out the historical and discursive arena for contemporary 
ASPD psychological knowledges and practices. As David Jones (2016) writes in his 
book Disordered Personalities and Crime, “crudely put, the story comes down to the 
three diagnoses of ‘moral insanity’, ‘psychopathy’ and ‘antisocial personality disorder’” 
(p. 3). These three diagnoses came to prominence in the early decades of 19th century, 
the latter decades of the 19th century and the middle of 20th century respectively 
(Jones, 2016). Before critically reviewing these diagnoses, I will briefly consider the 
influence of the ‘public sphere’, the media and press, the legal system and the medical 
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profession in the eighteenth-century Britain on the formation of ideas about moral 
insanity.  
 
2.2.4 Madness in the 18th Century Britain 
 
2.2.4a The emergence of the ‘public sphere’ and the new social order.  
 During the eighteenth century significant social, political and economic changes 
took place in Britain. The urbanisation, the industrialisation, the development of 
capitalism, the increasing liberty of the press (Holmes, 1969) and the emergence of 
new social and political forces promoted increasingly secular understandings of 
humans and the world around them (MacDonald, 1981) limiting gradually the power 
of the religious discourse. In this new developing society, traditional values were 
questioned and new socio-cultural norms, attitudes and practices arose giving birth to 
a new historic era that of ‘modernity’ (Giddens, 1990; Porter, 2000).   
Habermas (1991), in his publication The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere, identified the origins of the development of the ‘public sphere’ in Britain during 
this time. He suggested that the socio-political and economic changes mentioned 
above as well as the increased freedom of the press and the growing bourgeois 
brought about a crucial transformation in how people thought about themselves and 
their worlds (Habermas, 1991). The relationship between the individual and the social 
world was reframed and at the same time ‘the mind’ came to occupy a significant place 
as an object of study (Jones, 2016). This reconceptualisation enabled the formation of 
more nuanced theories of insanity including that of moral insanity (Jones, 2016). 
During this time, the term ‘moral’, which was connected to ethical aspects or human 
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behaviour and the religious discourse, came to gradually encompass a more 
psychological meaning and more particularly the concept of feelings and affects at the 
end of the eighteenth century (Millon et al, 2003). This emerging ‘modern state’ 
required new understandings of individual psychology and new ways of relating to 
social order (Elias, 1994) and the development of the ‘public sphere’ enabled a new 
space for the dissemination and exploration of such new ideas. This meant that new 
and cutting edge psychological advances were explored and discussed outside of the 
private academic circles (Reed, 1997).  Hence, the ‘public sphere’ played a central 
role in enabling public discussions and debates that were essential in the emergence 
and construction of new ideas about moral insanity (Jones, 2016).  
 
2.2.4b The role of media and the press. 
 The development of diverse channels and forms of media communication 
impacted significantly on the construction of new ideas about sanity and insanity. The 
media and the press enabled the creation of a new ‘space’ where ideas about 
madness could be accessed easily and could also be discussed and debated. By 
reporting debates and legal cases about madness, criminal responsibility and 
physiology (MacDonald, 1988) they promoted and stimulated reflection on human 
nature and human society contributing significantly on the development of the 
‘plebeian public sphere’ (Calhoun, 1992: 38). These debates were further enabled due 
to the proliferation of newspapers and the publication of books (Black, 1987) as well 
as other intellectual advances such as the novel. For example, the development of the 
novel from the mid-eighteenth century encouraged the consideration and exploration 
of the human ‘mind’ and internal psychological life. As Jones (2016) argues the novel 
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became “a significant cultural vehicle that allowed for innovative ways of 
understanding individual psychology” (p.12). Hence, these intellectual and cultural 
advances cultivated a new knowledge space that forged an interest in understanding 
human psychology and at the same time allowed for the dissemination of such interest 
across communities. 
 
2.2.4c The role of the law and the medics.  
Within the emergent modern state in the eighteenth century, the development 
of a centralised and more specialised legal system that was able to intervene in crime 
as well as the growing interest in understanding various emotional aspects of human 
relationships encouraged the consideration of more subtle forms of insanity in the 
court (Jones, 2016).  The consideration of insanity in a number of legal cases at the 
time suggested that the legal system was positioned a dominant expert knowledge in 
this significant area at the time. Although there were medical professionals that 
claimed expertise upon insanity at the time, medical experts were not involved in court 
trails (Jones, 2016).  It was only in the nineteenth century that medical professionals 
claimed expertise upon insanity in the courtrooms (Porter, 2002). This shift coincided 
with the emergence of psychiatry that was not recognised as a medical specialism 
during the eighteenth century (Porter, 1987). Psychiatry as an emerging expert power 
offered a different approach to moral insanity and its treatment to the prevalent legal 
discourse of the time. The following section will consider the development of the 
psychiatric discourse and its role in the construction of new concepts of insanity such 
as moral insanity, psychopathy and finally antisocial personality disorder. 
 
 43 
2.2.5 Early psychiatric influences in early and mid-19th Century: The emergence 
of moral insanity 
 The birth of psychiatry as a medical specialism is located by many in the 
nineteenth century (Porter, 1987; Scull, 1979b; McCallum, 2001; Jones, 2016) and it 
was not until well in the nineteenth century that psychiatry was recognised on an 
institutional level (Jones, 2016).The medical advances during this time and the gradual 
displacement of the religious doctrine by the scientific regime warranted psychiatrists, 
“the entrepreneurs of the moral world” (Jones, 2016: 50) not only to define moral 
insanity but also to claim expertise upon the minds of the morally insane and their 
treatment (Watson, 2011). The development of moral treatment became a vehicle for 
recognising the emergent profession of psychiatry and at the same time established 
its power through the promotion of psychiatric expert knowledge in scientific journals 
and the widespread construction of psychiatric asylums (Jones, 2016).  
Philippe Pinel, a French physician, was closely associated with the 
development of moral treatment. It was his work (Pinel, 1801/1962) that contributed 
significantly to the connection of emotional disturbance to immorality (Augstein, 2003; 
Schirmann, 2013). His work described a form of madness referred to at the time as 
folie raisonnante and noted that some of his patients engaged in impulsive and 
destructive acts, despite the fact that their reasoning abilities were not impaired (Millon 
et al, 2003). Pinel’s concept manie sans delire, insanity without delusion, became 
highly influential and formed a base for contemporary understandings of personality 
disorders (Sass & Herpertz, 1995) and in particular ASPD (Horley, 2014).  
 Following Pinel’s contribution, Thomas Arnold and Benjamin Rush were the first 
to use the term moral insanity to describe madness as a result of a disruption or 
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perversion of emotions or moral sense. Rush (1812) wrote in particular about the 
perversion of the moral faculties and described cases characterised by clarity of 
thought in combination with socially deranged behaviours. He constructed these 
individuals as possessing “an innate preternatural moral depravity” in which “there is 
probably original defective organisation in those parts of the body which are 
preoccupied by the moral faculties of the mind” (Rush, 1812: 112). Rush was the first 
to turn Pinel’s morally neutral clinical observation of affect defects into a social 
condemnation (Augstein, 2003; Milon et al, 2003). He wrote, 
The will might be deranged even in many instances of persons of sound 
understandings…the will becoming the involuntary vehicle of vicious 
actions through the instrumentality of the passions. Persons thus 
diseased cannot speak the truth upon any subject…Their Falsehoods 
are seldom calculated to injure anybody but themselves (Rush, 1812: 
124).   
Furthermore, Esquirol’s work, a highly influential student of Pinel,  promoted the 
idea that “it was possible for acts of violence to be carried out by people who had all 
outwards signs of normality but were driven by some flawed belief or impulse” (Jones, 
2016: 55). Esquirol (1819) introduced the concept of monomania (from the Greek 
monos meaning, one, and mania, meaning madness) and described “a form of partial 
insanity conceived as a single pathological preoccupation in an otherwise sound mind” 
(Goldstein, 2002: 115). Esquirol’s (1938) theory of monomania suggested that a single 
behavioural disturbance could be the only diagnostic criterion for a disorder (e.g. 
pyromania, kleptomania, homicidal monomania). His work contributed significantly in 
the recognition of the psychiatric profession at the time (Goldstein, 1998). Esquirol’s 
concept of monomania  not only emboldened the scientific understanding of the mind 
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but also implied the need of medical expertise in order to detect this subtle 
manifestation (Jones, 2016).   
 At the same time, issues of monomania became prominent in Britain. The 
British physician, James Cowles Pritchard (1835) influenced by Pinel’s and Esquirol’s 
contributions,  was the first to formulate the concept of moral insanity. Pritchard’s moral 
insanity differed significantly from monomania or partial insanity. Pritchard (1835) 
suggested that the morally insane patients afflicted by this disease were defective in 
the sense that they did not have any sense of rightness, goodness and responsibility, 
and despite their ability to understand the consequences of their acts they seem to 
engage in repugnant social behaviours. He defined moral insanity as, 
a morbid perversion of natural feelings, affections, inclinations, temper 
habits, moral dispositions, and natural impulses, without any remarkable 
disorder or defect of the intellect or knowing and reasoning faculties, and 
particularly without any insane illusion or hallucination (Pritchard, 1835, 
as cited in Sass & Herpertz, 1995: 635). 
 
In Pritchard’s view, “these behaviours signified a reprehensible defect in 
character that deserved social condemnation” (Millon et al, 2003: 7). It is of great 
interest as Augstein’s (1996) observed that Pritchard developed such a radical theory, 
whilst he fostered a deep Christian belief/connection.  It is important to mention that 
Pritchard’s work was highly influential for the development of modern psychopathic 
constructs, especially in the UK where his definition of moral insanity led to the moral 
imbeciles of the English Mental Deficiency Act in 1913 and the moral defects of the 
Mental Deficiency Act in 1927 (Gunn, 2003).  
           The psychiatric influences described above meant that immorality was no 
longer understood as related to religion but as a mental disorder. The birth of moral 
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insanity suggested that moral disease was an “abnormal phenomenon to be mastered 
by rationalising science” (Rimke & Hunt, 2002). Thus, “immorality was transformed 
from sin to an effect of insanity” (Schirmann, 2013: 34), a process described by Rimke 
and Hunt (2002) as the “medical model of vice pathology” (p. 80). Foucault’s idea of 
‘dividing practices’ (Foucault, 1982), suggested that the diagnosis of moral insanity did 
not only serve the purpose of distinguishing those who posed a threat to social order 
rather it aimed to ‘divide’ such individuals from the populations at large. In a 
Foucauldian sense, ‘the clinic’ (Foucault, 1963) and ‘the prison’ (Foucault, 1977) 
became central power mechanisms in the segregation and regulation of populations.  
The dominance of psychiatry in the construction of moral insanity signified an 
important discursive and historic shift: from moral codes and the religious discourse to 
moral insanity and the prevalence of the medical discourse (Rimke & Hunt, 2002). The 
development of formal ideas of moral insanity, and related ones such as monomania, 
in the first half of the nineteenth century not only marked the birth of the psychiatric 
discipline but also enabled the emerging profession of psychiatry to assume a high-
status position in the criminal courts of that time by claiming expertise in detecting 
‘forms of insanity that damaged the capacity for affective, or moral, understanding’ 
(Jones, 2016: 16). For some decades, the psychiatric expertise was highly influential 
in a number of trials verdict in the UK (McCallum, 2001). However, the cases of 
M’Nagthen in 1843 and Townley in 1863 as well as the press responses and public 
opinion towards these criminal cases lead to the abandonment of the moral insanity 
concept in the criminal courts (Jones, 2016).   
  Following the ‘dislocation’ of the psychiatric expertise from the courtrooms, 
psychiatry turned its interest in developing classification systems by measuring and 
identifying criminal cases and types in the growing populations of prison and asylum 
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institutions (McCallum, 2001; Jones, 2016).  Within this developing essentialist climate 
of psychiatry, brain-based explanations for immorality came to light that promoted the 
idea that moral insanity was linked to brain dysfunction (Verplaetse, 2004). Moral 
insanity came to be increasingly seen as a form of genetically-inherited degeneracy 
(Verplaetse, 2004; 2009), reminiscent of the Darwinian construction of morality as a 
sign of complex species development. Hence, the discursive construct of moral 
insanity signified the medicalisation of madness and badness and legitimised the 
regulation of those determined as mad and bad by the psychiatric domain. A complex 
discursive transition has begun in this century: from sin to degeneration.  
  
2.2.6 Early psychiatric influences in the late 19th and early 20th Century: The 
emergence of psychopathy 
 With the prevalence of the medical discourse at the end of the 19th century, 
psychiatry positioned itself as “an active moral police force” (Rimke & Hunt, 2002: 79) 
in regulating individuals who struggled to govern themselves. In the UK, Maudsley 
(1874), a renowned British psychiatrist interested in the degeneration theory, 
developed the concept of moral imbecility (Maudsley, 1874) referring to a subcategory 
of offenders that was “marked by a defective physical and mental organisation…which 
really determines their destiny in life, being an extreme deficiency or complete 
absence of moral sense” (Maudsley, 1874: 32). Maudsley’s (1874) understanding of 
moral imbecility, otherwise known as criminal psychosis, suggested a genetic origin 
and imperviousness to punishment (Milon et al, 2003).  
During the same time, German psychiatrists established medical models of 
moral insanity, which were gradually replaced by psychopathy, described by some as 
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an elusive category (Lewis, 1974). A leading figure of that movement was Julius Koch 
(1841-1908), a German psychiatrist and philosopher, who coined the term 
psychopathic inferiority to include all mental irregularities or impairments crystallising 
his belief that the basis of any mental dysfunction was biological (Koch, 1891). Koch’s 
description of a series of dysfunctional long-term ways of being eventually became 
known as personality disorders (Horley, 2014) and formed the base for contemporary 
understandings of ASPD. Furthermore, the work of Adolf Meyer (1904), an American 
psychiatrist, added further to the medical discourse of psychopathy by introducing the 
concept of constitutional inferiority. Meyer (1904) aimed to separate psychotic from 
neurotic disorders and was convinced that although neurotic disorders were primarily 
psychogenic, the psychopathic disorders were inherent by physical defects or 
constitutional inferiorities.  
Towards the end of the 19th century, Pontoppidan’s (1895) theoretical 
contribution of abnormal personalities and the ‘anatomically degenerated’ man 
supported further the medical discourse of psychopathy. Additionally, Lombroso’s 
(1876) idea of the born delinquent as well as Gouster’s (1878) conception of stigmata 
enhanced the medicalisation of psychopathy. These concepts proposed openly a 
biological basis for immorality and according to some, they seem to correspond 
strikingly with the DSM-5 (APA, 2013) criteria for ASPD (Millon et al, 2003).  
At the turn of the century, Emil Kraepelin (1856-1926), a renowned psychiatric 
nosologist, wrote about psychopathic personalities (Kraepelin, 1907), which included 
akin features to what it is termed today as ASPD. Kraepelin initially identified four 
different psychopathic personality types (‘morbid liars and swindlers’, ‘criminals by 
impulse’, ‘professional criminals’ and ‘morbid vagabonds’). Later in his work, Kraepelin 
(1915) understood psychopaths as deficient in affect or volition and proposed two 
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broad categories: those of morbid disposition and those exhibiting personality 
peculiarities. The latter category included seven personality subtypes: the excitable, 
the unstable, the impulsive, the eccentric, the liars and swindlers, the antisocial and 
the quarrelsome (Kraepelin, 1915). Millon et al (2003) note that the last three subtypes 
possess features similar to current notions of ASPD.  
The British concept of psychopathy was shaped by Henderson (1939) who 
understood psychopathic states as a condition of constitutional abnormality. In 
contrast to the medical discourse, Henderson (1939) suggested that heredity and 
environment played an equally significant role in the constitution of psychopathy. 
Henderson’s (1939) work suggested that psychopathy was intrinsically social in 
nature. Henderson (1939) inheriting a social approach on understanding individual 
deemed as psychopaths wrote, 
Their story is often not listened to, or if it is, it is not given a great deal of 
credence; and in any case there is no provision, so why not lock him up 
in prison or hang him and be done with him? It is not to be wondered at 
that, under such circumstances, the aggressive psychopath becomes 
bitter, hates society and himself and attempts to square accounts by 
whatever impulses, for the moment, in the ascendant (p. 46). 
 
Another example of a social approach in constructing psychopathy was the 
term sociopathy introduced by Partridge (1930), an American psychologist. 
Sociopathy also suggested the social origin of the problem. Henderson’s and 
Partridge’s ideas about the influence of social environment on psychopathy perhaps 
formed the ideological base for contemporary social constructionist understandings of 
this problem. 
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Furthermore, post-World War I, Kurt Schneider (1923), an eminent German 
psychiatrist, advocated for a value-free approach to the psychopathy problem and 
defined abnormal personalities as statistical deviations. Schneider distinguished “two 
forms of psychopaths: those who suffer from their psychic abnormality, and those from 
whom society suffers” (Herpertz & Sass, 2002). He also observed that individuals that 
thought to have psychopathic traits did not necessarily become criminals but lived at 
large in society and were usually successful in political or material power (Schneider, 
1958). Schneider’s understating seemed to be close to contemporary conception of 
the successful psychopath further developed by Cleckley’s (1941), another 
psychiatrist. In his book, The Mask of Insanity, Cleckley (1941) offered a detailed 
description of the psychopathic personality who can be found outside of prisons and 
in highly successful and respectable positions such as businessmen, scientists, 
physicians and psychiatrists. Cleckley (1941) wrote, 
In these personalities…a very deep seated disorder often exists. The 
true difference between them and the psychopaths who continually go 
to jails or the psychiatric hospitals is that they keep up a far better and 
more consistent outward appearance of being normal. The chief 
difference…lies perhaps in whether the mask or façade of 
psychobiologic health is extended into superficial material success (p. 
198-199).  
 
These dominant psychiatric influences constructed a new understanding of 
psychopathy that included not only the typical criminals who break the law and end up 
in confinement but highly intelligent and ‘powerful’ individuals who were respected and 
praised by society.  
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The multiple constructions discussed above, reveal the historic shifts in the 
discursive development of ASPD. During this historic time, moral insanity gave way to 
psychopathy, which was mainly understood as having a biological basis. This 
construction legitimised the psychiatric regime to establish its involvement in the 
production of psychopathic subjects and their management. Hence, the dominance of 
the psychiatric discourse privileged a set of power relations where the ‘expert’ 
psychiatrists were enabled to make claims upon the minds of the ‘dangerous’ 
psychopathic individuals.  
Furthermore, psychopathy came to have a place in the 1959 Mental Health Act 
(Rollin, 1963). The problem of psychopathy and the detention of individuals that were 
deemed as psychopathic and dangerous raised debates as to whether psychiatry was 
to be solely responsible for making decisions for the treatment of such individuals 
(McCallum, 2001). After numerous debates, it was decided that psychopathy would 
be included in legislation as ‘persistent disorder or disability of mind’ which resulted in 
‘abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct susceptible to medical 
treatment’ (DoH 1959: Part1, Point4, as cited in Jones, 2016). The recognition of 
psychopathy as a legal category reveals the complex interplay between the dominant 
disciplines of law and psychiatry in claiming expertise in this significant area.  
At the same time the development of psychology as an expert knowledge 
domain, the formation of new psychoanalytic ideas in relation to psychopathy and 
criminal behaviour (Reich, 1925; Alexander, 1935; Karpman, 1941; Fenichel, 1945) 
and the social/interpersonal models of antisocial personality (Leary, 1957) gave way 
to the emergence of psychological discourses that would become highly influential in 
the development of contemporary ASPD understandings throughout the mid-20th 
century to date. The new psychological advances enabled psychological practitioners 
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to claim expertise upon ASPD and establish their own position of power within this 
significant area. It is important to acknowledge the power struggle that emerges for 
Counselling Psychology as an expert knowledge. Amongst other disciplines, 
Counselling Psychology seems to be engaging in a contemporary ‘battle’ vying for 
power, recognition and expertise in the ASPD area. The following section will discuss 
and critique some of significant psychological knowledge influences in relation to 
ASPD with a particular interest in their relevance to Counselling Psychology. 
 
2.3 Contemporary psychological constructions of ASPD  
 As discussed in Chapter One (see section 1.2), ASPD as a construct is 
relatively new and was introduced as an official diagnostic category in DSM-2 (APA, 
1968). This section will explore and interrogate contemporary ASPD psychological 
knowledges and practices beginning with the contribution of Freud and early 
psychoanalysts, moving to the cognitive behavioural theory, the biomedical model, the 
humanistic approach and finally the social constructionist paradigm. The various 
constructions of ASPD and relevant therapeutic practices will be considered and 
problematised in the context of Counselling Psychology.   
 
2.3.1 Psychodynamic Perspectives of ASPD 
 Psychodynamic theory as a knowledge domain is widely constituted by 
numerous theoretical perspectives. This subsection will consider some of the most 
influential psychodynamic perspectives on personality disorders and particularly 
ASPD, beginning with Freud, moving to Object Relations School and finally 
considering Attachment Theory. 
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2.3.1a The Classical Psychoanalytic View of ASPD. 
Freud’s (1856-1939) development of psychoanalysis, the ‘talking cure’, 
constituted a new and highly influential discursive field of its time and marked an 
important conceptual shift in the production of psychological knowledge and practice. 
Freud understood psychopathology as the conflict between unconscious drives and 
internal prohibitions of these drives (Yeomans & Levy, 2002). He proposed a structural 
model of the ‘psyche’ which was concerned with the development and disturbance of 
personality (Freud, 1923). Freud saw personality as structured into three parts: the id, 
ego and superego. The Id was understood as dominated by unconscious, primitive 
instincts, including the sex instinct (Eros) and the aggressive instinct (Thanatos); the 
Superego incorporated the societal values and morals which are learnt from significant 
others; and the ego was seen as developing to mediate between the instinctual id and 
the external real world, represented by Superego (Freud, 1923). Within a Freudian 
context normal development of personality “works towards the delay of self-centered 
immediate gratification” (Millon et al, 2004: 166) and in this process a well-developed 
superego constrains immediate gratification through the introjection of moral principles 
and values (Millon et al, 2004). 
Freud himself devoted little time and thought to understanding the antisocial 
mind (Meloy & Shiva, 2007) but he recognised that amongst criminals there are 
individuals who  
commit crimes without any sense of guilt, who either have developed no 
moral inhibitions or who, in their conflict with society, consider 




Freud (1928) further suggested that,  
Two traits are essential in the criminal: boundless egoism and a strong 
destructive urge. Common to both of these, and necessary condition for 
their expression, is absence, lack of an emotional appreciation of 
(human) object (p. 178). 
 
Many early psychoanalysts, inspired by Freud’s psychoanalytic theory wrote 
about delinquency and antisocial personality. Aichorn (1925) was the first analyst to 
examine delinquent behaviour and suggested that delinquency was a result of a 
defective superego and the individual’s failure to internalise parental norms and social 
values during childhood. Similarly, Abraham’s (1925/1927) analysis of an impostor and 
Reich’s (1925) impulsive character supported the same view asserting that the 
superego in antisocial personalities failed to restrain the id impulses and gain 
expression through the ego’s controls. Additionally, Alexander (1930; 1935), who was 
the first psychoanalyst to explore psychopathy and criminal behaviour, described the 
neurotic character which was seen as underlying psychopathic states. In Alexander’s 
view this character description demonstrated diminishing levels of ego’s ability to 
control unconscious impulses leading to antisocial and criminal behaviours.  
Hence, from a classical psychoanalytic perspective, ASPD is understood as a 
result of the interplay of id-ego-superego: the ego develops but the superego remains 
undeveloped. Instead the total personality remains dominated by the id and its 
pleasure principle (Fenichel, 1945; Friedlander, 1945). This psychoanalytic 
understanding of ASDP further suggests that defence mechanisms are sparse as 
antisocials are seen as impervious to shame or guilt (Stone, 1993) and rather 
characterised by a lack of conscience (Millon et al, 2004). Thus, the antisocial 
individual is objectified as egotistical, centered in his/her own immediate needs and 
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gratification, and totally dominated by instinctual forces. In a sense, the antisocial 
subject seems to personify the id; absorbed by its own desires, urges and impulses 
the societal standards and norms are irrelevant and unimportant.  
Classical psychoanalytic theory was mainly resourced by the medical model 
and it positioned itself to explain and ‘treat’ problems that were unresolved medically 
at the time. A classical psychoanalytic view of ASPD suggests a set of power relations 
where the analyst, the ‘expert’ (Foucault, 1980), could decipher unconscious 
intrapsychic processes and communication and interpret the hidden meaning behind 
antisocial behaviours. This assumes that the ‘expert’ can have an ‘objective’ opinion 
over the client’s experience who is positioned as unknown to themselves (Foucault, 
1982) and reliant to the analyst’s expertise.  
 
2.3.1b The Object Relations view of ASPD. 
 The Object Relations theory is a further development of the psychoanalytic 
Freudian theory. Object Relational theorists and clinicians, such as Ferenzi, Guntrip, 
Klein, Winnicott suggested a more relational view of psychopathology. This view 
emphasised that the unconscious drives “are not experienced in the psyche in a void, 
but in relation to a specific other, an object” (Yeomans & Levy, 2002: 76). The psychic 
structure is made up by basic building blocks of psychological structures termed 
internal object relations. Kernberg and Caligor (2005) write that, 
An internalised object relation consists of a particular affect state linked 
to an image of a specific interaction between the self and another person 
(e.g. fear, linked to the image of a small terrified self and a powerful, 
threatening authority figure) (p. 116). 
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In infancy, the internal world of a child is characterised by splitting. The child 
relates to internal objects as totally good or totally bad, oscillating between ideal 
providers to sadistic persecutors (Kernberg, 1995). With the support of caring others, 
in this instance mainly the mother figure, the child integrates split internal images and 
to ‘good enough’ other position, termed by Klein (1946) as the ‘depressive position’. If 
the individual does not manage the psychological integration then she/he remains in 
the split internal organisation, otherwise known as ‘paranoid schizoid position’ (Klein, 
1946).  
 An object-relational understanding of ASPD would suggest that “internalised 
objects remain part-objects in the sense that good and bad aspects are not integrated 
into a whole object or representation” (Meloy & Shiva, 2007: 343). Hence, the self and 
others are seen as either good or bad and this is maintained by primitive defences, 
such as splitting or projection identification (Meloy & Shiva, 2007). In such an internal 
psychic organisation, there is an absence of conscience and also complex mature 
emotions, such as fear, guilt, empathy, depression, sadness, loneliness, reciprocal joy 
(Kernberg, 1984). 
 More specifically within the object relations context, Otto Kernberg (1970; 1984; 
1989) reconceptualised ASPD and understood it as possessing fundamental features 
of narcissistic personality in addition to the unusual pathological sense of morality 
(Kernberg, 1989). Kernberg (1989) proposed a special syndrome, he termed 
malignant narcissism, also termed in the literature as the traumatic narcissist (Shaw, 
2014), that is characterised by a combination of the following: a) a narcissistic 
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personality disorder, b) antisocial behaviour, c) ego-syntonic aggression8 or sadism 
and 4) strong paranoid thinking.  
 Similarly, to the classical psychoanalytic perspective, this view of personality 
psychopathology and more particularly ASPD, assumes that the problem lies in the 
individual’s internal world. Although, this approach implicates relational aspects of 
personality development, suggesting that relationships with others play a significant 
role in human psychological health or disturbance, the phenomenon of ASPD is very 
much understood as a result of intrapsychic unconscious processes. For example, the 
ASPD individual is objectified as deficient in their ability to develop mature emotions 
or defences or is seen as stuck in an internal realm dominated by persecutory or 
narcissistic fantasies. As some object-relational clinicians claim,  
the central motivation of the psychopath is to dominate his objects. There 
is no desire for affectional relating. Nor reciprocal altruism. He operates 
from within a dominance-submission paradigm, and identifies in a 
conflict free manner with the predator (Meloy & Shiva, 2007: 339). 
 
I would suggest that this view is particularly damning, painting a demonising 
picture of such individuals. Such understanding promotes a deeply pathologising 
understanding of the ASPD individual, obscuring other possible understandings of 
ASPD that may be resourced from the social and cultural sphere. At the same time, in 
clinical practice, this view may suggest a set of power relations where the ‘good’ 
therapist may be objectified and ‘used’ by such clients precluding further consideration 
of the therapist’s influence on therapeutic interaction with clients deemed as ASPD.  
                                                           
8 Egosyntonic is a psychoanalytic term referring to behaviours, values, and feelings that are in agreement with 
the needs and goals of the ego, or consistent with one's ideal self-image. 
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2.3.1c The Attachment Theory view of ASPD. 
 Attachment Theory, was developed by the British Psychoanalyst John Bowlby 
and has become particularly influential on contemporary theoretical and treatment 
developments of personality disorders. Mentalisation-based therapy, which is 
commonly provided in the NHS and prison personality disorder services, is rooted in 
Bowlby’s Attachment Theory and will be discussed later in this subsection.  
 Bowlby (1950; 1969; 1973), inspired by ethology and particularly Lorenz’s work 
on the phenomenon of imprinting, conceptualised and researched human attachment 
behaviour introducing new and highly controversial psychoanalytic ideas at the time. 
Having taken a particular interest in Darwinian ideas about evolution, Bowlby saw 
attachment as a biologically-based behavioural system, which served as an 
evolutionary survival mechanism for protection of the infant by maintaining closeness 
to the caretaker (Coates, 2012). The infant’s expression of object-seeking through 
behaviours such as sucking, clinging, following and crying, aimed to bring the infant 
closer to the mother. According to attachment theory, it is during this early time that 
the fundamentals of object permanence and object representation are observed 
(Meloy & Shiva, 2007). 
 From this perspective, attachment is seen as a strong affectional bond present 
both in children and adults, and most human beings with the requisite biology and 
loving parents will develop secure attachments as they grow up (Cassidy & Shaver, 
1999). Bowlby (1969) identified pathologies of attachment which were typically 
labelled as: fearful, preoccupied, disorganised and dismissive (Meloy, 2002). The 
latter attachment style seems to be the most relevant to ASPD as it is characterised 
by detachment, apathy, lack of emotions, self-absorption, and preoccupation with non-
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human objects (Bowlby, 1969). Bowlby (1944) described this attachment style as 
affectionless psychopathy in a research sample of juvenile offenders and attributed its 
cause to constant maternal rejection. Further research has suggested that this 
pathology of attachment is correlated with conduct disorder and ASPD (Allen et al, 
1996). 
 Furthermore, Mentalisation-based Therapy (MBT), a modified psychodynamic 
psychotherapy developed by Peter Fonagy and Anthony Bateman originally for 
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) (Bateman & Fonagy, 1999), has taken an 
interest in conceptualising and treating ASPD. Similarly, to attachment theory, MBT 
offers a bio-psychosocial understanding of ASPD, which is seen as arising from an 
interaction between genes and the environment with a particular emphasis to 
mentalisation, the individual’s ability to think about his/her mental state as well as the 
mental states of others (Fonagy & Target, 1997). From this perspective, ASDP can be 
understood  
as a disorder of attachment in which genetic precursors interacting with 
early environmental adversity result in abnormal personality 
development, particularly in areas of affect regulation, impulse control 
and, […] the ability to mentalise (McGauley et al, 2011: 377). 
 
In this developmental model of ASPD it is suggested that the interaction of 
adverse environments with genetic predisposition results in pathological attachment, 
inability to self-regulate and mentalise (Fonagy, 2003b; Levinson & Fonagy, 2004). 
Hence, in this context treatment primarily aims to help the client regulate affective 
states and develop the capacity to mentalise. 
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 Attachment theory and MBT, as expert knowledges, seem to be resourced by 
a bio-psychosocial discourse. In this developmental model, ASDP is essentialised as 
a product of genetics-environment interplay, where the client is produced as caught 
up in this gene-environment adversity, unable to regulate themselves or mentalise. 
This positioning may suggest a power differential where the ‘expert’ who is seen as 
‘safely attached’, to use attachment terminology, and able to self-regulate and 
mentalise, as ‘knowing’ more about the client’s subjective experience of affect 
regulation. This may contradict the clients’ personal beliefs and experience of their 
predicament and how they can be helped, suggesting a power imbalance within the 
therapeutic interaction.   
 
2.3.2 Cognitive Behavioural Perspectives of ASPD 
 Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) is one of the major approaches taught in 
Counselling Psychology trainings and practiced by CoPs (Woofle et al, 2010). CBT is 
also directly related to contemporary evidence-based research and practice, it is 
commonly used in the NHS and it is the main treatment recommendation for most 
mental health disorders by NICE guidelines. Thus, CBT is important to be considered 
in this research as it constitutes a main expert knowledge that influences 
contemporary understandings and therapeutic practices of ASPD.  
 CBT is currently a broad developing modality, initially originated to A.T. Beck’s 
work in the 1960s and 1970s (Beck 1963; Beck et al, 1979). The ‘Beckian’ model of 
CBT has been dominant in the UK for the past 30 years and it is considered to be in 
the mainstream in this country (Westbrook et al, 2012). The core idea of CBT is that 
people’s emotional reactions and behaviours are strongly influenced by their thoughts, 
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beliefs or interpretations about themselves and the world around them, and that 
behaviour is seen as crucial in maintaining or changing psychological states 
(Westbrook et al, 2012). In this context, psychological problems or difficulties are 
understood as resulting from problematic interactions between emotion/affect, 
cognitions, behaviour and physiology. To understand and explain behaviour, the 
actual beliefs held by a person must be explained (Millon et al, 2004). Beck et al (1990) 
distinguished three types of beliefs: core (non-conscious, absolute views of the self, 
world and future), conditional (if-then statements) and instrumental (what one should 
do) beliefs. The CBT view of therapeutic change lies in altering problematic thinking 
and behaving patterns, which then enables emotional and physical changes to occur 
(Westbrook et al, 2012; Bennet-Levey et al, 2004). 
 From a CBT perspective, individuals diagnosed with ASPD are described to 
have a cognitive style characterised by deviance, egocentricity and impulsivity (Millon 
et al, 2004). Higher goals and moral constraints are thought to be absent or vaguely 
developed and the antisocial mind is understood as invested in immediate 
gratifications and sensation-seeking behaviours (Meloy & Yakeley, 2013). Shapiro 
(1965) proposed that consciousness in ASPD consists of discontinuous series of 
fixation and frustrations that lead to a lack of insight, poor behavioural controls and 
self-indulgent, predatory actions. This thinking suggests that individuals labelled as 
ASPD, are either unable to create actions-consequences mental models or are highly 
vulnerable to the influence of immediate gratifications.  Furthermore, from a Beckian 
perspective, antisocials seem to hold core beliefs that are organised around a need to 
see themselves as strong and independent (Beck & Freeman, 1990). The world is 
seen as a dangerous and hostile place that demands survival-oriented core beliefs, 
for example, “I must look out for myself” or “if I am not the aggressor then I will be the 
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victim” (Beck & Freeman, 1990: 5). Hence CBT thinking may suggest that these core 
beliefs reduce morality to ‘an eye for an eye’ situation where retaliation becomes a 
moral imperative (Millon, et al, 2004). 
The founding premise for CBT interventions (Marlatt & Gordon, 1985) is that 
the targeted behaviour in this case ASPD is “learnt, motivated, and reinforced by 
internal factors within the patient and external factors within the environment” (Meloy 
& Yakeley, 2013: 16). For example, internal factors may include thoughts, feelings, 
beliefs, and fantasies, and external factors can be alcohol, stimulants, weapons 
(Hunter and Love 1993), or an available pool of victims (Meloy, 1988). Thus, CBT 
typically focuses on attempting to modify the impulsive, egocentric, illogical and rigid 
thinking of individuals diagnosed with ASPD (Beck & Freeman, 1990; Freeman & Leaf, 
1989; Walters, 1990) as well as antisocial behaviours (Bandura, 1969). CBT is mostly 
provided in controlled environments such as correctional institutes and hospitals, as it 
has been suggested that successful treatment of ASPD can take place within settings 
where the individual’s resistance behaviour can be strictly controlled (Vaillant, 1975).   
CBT is undoubtedly a dominant expert knowledge that informs contemporary 
psychological practices. Within a society where positive psychology thrives and the 
need for quick explanations and solutions to psychological problems and difficulties, 
CBT offers a ‘viable’ option for many: change how you think, so that you can change 
how you feel and behave. From a CBT perspective, the ASPD phenomenon is reduced 
to problematic cognitions and behaviours mainly located in the individual who is 
perceived as dysfunctional. Although, CBT is a wide spectrum with the more 
contemporary end (Third-Wave CBT models) being influenced by humanistic 
perspectives (for example Acceptance Commitment Therapy) or mindfulness practice 
(Mindfulness-based CBT), it remains highly influenced by the medical model where 
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categorical binaries (such as normal/abnormal) localise psychological disturbance 
within the individual.  
Hence, it is argued that in a CBT treatment context of ASPD an ‘expert’ 
(Foucault, 1977) power dynamic may be mobilised, that enables practitioners to hold 
authority over the client’s thinking and feeling subjective experiences through their 
CBT expertise. As such, clients may be positioned as unaware of their own thoughts 
and feelings and the therapist as the expert who ‘knows better’, what needs to be re-
learnt and modified. I suggest that this way of thinking about ASPD, not only reduces 
human experience and promotes a ‘quick fix’ but it also precludes the consideration of 
societal and cultural influences that may inform both psychological knowledge and 
practice.  
 
2.3.3 The Biomedical Model of ASPD 
 Medical science and particularly neuroscience have become increasingly 
influential for various contemporary counselling and psychotherapy perspectives 
(Fuchs, 2004; Rizq, 2007; Cozolino, 2010). A biomedical approach to understanding 
personality disorders, and particularly ASPD, assumes that psychological experiences 
and problems have primarily an organic, biological base. The biomedical discourse of 
mental health, as discussed in the first section of this Chapter, stems back to ancient 
times and has formed a dominant expert regime that contributed to the medicalisation 
of human experience and suffering through time. Thereby, an exploration of such 
contributions is critical to be considered in this study. 
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 Biomedical perspectives argue that individuals who fit in the diagnostic label of 
ASPD appear to have inborn temperaments such as toughness, fearlessness, 
impulsivity, aggression and sensation-seeking (Millon et al, 2004). It has been further 
suggested that psychopaths, in particular, suffer from an innate inability to understand 
and express meaning of emotional experience even though they have a normal 
understanding of language, a condition term as semantic aphasia by Cleckley (1941). 
More recent research on exploring discrepancies in the language of ‘psychopaths’ 
(Hare, 1993; Williamson et al, 1991; Louth et al, 1998) as well as cerebral blood flow 
studies (Intrator et al, 1997) have supported Cleckley’s claims. Furthermore, some 
other biological traditions have argued that ‘antisocials’ have a great difficulty in 
physical arousal (Eysenck, 1964; Lykken, 1957), which is linked to their inability to 
appraise potentially dangerous situations.  
Neurobiological models of ASPD have proposed that antisociality is linked with 
the function of brain systems (Cloninger, 1987b; Gray, 1987), whilst neurochemical 
findings attribute ASPD to hormonal imbalances. For example, low serotonin levels 
have been associated with aggression, violence and impulsivity (Siever & Trestman, 
1993). Similarly, decreased levels of cortisol have been found in violent adult male 
offenders (Virkkunen, 1985). Additionally, it has been suggested that high levels of 
testosterone in the brain play an important role in aggression (Batrinos, 2012). 
 From a biomedical perspective, ASPD is constructed as a problem located in 
the body. This understanding not only privileges the idea that psychopathology has a 
biological base but also positions individuals who are diagnosed with ASPD as having 
ill bodies and/or ill brains, and in a sense as unable to escape their biological 
constrains. Furthermore, this thinking legitimises science, medicine and psychiatry as 
expert knowledges to have a central role in the management and treatment of those 
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labelled as ASPD. Perhaps an example of this legitimisation is the promotion of drug 
treatments that mainly target aggressive behaviour, hostility rates and cortical arousal 
(Markovitz, 2001; Sue et al, 1990) despite that “no biologic factor has yet been shown 
to be either a necessary or a sufficient cause of aggressive behaviour” (Berman et al, 
1997: 311). 
 The influence of the biomedical discourse, and more specifically the psychiatric 
discourse, on contemporary psychological knowledge and practice is undeniable. This 
kind of discourse has infiltrated the psychological domain particularly through the use 
of diagnostic tools in mental health settings. The most widely used diagnostic tool in 
UK, the DSM-5 (APA, 2013), is located at the heart of the contemporary mental health 
system and contributes significantly to the construction of mental health disorders 
through the categorisation and classification of symptoms. The most recent edition, 
DSM-5 (APA, 2013) defines personality disorder as, 
A personality disorder is an enduring pattern of inner experience and 
behaviour that deviates markedly from the expectations of the 
individual’s culture, is pervasive and inflexible, has an onset in 
adolescence or early adulthood, is stable over time, and leads to distress 
or impairment (p. 645). 
 
Specifically to ASPD, there is “a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation 
of, the rights of others that begins in childhood or early adolescence and continues 
into adulthood” (APA, 2013: 659)9. Hence from a DSM perspective, ASPD is defined 
in terms of standards of normality/abnormality producing as such binary 
understandings (‘either/or’). This perspective not only assumes that ASPD can be 
                                                           
9 See Appendix 1: DSM-5 Diagnostic Criteria for ASPD. 
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known empirically but also reduces significantly its complexity. These kinds of 
discourses have legitimised the development of positivist tools that can measure and 
thereby attempt to prove the scientific existence of certain antisocial characteristic. An 
example of this, is the PCL-R that was developed by Robert Hare (Hare et al, 1991; 
Hare 2003). PCL-R is highly influential and is widely used in mental health and prison 
settings to identify and measure psychopathic traits.  
 Finally, it is important to note that there are fundamental epistemological 
differences between the biomedical model and psychology, and more particularly 
Counselling Psychology, which is primarily embedded in humanistic values. Working 
with clients that are diagnosed with ASPD presents unavoidably a challenge for 
psychological practitioners as they are called upon to practice within competing 
ideological paradigms. Hence, psychological practitioners who draw upon the 
biological model or DSM understandings of ASPD may be subjected to essentialist 
and conformist views as well as be unknowingly confined within certain social, political 
or economic agendas.  
 
2.3.4 Humanistic Perspectives of ASPD 
 Humanistic therapies are a wide term that includes a number of different 
approaches to therapy that have as a common denominator a deep desire to respect 
the other as a human, who is seen as able to self-actualise, exist and experience the 
world authentically (Bozarth, 1998; Scharf, 1996). Amongst the diverse humanistic 
approaches, Person-Centered Approach (PCA), which can be traced back to Carl R. 
Rogers’ (1951; 1961; 1980) work, is the most influential and is widely taught in most 
UK Counselling Psychology trainings. Although it is acknowledged that the 
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contribution of other humanistic therapies is important, in this section I will mainly 
discuss and critique the PCA perspective on ASPD as the most relevant to the 
Counselling Psychology domain.  
 PCA takes a phenomenological approach to human experience and suggests 
that all humans have a unique capacity for reflective consciousness and a tendency 
for growth and self-actualisation (Rogers, 1951). From a PCA perspective, humans 
are seen as free, influenced by history and context but at the same time playing a role 
in who they are (McCulloch, 2012). The therapeutic relationship is understood as an 
integral component of person-centered therapy, with the therapist being driven by a 
deep respect for the client’s subjective experience. The therapist strives to facilitate a 
therapeutic environment embedded in the core–conditions (empathy-unconditional 
positive regard-congruence) (Rogers, 1951), which are seen as central to enabling 
therapeutic change, whilst listening, reflecting and avoiding directiveness and 
interrogation (Bozarth, 1998; Kirschenbaum, 2003; Rogers, 1951). 
 PCA also inherits a critical stance towards labelling as well as assessment and 
diagnostic processes (Sanders, 2012; Wilkins, 2012) which are viewed as highly 
problematic (Warner, 2012). McCulloch (2012) writes, 
From a PCA perspective, clients are accepted as individuals and 
diagnostic labels are not of psychotherapeutic concern. Rather, the 
unique understandings, experiences, desires and conceptualisations of 
clients are the focus in therapy sessions (p. 183). 
 
Therefore, in a PCA context, the label of ASPD poses a number of problems as 
it does not account for individual differences, it may provide inaccurate and generic 
descriptions of human experience and hence dismiss such clients (McCulloch, 2012).  
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Although, PCA (and psychotherapy in general), has been discouraged from use 
in ASPD treatment (Ruegg et al, 1997; Seligman, 1990), PCA research is arguing 
otherwise. PCA studies have demonstrated that person-centered therapy can be 
particularly helpful for highly defensive resistant ASPD clients in comparison to 
directive interventions (Beutler et al, 1991; Greenberg et al, 2000) and that it can 
generate substantial desired changes in ASPD pathology (McCulloch, 2000).  
There is no doubt that the PCA’s objection to mainstream psychiatric 
discourses is highly important as it offers new ways of thinking about human suffering. 
Although PCA provides an alternative option to the dominant expert medical 
knowledges in terms of understanding human experience, psychopathology and 
therapeutic change, it does struggle to consider certain aspects of human subjectivity. 
For example, Richard Worsley (2012) a person-centered academic and practitioner, 
has suggested that PCA struggles in particular with the concept of ‘evil’, which has 
been historically attached to ASPD understanding. Thus, this may preclude more 
complex understandings of such experiences as well as it may foreclose their 
exploration within a PCA therapeutic context.  
 Furthermore, although PCA is in accordance with the humanistic value base of 
Counselling Psychology (Woolfe et al, 2010) it has often been criticised for its 
simplistic understanding of human psychopathology. Perhaps, its phenomenological 
emphasis may debar the therapeutic exploration of certain aspects of human 
experience as well as relational processes that may be taking place beneath 
conscious awareness. Additionally, its idealistic position in relation to the power 
relations between therapist and client (therapist-client are seen as equal) may obscure 
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complex power relations that may be implicated in the therapeutic relationship, 
including the humanistic one too.  
 
2.3.5 Social Constructionist Perspectives of ASPD 
 Some contemporary psychological knowledges, that are located in the social-
constructionist paradigm, have contested and critiqued modernist, essentialist models 
of mental illness and disorders (Berger & Luckman, 1966; Harper, 1995; Parker, 1999; 
Marecek & Hare-Mustin, 2009; Sloan, 2009) challenging the individualistic and asocial 
character of mainstream psychology and psychiatry. These approaches argue that 
knowledge, including psychological knowledge, is always shaped by its social and 
cultural context. In this view, language is seen as central to the constitution of 
knowledge as it shapes “what we know, what we see, as well as what we can say” 
(Marecek & Hare-Mustin, 2009: 76). 
 Social constructionist approaches, challenge the modernist notion that 
personality is a static formation of human traits (Powell, 1984; Burr, 1995; Fernando, 
1995; Matthews, 1998). Rather, they understand personality as referring to  
socially produced aspects of identity and affective experience that 
impede self-reflection, agency, autonomy, mutuality, participation, and 
other capacities that characterise meaningful living (Sloan, 2009: 68). 
From this point of view, personality is constructed as something to be 
transcended. Therefore, personality disorder is not perceived as an enduring condition 
but as shaped by social and cultural influences (Burr, 1995) through interaction 
between the individual and the context (Powell, 1984).  
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Furthermore, it has been noted that the concept of personality reflects a 
historical form of individuality (Seve, 1978) associated with a particular order. Beck 
and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) suggested that there is a special form of regulation being 
established in society, where systematic problems are given less political responsibility 
and instead become more focused on personal failure. From this perspective, it could 
be argued that the use of personality disorder labels, such as ASPD, appoints 
responsibility for social problems onto individuals. Thus, social failures are ‘rebranded’ 
as personal failures to be treated, managed or regulated by those legitimised by 
society, in ASPD’s case, by psychiatrists and psychologists.  
A social constructionist view of personality disorder locates the responsibility 
for related antisocial behaviours outside of the human body and opposes the 
causation-objectivity approach and pathological focus of the medical model. Rather, 
responsibility is placed in the role of social and economic inequality and its contribution 
in the construction of madness and badness. Therefore, social constructionist thought 
challenges the power assigned to the disciplines of psychiatry and psychology in 
defining normality and abnormality, and thereby personality health or disorder, and 
their legitimacy in the regulation of human bodies and minds. This thinking aligns with 
Foucault's (1991b) theory of the progressive governmentalisation of the state, “moving 
from direct law enforcement towards indirect rule through inventing technologies for 
the regulation of conduct” (Quinney, 2011: 55).  
Such a perspective, not only moves beyond the causation-objectivity-rationality 
modernist values in terms of understanding personality disorder, and more particularly 
ASPD, but also urges for issues of social inequality and injustice to be considered 
seriously by professionals. Mainstream psychiatric and psychological knowledges 
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pathologise the individual and undervalue the complex interplay between risk, need, 
illness and offending (Quinney, 2011), obscuring as such the contribution of social 
injustice in the phenomenon of ASPD.  
Social-constructionist thought does offer an alternative to conceptualise ASPD 
moving beyond the individual realm and into the societal realm. From this perspective, 
perhaps a challenge that emerges in a clinical context is the diverse socio-cultural 
understandings that practitioners and clients may hold about mental health or illness 
and more particularly about ASPD. Taking into consideration the ‘pre-assigned’ power-
laden positions to psychological practitioners and the clients in a therapeutic context, 
expert notions of madness and badness - even though resourced from a socio-cultural 
perspective - may have a significant impact on the person’s subjective experience of 
being labelled as ASPD as well as the power games operating in psychological 
therapy. Hence, this study proposes that it is of critical importance to explore and 
interrogate psychological practitioner’s and client’s socio-cultural understandings of 
ASPD.  
 
2.3.6 The emergence of Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder in the UK 
 This brief section considers the emergence and importance of Dangerous and 
Severe Personality Disorder (DSPD) category as a contemporary construction of an 
extreme form of ASPD. DSPD was ‘invented’ by the UK government in 1999 as a 
response to intense press, public and political debates in relation to the high-profile 
case of Michael Stone. The DSPD program aimed to describe highly dangerous 
mentally disordered offenders that considered posing significant risks to themselves 
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and others and proposed how to detain and treat (Ascoli et al, 2011). This suggested 
that mentally disordered offenders were to receive special penal and treatment 
attention. The DSPD program is of high significance as it demonstrates how public, 
press and political views, beliefs in relation to mental health disorders as well as 
reactions to violent crimes related to mental health can affect public policy as well as 
treatment provision.  
 
2.3.7 Summary of the pre-psychological and contemporary constructions of 
ASDP 
 In this genealogical and critical literature review, various historic ASPD 
constructions were explored. The first section of this chapter focused on pre-
psychological concepts of ASPD from ancient times, through to the Middle Ages, the 
Enlightenment Era, the 19th and finally the 20th century with a particular interest in the 
historical and discursive development of the term ASPD and the early psychiatric 
influences on psychological knowledge. The second section, drew upon contemporary 
psychological knowledges (Psychodynamic, CBT, Humanistic), biomedical 
approaches and social constructionist perspectives of ASPD and highlighted the 
fluidity of these constructions as well as the power games implicated within the 
psychological practitioner-client interface.  
 Overall, it has been argued that ASPD is problematic and a hard to define 
concept; it is an opaque construct that carries social meaning. As demonstrated 
through this genealogical account ASPD has undergone a process of transmutation 
through time, where different disciples, such as religion, medicine, psychiatry, 
psychology and sociology shaped contemporary understandings. Additionally, this 
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literature review has proposed that various theoretical understandings of ASPD may 
impact on how ASPD clients are viewed and treated. Thus, this study will adopt a 
critical perspective aiming to unmask any possible power relations implicated in expert 
ASPD ‘truth claims’ in the participants’ accounts. The following chapter will introduce 




















Methodology and Method 
 
“People know what they do; frequently they know why they do what they do; but what they 
don't know is what they do does”  
(Foucault, 1982: 187). 
 
3.1 Introduction to Chapter Three 
 In this chapter, I present the post-structural methodology and the method that 
were employed to address the research question “How do PPs construct ASPD and 
what are the discursive power relations, if any, in PPs’ therapeutic accounts regarding 
ASPD?”.  As argued in Chapter One, a discourse analytic approach influenced by 
poststructuralist epistemology and more specifically Foucauldian ideas was adopted. 
I initially introduce FDA and its epistemological framework in relation to psychological 
research. I then present the methodological design and the FDA analytic steps. Finally, 
I conclude with addressing the researcher’s reflexivity and the criteria for quality in 
qualitative research in relation to this proposed study. 
  
3.2 Foucauldian Discourse Analysis in Psychology and its Epistemological 
foundation 
 In this subsection, I will initially discuss the poststructuralist epistemology that 
embeds this study. Additionally, I will further consider FDA in the context of 
Counselling Psychology and psychological research, and thus locate the proposed 
study epistemologically within the wider psychological research arena. 
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3.2.1 The Poststructuralist Epistemological Foundation. 
Poststructuralism is an intellectual movement that was inspired by a group of 
mid-20th century French and continental philosophers and critical theorists. 
Poststructuralism came to prominence in 1960s -1970s (Merquoir, 1987; Poster, 1989) 
as an extension of Structuralism and challenged the prevalent modernist ideas, which 
undoubtedly shaped the mainstream psychological theories and practices at the time. 
It challenged the post-Enlightenment essentialist premise that truth lies out there 
awaiting to be discovered (Loewenthal & Snell, 2003) and thereby questioned the 
‘taken-for-granted’ approach to the world and the notion that the explanation of social 
phenomena can be neutral (Gergen, 1985). Such approach postulates that “there can 
be no universal truths or absolute ethical positions [and hence] a belief in social 
scientific investigation as a detached, historical, utopian, truth seeking process 
becomes difficult to sustain” (Wetherall, 2001: 384).  
More particularly, poststructuralist thought rejected the essentialist 
assumptions and proposed that reality is always mediated by language. In this context 
language is understood as “central to the way we view the world and is seen as 
constitutive rather than as merely descriptive” (Harper, 1995: 3) always fluid and 
flexible. In such epistemological positioning, knowledge is seen as historically and 
culturally specific, sustained in social processes (Harper, 1995; Burr, 2003). Hence, 
knowledge is “not something that a person has (or does not have), but as something 
that people do together” (Burr, 1995:8). 
This study is located in a poststructuralist epistemology and therefore assumes 
that ASPD cannot be known empirically. Rather, it can be understood as a socially 
constructed concept that carries social meaning. It further assumes that knowledge is 
discursively generated and that there is not one objective ‘truth’ about ASPD and its 
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therapeutic applications. Thus, it is proposed that the analytic aim is to explore 
participants’ ways of talking about ASPD, which constitute multiple therapeutic ‘truths’ 
in the domain of Counselling Psychology. Furthermore, it is suggested that the analytic 
inquiry of this study will focus on investigating what may be enabled or constrained 
through the various ASPD constructions as well as what it is produced as ‘true’ and 
whose interest different perspectives may serve. 
 
3.2.2 A poststructuralist approach to Counselling Psychology and psychological 
research. 
Foucauldian-influenced Discourse Analysis was initially introduced to Anglo-
American Psychology in late 1970’s and was taken up in UK under the name of post-
structuralism (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008). The poststructuralist ideas 
unsettled the mainstream positivism in the Psychology domain and offered new tools 
to explore the link between language, subjectivity and psychological research (Willig 
& Stainton-Rogers, 2001). This turn to language was marked by the highly influential 
publications of Ideology and Consciousness (Adlam et al, 1977) and Changing the 
Subject: Psychology, Social Regulation and Subjectivity (Henriques et al, 1984), which 
critically interrogated psychological theories and their role in constructing the objects 
and the subjects, which they study (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008; Willig, 2013). 
Foucault’s ideas on meanings and constitution of knowledge suggested that 
“psychology actively constitutes a social domain” (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 
2008:5) and influenced highly psychological research. Walkerdine (1984) applied 
poststructuralist ideas in developmental psychology and child-centred pedagogy, 
whilst Parker (1992; 1994: 1999b) used the same ideas to engage with Critical 
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Psychology. Furthermore, Rose (1979) drew from poststructuralist thought and 
developed his idea of the ‘psy-complex’ (Rose, 1985), which offered a meticulous 
critique of the psychological apparatus. Finally, Willig’s (1998; 2008) work on 
discourse and health practices led to the development of a six stage FDA model, which 
informs the analysis of this study (see section 3.4). 
From a psychological perspective, FDA is located in the Social Constructionism 
paradigm (Gergen, 1973; 1985) and more specifically, it is informed by a 
poststructuralist epistemology. In particular, the Foucauldian perspective that informed 
this study is positioned in the Discourse Analytic arena. Discourse Analysis (DA) is “an 
umbrella term for a number of different approaches to language” (Harper, 1995: 2) and 
it aims to provide insight to the functioning of bodies of knowledge and the 
power/knowledge nexus without claiming generalisability to other contexts (Cheek, 
1997). In contrast to other DA analytic perspectives which adopt a ‘bottom-up’ 
approach (Potter & Wetherell, 1987) focusing on action orientation (Henriques et al, 
1984) and on how language is used to manage stake in social interactions (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1995), FDA is a ‘top-down’ approach that focuses, 
 
on issues of power, ideological practice and social process and typically 
draws upon analytical concepts of discursive regimes, interpretative 
repertoires, cultural narratives and subject positions to highlight the ways 
in which people are spoken through or by discourses (Edley & Wetherell, 
1997: 205). 
 
Thus, this study takes a ‘top-down’ Foucauldian approach taking into 
consideration the wider socio-political implications of talk and how people (in this 
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instance the participants) may become variously subjected to circulating discourses 
and discursive power relations (O’Callaghan, 2010). 
 Considering FDA as the chosen methodology for this study, it is important to 
acknowledge that although Foucault developed a methodological approach to 
research (archaeological and genealogical approaches), he did not prescribe a 
method for conducting discourse analysis. He was opposed to a prescriptive method 
(Graham, 2005) and stated, “I take care not to dictate how things should be” (Foucault, 
1994: 288). Although Foucault has been fiercely criticised for not offering a concrete 
method (Harwood, 2000; Tamboukou, 1999) he did indeed remain committed to the 
postmodern ideological premise that there is not a universal truth to be discovered 
thus nor a certain method to go about unravelling the discovery of such ‘truth’. 
However, some contemporary Foucauldian researchers have endeavoured to outline 
why FDA is of interest for psychologists (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008) and have 
stipulated that FDA: a) begins with a historic inquiry of the topic studied (see Chapter 
Two), b) it moves towards the mechanisms of power that unravel between objects and 
subjects (see Chapter Four) and c) finally turns its focus to how subjects position 
themselves or are positioned in power relations (see Chapter Four). 
  In conclusion, FDA was chosen as the most appropriate method for this study 
because the analytic interest attends to unmasking the various objectifications of 
ASPD that are worked up in the participants’ professional talk, the participants’ 
positioning in relation to ASPD and its clinical applications and finally any possible 
discursive power games that may be implicated in participants’ accounts. Hence, the 
analytic process will focus on what participant’s ‘real talk’ does (Arribas-Ayllon & 
Walkerdine, 2008) and how the participants position themselves or are positioned in 
discursive power relations. 
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3.3 Methodological Design 
 In this section, the methodological design will be presented. The research 
proposal, ethics, pilot interviews, participants and data collection will be discussed. 
Also, the analytic steps adopted to produce the findings of this research will be 
outlined. 
 
3.3.1 Research Proposal and Ethics. 
 The proposal for this research project was submitted on the 31st of March 2014 
and was successfully approved on the 8th of April 2014 by the University of 
Roehampton’s Psychology & Social Sciences Research Student Review Board 
(RSRB). After the successful approval of the research proposal this research project 
was submitted for ethical consideration under the reference PSYC 14/ 136 and was 
approved under the procedures of the University of Roehampton’s Ethics Committee 
on 2nd of October 2014. 
 The conduct of this study abided by the British Psychological Society Code of 
Ethics and Conduct (BPS, 2009) as well as the University of Roehampton Code of 
Good Research Practice (University of Roehampton, 2010). In order to establish high 
standards of ethical practice the following issues were considered carefully and 
thoroughly: 
• Confidentiality and Anonymity: Pseudonyms were used in the presentation 
of this analysis and all identifiable information were omitted. Participants were 
also advised to protect the confidentiality and anonymity of any client and 
organisational identifiable information.  
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• Raw Data: The audio-recordings and transcriptions were stored accordingly to 
the Data Protection Law and the files will be destroyed after 10 years as per 
requirements of BPS’s guidelines for ethical conducting of research (BPS, 
2009).  
• Informed Consent: All participants signed a consent form (see Appendix 6), 
which informed them of their rights of confidentiality and freedom to withdraw 
from this research if they wished.  
• Debrief Process: At the end of the interview participants were given a debrief 
form (see Appendix 7) to ensure the professionalism and the ethical conduct of 
the interview. The form provided the researcher’s contact information as well 
as the professional contact details of the Director of Studies and the Head of 
Psychology at the University of Roehampton. No concerns have been reported.  
• ID Numbers: ID numbers were given to all participants which were used to 
label the audio-recordings, transcriptions, electronic and hard files. The original 
consent forms, debrief forms and the list with the ID numbers were stored 
separately and securely to avoid any cross-identification.   
 
3.3.2 Pilot Interviews. 
 After having obtained ethical approval for the conduct of this research, two pilot 
interviews were conducted to ensure that the research questions generated rich 
accounts in an ethical way. Feedback was obtained and discussed after each pilot 
interview. In both interviews, “How do you understand Antisocial Personality 
Disorder?” generated a valuable discussion around diagnosis and labelling and its 
links to clinical practice. Also, “how do you work therapeutically with individuals who 
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have been given the diagnosis of ASPD?” led to a rich discussion of the practitioner’s 
therapeutic role. The material that derived by the pilot interviews was used to form the 
final research questions. 
 
3.3.3 Participants. 
 Recruitment of participants started in late October 2015 after the successful 
approval of the Ethics application. A number of organisations were approached using 
the Research Letter (see Appendix 3) and the Research Leaflet (see Appendix 4). 
However, the recruitment of participants via this route was not successful. In January 
2015, I was invited to talk about my research project with the view of recruiting 
participants in a small conference for ASPD and also a Forensic Forum. Five research 
participants signed up as a result of both presentations. The remaining five participants 
were recruited through snowballing (see Appendix 8: Participant Flow Chart).  
The inclusion criteria for participants were the following: participants had to be 
qualified and accredited psychological practitioners (Counselling or Clinical 
Psychologist or Psychotherapists) trained in the UK, with self-identified experience of 
working clinically with individuals who had an official diagnosis of ASPD. In the end, 
three Counselling Psychologists, four Clinical Psychologists and three 
Psychotherapists were recruited all trained at various UK training bodies. Although 
small studies employing FDA usually strive to recruit a homogenous group of 
participants, due to the dearth of CoPs working with ASPD, pragmatically I recruited 
other psychological practitioners. 
 At the interviews, participants were asked demographic questions related to 
their training and clinical experience (see Appendix 9: Demographics Table). This data 
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was considered in order to offer a context to the participants’ accounts. Seven out of 
ten participants identified as integrative practitioners with emphases in various 
theoretical perspectives, whilst one of them mentioned that she was pursuing further 
psychodynamic training at the time of the interview. The remaining three participants 
identified as psychodynamic practitioners. All participants had clinical experience in 
NHS medium secure units and/or prison settings. Also, some participants had clinical 
experience working in community services, universities, corporate environments and 
private practice. The contextual influences seemed to be of significant analytic interest 
and they will be further discussed in Chapter Four and Chapter Five as appropriate. 
Finally, all participants expressed an interest in ASPD and its clinical applications and 
wanted to contribute to research. Possible implications of demographics of the 
participants are addressed in Chapter Four and Chapter Five as relevant. 
 
3.3.4 Data Collection. 
Semi-structured interviews were used to elicit the participants’ accounts for this 
study. Semi-structured interviews are the main tool of data collection and data 
generation in discourse analysis (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Willig, 2008; Willig, 2013). 
The purpose of this type of interview is to gain access to systems of beliefs, practices 
and constructs of knowledge in specific settings (Potter & Hepburn, 2005). According 
to the FDA guidelines described by Parker (1992) and Willig and Staninton-Rogers 
(2001), a sample size of ten participants it is appropriate and should generate 
sufficiently rich accounts in order to conduct the analysis. 
Interviews varied from 45 to 90 minutes and were audio-recorded. Seven 
interviews took place at the location at the participant’s place of work. The remaining 
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three interviews took place at a professional room arranged by the researcher. All 
interviews were transcribed by the researcher to ensure confidentiality. A copy of the 
interview transcription was send to the relevant participant. None of the participants 
reported any concerns about the transcriptions. 
The semi-structured interviews invited participants to talk about their 
understanding, knowledge and views of ASPD as well as how they worked 




a. Could you tell how you have come to work in this specific clinical field? 
b. How do you understand/ conceptualise ASPD? 
c. How do you work therapeutically with ASPD? 
d. Could you give me some specific examples? 




Throughout the interviews, a number of client, organisational and team cases 
surfaced. All of those examples were explored ensuring confidentiality and anonymity. 
As a researcher, I endeavoured to remain close to the poststructuralist epistemology 
without directing the participants talk but at the same time it was of great significance 
to ask questions in an ethical manner to elicit participants’ ‘truth claims’ and ‘real talk’. 
During the interviews I pursued professionalism, curiosity and openness to facilitate 
the participants’ sharing of their knowledge, understanding, practices and 
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experiences. No problems occurred during the interviews and none of the participants 
raised any concerns in relation to the conduct of the interviews. 
 
3.4 The Analytic Steps 
In this section I will describe the FDA analytic steps taken to carry out the 
analysis of the data. Firstly, I started the analytic process by engaging with the 
transcribed text (Arribas-Allyon & Walkerdine, 2008). Guided by the research question, 
I focused on how ASPD was ‘talked about’ or ‘worked up’ as a mental health construct. 
Secondly, in order to grasp the volume and the breadth of the data I created tables 
with the different themes that emerged for example, ASPD objectifications, challenges 
in clinical practice, clinical possibilities and contextual influences. Finally, Willig’s 
(2013) six-step guidelines were used as a framework to analyse my data. Willig’s six-
stage FDA guide condensed successfully Parker’s (1992) 20 stages to six without 
compromising its analytic strength. More specifically these six steps included: 
discursive constructions, discourses, action orientation, subject positions, practice and 
subjectivity and aimed to a thorough and systematic approach to the data. Following 
these steps are presented in more detail. 
  
• Step 1: Discursive Constructions 
Initially, the analytic process identified how ASPD was constructed as a 
discursive object. Explicit and implicit references to the discursive object were coded, 
which highlighted the subtleties of these constructions. A number of different 
objectifications of ASPD were identified that were relevant to psychological 
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knowledges and practices. For example, I noticed that many participants talked about 
ASPD as a problem located in the individual. 
 
• Step 2: Discourses 
Following, the analysis progressed to focusing on how ASPD was constructed 
in multiple ways. Through investigating different ways in which ASPD was constructed 
it became possible to illustrate the different discourses on which the research 
participants drew upon to formulate ASPD as a recognisable (Butler, 1997a) “object 
of discourse” (Foucault, 1972: 50). Separate tables were created gathering the various 
constructions that seemed to substantiate the participants ‘truth claims’ in relation to 
ASPD. For example, some accounts objectified ASPD as a psychiatric construct while 
others challenged the opacity of the ASPD construct. 
 
• Step 3: Action Orientation 
At this step, my focus shifted on interrogating ‘what’ was enabled or constrained 
when ASPD was constructed in specific ways in specific times in the text. For example, 
issues of defining ASPD, identifying challenges and possibilities in clinical practice as 
well as negotiating issues of power were highlighted. 
 
• Step 4: Therapeutic Subject-Positions 
In step four, emphasis was given on the therapeutic subject-positions that were 
made available through the discursive resources. More specifically, I explored how the 
participants became variously subjected to different therapeutic subject-positions in 
relation to the construct of ASPD and how these positions seemed to enable or disable 
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ways of talking, feeling and relating to ASPD. For example, some participants talked 
about ASPD from a position of expert whilst others seemed to form resistances against 
expert knowledges. 
 
• Step 5: Practice 
At this stage, the attention was directed to the relationship between discourse 
and practice and to what can or/and cannot be said from various subject positions. For 
example, I became particularly interested in what was enabled or constrained in ASPD 
therapeutic practice accounts. 
 
• Step 6: Subjectivity  
This final step was concerned with the connection between discourse and 
subjectivity. The discourses, the relationship between ASPD objectifications and the 
therapeutic subject-positions were examined to highlight the potential implications for 
those involved. This final stage is highly speculative (Wllig, 2013, Hanna, 2014) but it 
strives to identify “what can be felt, thought and experienced from within various 
subject positions” (Willig, 2008: 117). 
 
 In addressing the research question, I focused on the participants’ therapeutic 
subject-positions, including the discursive resources they drew upon to generate their 
‘truth claims’ as well as the ways these positions were managed through their talk. By 
turning my focus on power relations operating in these participants’ talk and using 
more particularly Willig’s (2013) FDA guideline steps 4, 5 and 6 five distinct therapeutic 
subject-positions were identified, which will be discussed in Chapter Four. It is 
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suggested that the therapeutic subject-positions identified encompassed qualitative 
differences in terms of power relations implicated in therapeutic talk.  
Upon identification of these therapeutic subject-positions, excerpts were 
selected to represent the talk from each therapeutic subject-position. All ten 
participants’ accounts were analysed, but nine of those were considered and 
represented in the final write-up. It is acknowledged that some participants were 
represented more than others due to their rich and fluent accounts that captured 
certain ideas of interest more concisely and succinctly. As a researcher, I recognise 
that the analytic process is highly influenced by my own subjectivity as a 
psychotherapeutic counsellor and a trainee counselling psychologist. My thoughts and 
reflections on my own positioning are considered in the following section. 
 
3.5 Researcher’s Reflexivity 
 The acknowledgment of the researcher’s influence on the research process “as 
a person (personal reflexivity) and as a theorist/thinker (epistemological reflexivity)” 
(Willig, 2013: 25) is central in the qualitative inquiry.  Finlay and Gough (2003) 
underline the significance of exploring the influences that shape the generation of 
research accounts, while Fine (1992) stresses out the importance of “positioning the 
researchers as self-conscious, critical, and participatory analysts, engaged with but 
still distinct from our informants” (p. 220). Hence, in the process of dealing with the 
influence of assumptions, qualitative researchers attempt to approach their research 
practice reflexively (Morrow, 2005).  
More specifically, from a poststructuralist epistemological perspective, the idea 
that the researcher can be disentangled and set-apart from the research through 
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reflexivity is questioned (Finlay & Gough, 2003). On the contrary, the identity of the 
researcher is seen to be ever fluctuating, multiple and incomplete (O’Callaghan, 2010).  
In Foucauldian terms, reflexivity can be understood as a surveillance practice 
(Foucault, 1977) through which subjects come to self-regulate towards standards and 
practices. Hence, in this epistemological context it is not only important to be reflexive 
but to be critical of one’s reflexivity (Butler, 2005). Foucauldian critique as a virtue 
(Foucault, 1978b) is concerned with questioning one’s reflexivity, one’s subject-
position in the research, one’s attempt to challenge discursive norms and expose the 
limitations of the established order of things that subjects – including the researcher- 
are constituted (Butler, 2000). As a result, considering the poststructuralist view of 
reflexivity, I discuss some of the influences that motivated this study.  
During my Diploma studies in Counselling and Psychotherapy I started working 
as a support worker in the homelessness sector with adults with a long history of 
offending and substance misuse. This was my first encounter with antisocial 
presentations in my capacity as a professional. In the first year of my PsychD 
Counselling Psychology studies, I was offered a job opportunity in an innovative 
housing project that aimed for the reduction of offending and the rehabilitation of 
offenders in one of the most deprived London areas. This professional experience 
gave me the chance to familiarise with the criminal justice system and work closely 
with forensic and psychology services in an effort to support my clients to ‘re-integrate’ 
in the community. It was at this point that I was confronted with the official label of 
ASPD. 
 Working with individuals that had been extensively involved with forensic 
services and fitted the DSM description of ASPD, I became curious of how the notion 
of antisociality was understood as well as dealt with both by services providers and 
 89 
service users. I found myself working in a context where different notions of madness 
and badness, such as ‘being antisocial’, ‘not conforming with social norms’, ‘being 
violent’, became part of my daily working routine. Observing as well as participating in 
the delivery of a service that aimed to decrease antisocial behaviours a number of 
questions were born: What was ASPD? What were we really trying to manage as a 
project?  And, whose interest were we really serving? Although I never reached 
definite answers, these questions, brought me face to face with the complexity of the 
ASPD problem and the intricacy of the power dynamics implicated in services that are 
directly involved with the management of such problem.  
 Additionally, whilst I was conceptualising my research project I began working 
as a counselling assessor in one of the most deprived London boroughs. During this 
work experience I became interested in the impact of wider societal influences on 
therapy as a practice. I soon realised that the practice of therapy was mediated by the 
context it was provided in. Decisions about funding, management of services, actual 
delivery of therapeutic practices, promotion of certain therapy models in comparison 
to others, professional titles, issues around diagnosis and treatment contributed to the 
formation of a wider socio-political discursive arena within which therapeutic practices 
were performed. This experience forged further my curiosity about the influences of 
the social on the psychological and shaped greatly the motivations of this study. 
 Finally, during the course of this study, I became aware of my own limitations 
of understating ASPD. I came to recognise that I was positioned as resistant to this 
particular diagnosis, yet I had very little resources to understand ASPD other than the 
DSM-5 and the theories of psychopathology. While I was preparing this research 
proposal, I became acquainted with a whole new set of ideas embedded in social 
constructionism. During this phase as a developing researcher, my ideas and beliefs 
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about therapy as a practice were unsettled and I found myself having to navigate 
through multiple and often competing ideas about ASPD knowledges and practices; a 
process quite challenging yet incredibly enriching.  
Concluding, in this study reflexivity is informed by poststructuralist thinking and 
aims to expose the limitations of the established order of things by which subjects, 
including the researcher, are constituted. Hence, the consideration of the influences 
discussed above are of great importance as they reveal the possibilities as well as 
limitations of my positioning as a researcher. A critique of my own reflexivity will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Five (see section 5.3.4). 
 
3.6 Criteria for quality in qualitative research  
Establishing criteria for the quality and the “goodness” (Morrow & Smith, 2000) 
of qualitative research has been a central inquiry for qualitative methodologists (Seale, 
1999). A number of criteriologists (LeCompte & Goetz, 1982; Kirk & Miller, 1986; 
Altheide & Johnson, 1994; Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Patton, 2002) have endeavoured to 
set criteria for quality in qualitative research in different paradigms in an effort to 
improve qualitative research practice. In contrast to modernist approaches that focus 
more on the scientific terms of validity and reliability, as a way of testing the quality of 
quantitative research (Seale, 1999), qualitative approaches do not follow the classic 
scientific criteria as they are inspired by different ontological and epistemological 
assumptions. The Qualitative inquiry does not seek universal truths or objective, 
generalisable results but it is concerned with knowledge as context dependent 
(Hollway, 2007).  
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 Adhering to the post-modern paradigm this study does not follow the classic 
scientific quality criteria (for example reliability and validity) that are applied in 
quantitative studies. From a poststructuralist angle the quality of research is concerned 
with “sensitivity to the context”, “rigour”, “coherence” (Yardley, 2000) and “authenticity” 
(Morrow, 2005). More specifically, FDA is not concerned with accuracy of the 
discourses as they are viewed as historically and socially bound. FDA does not 
assume that the researcher can be objective, but that he/she is interlinked closely with 
the research. The search for big truths claims becomes irrelevant and  
the search for clarity and simplicity of meaning is seen as illusory because 
there will always be other perspectives from which to interpret the material 
under review. To seek a definitive account is, thus, a misguided 
undertaking (Humes & Bryce, 2003:180). 
 
I suggest, that I have endeavoured to achieve this throughout this research 
process and account. Applying thoughtful and rigorous consideration for the subject 
studied (see Chapter One and Chapter Two) and following closely the epistemological 
ideas for the method of this study (see Chapter Four and Chapter Five) has been the 










“[power is] never localised here or there, never in anybody’s hands, never appropriated as 
commodity or a piece of wealth. Power is exercised through a net-like organization. And not only 
do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously 
undergoing and exercising this power. They are not only its inert or consenting target: they are 
always also the elements of its articulation.”  
(Foucault, 1980: 98)  
 
4.1 Introduction to Chapter Four 
 This chapter presents the results of the analysis which is offered as one reading 
of many possible and focuses on some of the ways these research participants, as 
psychological practitioners (PPs), construct and work therapeutically with Antisocial 
Personality Disorder (ASPD). It also addresses how they discursively position 
themselves or are positioned in particular power related regimes. As noted in Chapter 
Three 10 PPs were interviewed about their understanding, views and clinical 
experience with ASPD and five distinct therapeutic subject-positions were produced 
from these participants’ accounts entitled as: “Dangerous to Know”, “Damaged 
Goods”, “The White Collar Psychopath”, “Resisting to Psychiatric Norms” and “Critical 
Questioning”, summarised in Table 1 below. These therapeutic subject-positions were 
defined by the ways these PPs ‘talked’ and produced ‘truth claims’ about ASPD and 
its clinical applications. The main analytic interest is on exploring the diverse power 
relations that were deployed in each distinct therapeutic subject-position. The first 
three therapeutic subject-positions focus on the diverse forms of compliance to extant 
expert knowledges (see section 4.2), whilst the latter two focus on the diverse forms 
of resistance practices to the extant expert knowledges (see section 4.3). 
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Illustrative discourses of the therapeutic subject-positions 
  








• “Dangerous to Know” resourced by a psychiatric 
discourse. 
• Accounts of dangerousness in clinical practice.  
• ‘Gatekeeping’: therapy as a social regulatory practice of 





• Accounts of “Damaged Goods” as other and damaged. 







• Accounts of “The White Collar Psychopath” as other and 
powerful.  
•  “The White Collar Psychopath” in accounts of clinical 
practice. 
  








• Resistance accounts against the psychiatric norms. 
• Accounts of resistance through the employment of 
expertise.  






• “Critical Questioning” of notions of badness.  
• “Critical Questioning”: Who does more harm? 
• “Critical Questioning” of therapy norms. 
• “Critical Questioning” in clinical practice accounts. 
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4.2 Diverse forms of compliance to extant expert knowledges 
 This section will discuss the therapeutic subject-positions of “Dangerous to 
Know”, “Damaged Goods” and “The White Collar Psychopath”. The analytic account 
will focus on exploring how ASPD clients were discursively constructed as ‘other’ as 
well as the particular set of power relations implicated in each of these therapeutic 
subject-positions. Overall, the PPs who spoke from these therapeutic subject-
positions seemed to variously produce themselves as ‘experts’, dominated by extant 
expert knowledges.  
 
4.2.1 The therapeutic subject-position of “Dangerous to Know” 
The first therapeutic subject-position identified in many of these PP’s accounts 
was entitled as “Dangerous to Know”. This position was resourced by a dominant 
psychiatric discourse and was mobilised by accounts that problematised ASPD as a 
phenomenon located within the individual who is labelled as such. In practice 
accounts, PPs positioned themselves as ‘experts’ and employed discourses of 
dangerousness and social regulation to talk about their clinical work with ASPD.  
It is important to be mentioned that the participants who spoke from this 
therapeutic subject-position practiced in medium secure units. This particular context 
suggests that PPs practiced with individuals who have been deemed as ‘high risk’ and 
were managed and treated in a secure hospital environment.  Thus, this contextual 














• “Dangerous to Know” resourced by a psychiatric 
discourse. 
• Accounts of dangerousness in clinical practice.  
•  ‘Gatekeeping’: therapy as a social regulatory practice 
of “Dangerous to Know”. 
 
4.2.1.1: “Dangerous to Know” resourced by a psychiatric discourse. 
 
This therapeutic subject-position seemed to produce singular accounts that 
objectified ASPD as a psychiatric construct.  
 
Excerpt 1: 
“…the idea of antisocial is that somebody breaks the rules […] not conforming to 
social norms, having a sense of the fact that their way it is the right way and they’ll 
do things regardless and people are there to be used to achieve their one aim if you 
like […] puts themselves first, struggles in relationships with the concept of another 
[…] thrill seeking, drug use, stealing, violence those sort of things” (Lisa 58-70). 
 
Excerpt 2: 
“For me it’s, erm, basically somebody has kinda of a real difficulty, […] an inability 
to recognise societal kinda of standards for behaviour […] they forever kinda of 
crossing boundaries […] invading your space, erm, kinda of start to shut, […] they 





“…with Antisocial Personality Disorder, […] there’s […] impulsive behaviours such 
as criminal behaviours or drug taking and kind of just general impulsivity in their lives 
and, erm, difficulty kind of, erm, maintaining stability” (Samantha 67-71).  
 
Excerpt 4: 
“…sometimes is about getting one over other people […] stealing from a shop is, or 
deceiving somebody is not just about being able to do those things, it’s, it’s about, 
it’s about the good feeling you get back from having deceived […] somebody” (Nick 
66-70). 
 
In these extracts the behaviours identified as definitive of ASPD by these PPs 
seem to employ the categories provided by the DSM-5 (APA, 2013), the ‘psychiatric 
bible’ (Kutchins & Kirk, 1993). From a discursive perspective, it is interesting how these 
categories have become normalised in these participants’ vernacular talk, suggestive 
of how such expert knowledges infiltrate and work their power to label such clients as 
‘other’ and dangerous. For example, the participants’ reference to the failure of 
conforming to social norms (Lisa, Excerpt 1/ Nick, Excerpt 2), impulsivity (Samantha, 
Excerpt 3: line 70), deceitfulness (Nick, Excerpt 4, lines 68-70), criminal behaviours 
(Samantha, Excerpt 3: lines 67-70/ Lisa, Excerpt 1: line 70) and violence (Lisa, Excerpt 
1: line 70/ Nick, Excerpt 2: lines 46-47) demonstrates the unknowing influence of DSM-
510 discourse (see Chapter Two, section 2.3.3) on the ASPD construction produced 
by these participants. 
Furthermore, this dangerousness seems to be located in the individual, which 
enables them to be produced as categorically ‘other’. For example, in Excerpt 1, Lisa’s 
reference to “breaking the rules” (line 58) and “not conforming to social norms” (line 
                                                           
10 See Appendix 1: Table 1, DSM-5 Diagnostic Criteria for ASPD 
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62) or Nick’s highlighting their “inability to recognise social standards for behaviour” 
(line 39) illustrate this reductive binary construction of otherness as non-conformist. It 
is proposed that these participants’ talk seems to privilege a narrowed and simplified 
version of ASPD, reducing it to a set of pathological behaviours. This understanding 
suggests a binary dividing practice (Foucault, 1982) separating ASPD clients as a 
distinct group, a specific discursive grid (Foucault, 1972), on the basis of specific 
actions and attitudes (Schirato et al, 2012). Hence, a categorical thinking seems to 
prevail, which generates a position of ‘either/or’, and more specifically ‘good or bad’, 
‘social or antisocial’ locating the ASPD problem in the individual.  
As Foucault (1972) writes the “psychiatric discourse finds a way of limiting its 
domain, of defining what it is talking about, of giving it the status of an object – and 
therefore of making it manifest, nameable, and describable” (p. 46). In identifying “who 
the problem group is and how the group is seen or known as a problem” (Scheurich, 
1997:107), these participants seemed to distance themselves from ASPD clients 
through taking up the position of the ‘expert’ (Foucault, 1961) who holds uncontested 
‘truth claims’ about ASPD. These PPs’ accounts produced a deterministic view of 
ASPD clients “that overlooked individual uniqueness, consciousness and agency” 
(Sloan, 2009: 60) and at the same time underplayed the role of possible historical, 
social, economic and cultural influences that may contribute to a more critical 
understanding of APSD. Thus, this approach may limit alternative ways of 
conceptualising ASPD and exclude multiple diverse knowledges that could inform 





4.2.1.2: “Accounts of dangerousness in clinical practice. 
Here, this therapeutic subject-position was evident in accounts referring to 
dangerousness of working with these individuals in the therapeutic relationship and 
therapeutic space. The illustrative discourse below is influenced by the specific context 
of medium secure units. The discourse produced by these PPs is resourced by their 
clinical experience with clients who are thought to be high risk towards others. 
Excerpt 5: 
“… there is always a threat there. You’re gonna get hurt emotionally or physically 
definitely” (Lisa 236-237). 
 
Excerpt 6: 
“I: You spoke about this threat that may exist in the room while you are working with 
somebody. 
P: Yeah. It’s a threat of violence. You know there is always a threat, […] in the back 
of your mind. You do wonder if you are going to leave the room alive” (Lisa, 215-
219). 
Excerpt 7: 
“…you try to be rational but you’re not engaging with a rational being […] you’re 
always trying to think about ‘what am I saying, how can this be perceived, should I 
say it, should I not, why shouldn’t I say it’ and those sort of things, and you are just 
like, ok chair could be thrown at me” (Lisa, 258-262). 
 
Excerpt 8: 
“P: And it can be quite scary […] you have to erm, erm have a double think about, 
erm, whether this person actually kinda of poses a, a risk to you […] while you are 
in the room” (Nick, 327-334). 
  
 Above, participants’ talk mobilised singular accounts of dangerousness related 
to their clinical practice with ASPD. In these accounts, ASPD clients were glossed as 
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‘risky in the room’, violent, dangerous, irrational beings capable of causing grave 
emotional and physical harm. For example, in Excerpt 5, Lisa illustrates this position, 
by stating that “there is always a threat” that “you are gonna get hurt emotionally or 
physically definitely” (lines 236-237). Lisa further elaborates, in Excerpt 6, that this 
threat is a “threat of violence” (line 217) suggesting that clinical interactions with the 
ASPD subjects can be nothing else but dangerous and potentially fatal, as “you do 
wonder if you are going to leave the room alive” (lines 218-219). Similarly, Nick seems 
to take up the same position by describing his experience of working with ASPD clients 
as “scary” (Excerpt 8: line 327) that requires a particular ‘expert’ risk-thinking.  
 In producing such accounts, these PPs seemed to position themselves as 
vulnerable and deskilled, exposed to a pervasive ASPD threat of physical and 
emotional aggression in the clinical room. Ironically this subjectivity rather than 
sustaining the ‘expert’ role (Foucault, 1961) seems to be taking up a fearful position 
and thus distancing these PPs from their ASPD clients. This is further highlighted in 
Excerpt 7, where Lisa states that “you try to be rational but you’re not engaging with a 
rational being” (line 258) producing herself as different and by inference a well-
functioning practitioner who is vulnerable to the ‘unpredictable’ and ‘unreasonable’ 
ASPD clients. 
While this understanding of ASPD may suggest clinical competence in 
identifying the potential risks involved in clinical practice, a competence that is highly 
recognised by clinical services, training bodies and the other relevant institutions, at 
the same time it may also promote a reductive and enfeebling construction of ASPD 
that locates practitioners in a de-skilled ideology of ‘violence’ and ‘dangerousness’. It 
is proposed that such positioning produces discursively a particular form of ‘otherness’ 
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that may foreclose different possibilities of thinking, feeling and working with ASPD 
clients.  
 
4.2.1.3: ‘Gatekeeping’: therapy as a social regulatory practice of “Dangerous to Know”. 
Considering the ASPD construct as a discursive formation and the 
psychological practice as a system of formation of ‘disorderly’ objects (Graham, 2005) 
the illustrative discourse below, exemplifies how some PPs positioned themselves 
discursively in a social regulatory role of protecting the public. 
Excerpt 9: 
“…your role is to acclaim public protection” (Lisa, 570-571).  
 
Excerpt 10: 
“…you are a gatekeeper […] the notion of risk is so difficult to hold in mind and risk 
and therapy don’t always sit well together […] in the crisis moment you don’t know 
what a person is going to do. The reality is they’ve done it before.” (Lisa 662-702). 
 
Excerpt 11: 
“…forensic psychotherapy that I was taught the point is to stop people offending […] 
we are very clear about our intention […] the patient gets to know himself or herself 
a little better, becomes more in touch with the why of the behaviours, in order to 
change behaviours, so it very much has a social agenda […] a psychotherapist has 
to have some sense of social responsibility” (Jane 101-109). 
 
 In these accounts, participants inhabiting the therapeutic subject-position 
“Dangerous to Know” seemed to also locate themselves in a position of obligation to 
keeping safe the wider community. Here, the role of therapy appeared to be 
constituted as a social regulatory practice of safety assurance, where the practitioner 
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is produced as the ‘gate-keeper’ (Lisa, Excerpt 10: line 662) who has the responsibility 
to manage the ‘disorderly’ clients (Graham, 2005) and protect the public from them. 
For example, in Excerpt 9, Lisa states with certainty that the practitioner’s role is “to 
acclaim public protection” (lines 570-571) emphasising “gatekeeping” (Lisa, Excerpt 
10: line 662) as central to her therapeutic responsibility.  
Similarly, Jane, in Excerpt 11, privileges the idea of the therapist as a 
‘gatekeeper’, underlining that “the point is to stop people offending” (line 101). Jane 
further states that therapy “very much has a social agenda” (Excerpt 11: line 108) 
admitting in a sense to the wider socio-political influences on therapeutic practices. 
Although, Jane notices the power games that may be implicated in relation to ASPD 
she does not contest them, but rather she seems to accept this ‘truth claim’ by stating 
further that the practitioner “has to have some sense of social responsibility” (Excerpt 
11: line 109). 
Hence, it is suggested that these participants seemed to be dominated by the 
wider discourse of madness and dangerousness as forms of otherness and danger 
requiring regulation that was unmasked by Foucault (1961; 1988) through the 
interrogation of its management. This was illustrated in the genealogical review of 
ASPD in Chapter Two (see section 2.2.3).  
Overall, in this illustrative discourse of “Dangerous to Know”, PPs seemed to 
position themselves discursively as the ‘good’, socially responsible ‘experts’ whose 
job is to manage and police the ‘bad’ and ‘dangerous’ ASPD clients and therefore to 
protect the ‘vulnerable’ public. Such positioning seems to reduce therapy to a 
disciplinary regime that prioritises the confinement and regulation of populations, in 
this case the “Dangerous to Know”, suggestive of a ‘top-down’ power differential 
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(Foucault, 1977). Therefore, therapy seems to be produced as a social regulatory 
practice invested in protecting public interests rather than focused on the therapeutic 
needs of ASPD populations. This unavoidably raises an important question: In whose 
interest is therapy being provided for? Thus, it is proposed that these PPs seem to be 
uncritically dominated by a wider socio-political agenda that prioritises the confinement 
and regulation of such clients.  
 
To summarise, the therapeutic subject-position “Dangerous to Know” has been 
illustrated as resourced by a wider psychiatric discourse. ASPD clients were objectified 
as dangerous ‘others’, while PPs who spoke from this therapeutic subject-position took 
up a dominant expert position (Foucault, 1982). Interestingly, in clinical accounts of 
practice, PPs produced themselves as fearful and deskilled ‘experts’ in relation to 
ASPD clients. Finally, PPs privileged accounts of therapy as a social regulatory 
practice and seemed to be hegemonised by wider socio-political ‘truth games’ unable 
to critically contest the discursive resources they were subjected to. 
Finally, it is important to mention, that the therapeutic subject-position of 
“Dangerous to Know” highlights issues or professional conflict and power. More 
specifically, the conflict between the ethical stance of counselling psychology and the 
social control facet is ‘evident’ particularly in the third illustrative discourse of this 
therapeutic subject-position. The ‘gatekeeping’ discourse produced by these PPs 
uncovers power-laden tension between competing ideologies that PPs are called upon 




4.2.2 The therapeutic subject-position of “Damaged Goods” 
 The second subjectivity, in these participants’ accounts, was entitled as 
“Damaged Goods”. Contrary to the previous subject position, PPs who spoke from this 
subjectivity mobilised a different form of ‘otherness’ in constructing ASPD clients as 
damaged developmentally by the neglectful and abusive systems of family and society 
in general. Additionally, in clinical accounts of practice, these PPs produced 
themselves as ‘experts’ and resourced their expertise from various expert 
psychological knowledges when talking about their clinical work with “Damaged 
Goods”.  
Table 3: Therapeutic subject-position of “Damaged Goods” 
Therapeutic 
Subject-position 






•  Accounts of “Damaged Goods” as other and 
damaged. 
• Accounts of clinical practice while working with 
“Damaged Goods”. 
 
4.2.2.1 Accounts of “Damaged Goods” as other and damaged. 
 
 
In this illustrative discourse, these PPs produced accounts that objectified 
ASPD clients as damaged developmentally by systemic neglect and abuse. This is 






“…you do get situations where you’ve got a mother who is not available or father 
who is violent, there is alcohol and drugs in the home, the child’s been brought into 
the world, is not particularly wanted, or left alone to its own devices, does not do 
particularly well at school, gets in trouble, gets involved in gangs because […] 
parents are not that particularly concerned about them, may actually then be 
unpredictable in terms of beating them […] so then they go down the routes of crime, 
things like that, violence aggression” (Lisa 386-394). 
 
Excerpt 13: 
“…they have biographies of terrible neglect and abuse that have not been 
addressed by social systems and not been picked up in education, welfare system, 
that the criminal population is largely made up […] that society has cheated on some 
way, they didn’t have their ordinary human rights, if you think about why people 
become antisocial it starts with society and why we’ve excluded, neglected, […] and 
abused them” (Jane, 132-139). 
 
Excerpt 14: 
“the majority of women who were in there, erm, if not all, had, I don’t think there was 
one, I can’t remember not working with a woman who hadn’t been, erm, physically 
and sexually abused at a very young age by a male” (Ellis, 180-182). 
 
Excerpt 15: 
“…I also think […] how other people have kinda of treated you lends, lends towards 
you breaking kinda of the rules of society because, you know, society hasn’t kinda 
of treated you particularly well” (Nick, 108-111). 
 
The professional talk produced by these PPs seems to fabricate a different kind 
of ‘otherness’. Here, ASPD clients are still constructed as ‘other’ and ‘different’, but 
this time as damaged rather than dangerous. In the excerpts illustrated above, ASPD 
clients are talked about as damaged victims of neglectful and abusive social systems 
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from childhood. For example, in Excerpt 12, Lisa produces a detailed account of how 
parental failure to provide a caring environment ‘damages’ such clients and “so then 
they go down the routes of crime, things like that, violence aggression” (lines 393-
394). Furthermore, in Excerpt 13, Jane produces ASPD clients as damaged victims 
through “terrible neglect and abuse” (Excerpt 13: line 132), whilst Ellis, reaffirms the 
production of “Damaged Goods” by referring to his definite claim that all of the women 
he worked with have been “physically and sexually abused at a very young age by a 
male” (Excerpt 14: line 181-182).  
Additionally, it is suggested, that these PPs privilege the idea of ASPD clients 
as irreparably damaged by family or societal structures, and in a sense suggesting 
implicitly that these systems are to blame rather than the individual. This is illustrated 
in Jane’s statement “that society has cheated on some way” (Excerpt 13: line 135), 
and Nick’s argument that these clients are “breaking kinda of the rules of society 
because, you know, society hasn’t kinda of treated you particularly well” (Excerpt 14: 
lines 110-111). This understanding seems to reduce the complexity of how systems 
interact with individuals and vice versa and how the effects of this interaction may 
contribute in shaping and forming personalities.  
It is proposed, that these PPs seem to resource their understanding of ASPD 
from psychological developmental literature on trauma and its effects on personality 
development (see Chapter Two, section 2.3.1c). In privileging such perspective, these 
practitioners seem to position themselves as ‘experts’ (Foucault, 1961) and 
simultaneously produce ASDP clients as ‘done to’ and ‘damaged’, thereby as ‘other’.  
Such understanding may promote a simplistic view of ASPD clients who are objectified 
as passive recipients of the effects of developmental trauma, and hence release them 
from any responsibility for their actions and behaviours as adults. 
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4.2.2.2: Accounts of clinical practice while working with “Damaged Goods”. 
 
Considering the objectification of “Damaged Goods” attention is turned to how 
the participants who spoke from this therapeutic subject-position talked about their 
clinical practice with such clients.   
 
Excerpt 16: 
“we were in a kind of primitive, erm, erotic transference […] being enacted out […] 
it was interesting to work through some of that with some of the women […] who 
had been abused from very young age […]and to be able to work with the more 
seductive qualities […] not get into that kind of game play […] unconscious game 
that was” (Ellis, 182-198). 
 
Excerpt 17: 
“I think that when the attachment system is activated or threatened I think that is 
when you get a lot of the defences, the impulses, the sort of antisocial behaviours 
emerge because they do not feel secure, they don’t feel safe, the world is 
dangerous, the world is threatening or they have to make themselves feel safe that 
is definitely, definitely what I’ve seen […] when the attachment has been broken or 
for example in my clinical practice when people have gone breaks, […] that’s when 




“…A year and a half ago, I had, erm, one of my most difficult, challenging clients 
after being qualified […] He was treated incredibly poorly as a child, his mum a drug 
abusing, heroin using and, erm, erm, basically she didn’t look after him at all, was 
repeatedly found completely neglected by family members or friends […] we were 
doing DBT at the time and we were making lots of links with how he was brought up 
as a child and how he felt invalidated, and the more he understood those links […] 
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his anger lessened and his recourse to antisocial acts kind of lessened over, over 
the time […] But he was incredibly damaged” (Nick, 123-172). 
 
 
 The professional talk exemplified in the extracts above, highlights how these 
PPs positioned themselves discursively as the ‘experts’ (Foucault, 1961), who seem 
to resource their clinical expertise from different psychological expert knowledges to 
talk about their clinical practice with “Damaged Goods”. For example, Ellis’ reference 
to “erotic transference […] being enacted out” (Excerpt 16: lines 182-183) and “to be 
able to work with the more seductive qualities […] not get into that kind of game play 
[…] unconscious game” (Excerpt 16: lines, 194-198) produces him as the 
psychodynamic expert who somehow is able to notice unconscious dynamics and, at 
the same time, positions these clients as unaware of the influence of the damage 
imposed to them through abuse (see Chapter Two 2.3.1a). 
Similarly, Lisa, in Excerpt 17, resourcing herself from the attachment theory 
describes the idea of how “when the attachment system is activated or threatened […] 
you get a lot of the defences, the impulses, the sort of antisocial behaviours” (lines 
100-101) inferring as such to the existence of a ‘damaged’ attachment, referred to in 
the literature as ‘insecure’ attachment (see Chapter Two, 2.3.1c). Furthermore, Nick 
in Excerpt 17, referring to Dialectic Behavioural Therapy (DBT) as an expert 
knowledge uses the idea of making links with childhood as a way of working with his 
client who he refers to as being “incredibly damaged (Excerpt 17: line 172) (see 
Chapter Two 2.3.2). 
Additionally, this kind of expert talk privileges the idea that the practitioner as 
the expert has some sort of superior knowledge over “Damaged Goods” creating a 
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particular kind of distance between the ‘experts’ and such clients. Hence, this 
positioning seems to legitimise the expert practitioner to make certain ‘truth claims’ 
upon “Damaged Goods” promoting a simplistic view of these clients and the nature of 
the therapeutic work. It is argued that a positioning as such, may foreclose a more 
pluralistic and reflexive stance in terms of the therapeutic applications of ASPD. 
 
In summary, the participants who spoke from the therapeutic subject-position 
“Damaged Goods” produced another form of ‘otherness’ in relation to ASPD, that of 
being damaged victims. In clinical accounts of practice, these PPs seemed to position 
themselves as the ‘experts’ who hold expert knowledge of “Damaged Goods” and the 
therapeutic process. This positioning seemed to privilege a simplistic view of the 
clinical practice with “Damaged Goods” foreclosing possibly a more reflexive and 











4.2.3 The therapeutic subject-position of “The White Collar Psychopath” 
 The third therapeutic subject-position was identified as “The White Collar 
Psychopath”. In this therapeutic subject-position, participants’ talk mobilised a distinct 
construction which seemed to capture a particular aspect of ASPD. It is important to 
mention that this therapeutic subject-position is particularly influenced by context as 
these PPs drew examples from private practice and corporate environments. 
 
Table 4: The therapeutic subject-position of “The White Collar Psychopath” 
Therapeutic 
Subject-position 
Illustrative Discourses of this therapeutic subject-
position 
 
“The White Collar 
Psychopath” 
• Accounts of “The White Collar Psychopath” as other 
and powerful.  
• Accounts of clinical practice while working with “The 
White Collar Psychopath”. 
 
 
4.2.3.1: “Accounts of “The White Collar Psychopath” as other and powerful.  
 
 
From this therapeutic subject-position, the participants’ accounts produced the 
construct of “The White Collar Psychopath”. These participants spoke about this 





“…if you’re from more kind of privileged socioeconomic status and you have good 
education […] your antisocial behaviours might come out in different ways that they 
don’t necessarily get you into contact with police or justice services. And the kind of 
the idea […] the white collar psychopath […] those antisocial behaviours may come 
out in business environments but in a way that does not necessarily attract, erm, the 




“…if you happened to be, you know, reasonably well educated antisocial narcissistic 
personality disorder, you might well be the prime minister […] I’d like to think that 
prime minister is one of those people […] whereas if you’re less well educated or 




“I’ve met, I mean the standing joke, you know, is CEOs and people who run big 
companies have quite pronounced psychopathic tendencies […] I think it’s probably, 
you’d might find more of that in the real world than you actually find in prison” (Jane, 
lines 380-382). 
 
The participants who spoke from this therapeutic subject-position constructed 
discursively a new recognisable ‘disordered’ object (Butler, 1997a) that seemed to 
differ significantly to the objectifications discussed in previous therapeutic subject-
positions. The clients identified as “The White Collar Psychopath” are still produced as 
‘other’, but this time as privileged, domineering and powerful enabled in high status 
positions by the wider society through valuing and praising. This is evident in Excerpt 
19, where Samantha, highlights that “…if you’re from more kind of privileged 
socioeconomic status and you have good education […] your antisocial behaviours 
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might come out in different ways” (lines Samantha 98-99). Similarly, in Excerpt 20, 
Craig’s daring account further suggests that the ultimate manifestation of this 
objectification could be expressed in the face of the prime minister (lines 977-978), 
whilst Jane in Excerpt 21 endorses the “standing joke” that “CEOs and people who 
run big companies have quite pronounced psychopathic tendencies” (lines 380-381). 
These PPs seemed to work up an expert position resourced by wider 
psychological knowledges that objectified “The White Collar Psychopath” as a 
particular ‘psychological species’ that operates in the higher socioeconomic levels of 
society, such as business and political environments. This idea of the ‘‘successful’’ 
psychopath (Babiak, 1995, 1996; Lilienfeld, 1998) who remains undetected from the 
mental health and criminal justice system (Lynam et al., 1999), evident in Excerpt 19 
(Samantha, lines 103-105) and Excerpt 21 (Jane, lines 381-382) links back to the work 
of Cleckley (1941) on psychopathy as discussed in Chapter Two (see section 2.2.5). 
By producing these expertise accounts, PPs seemed to take up an ‘otherness’ 
position by identifying and defining this particular discursive grid (Foucault,1972). This 
‘othering’ position seemed to implicate a particular set of power relations where PPs 
uncritically produced another clinical essentialist category to be aware of. Although 
these PPs spoke about how particular privileged contexts may influence the formation 
of subjects and consequently how they are seen, labelled, treated and valued, they 
did seem to reflect critically on the ‘truth games’ they became subjected to. On the 
contrary, they inherited rigid singular views of “The White Collar Psychopath” reducing 
the complexity of this construction and simultaneously valorising certain essentialist 
claims of what this client group ‘is’ or ‘is not’. 
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4.2.3.2: “The White Collar Psychopath” in accounts of clinical practice. 
Considering further the “The White Collar Psychopath”, the focus shifts to 
practice accounts that were produced from participants who spoke from this 




“…I’ve had quite a few patients that have been immensely successful in the world. 
[…] They have a state of mind which is about […] other people aren’t really people 
in their world, they’re objects to be used […] I’ve worked with a quite few high profile, 
high power figures, celebrities, CEOs, bankers […] they didn’t want kind of major 
personality change, they didn’t want an alteration in the way they thought, thought 
about things, they come with a particular agenda” (Jane, 396-404). 
 
Excerpt 23: 
 “…when I worked more sort of like the corporate side […] their way is the right way 
and they’re gonna make it known at any cost. So they are very, very driven, and I 
think these are the traits that society prizes, ambition and stuff like that. But you kind 
of feel there is no room for another point of view, and this is the way it is going to be 




“…they need to possess your mind in a sense […] they need to be in control of all 
the sessions […] privately I had two or three experiences of this, where there’s 
clearly, erm, this kind of traumatising narcissistic presentation, where they, where 
they want to buy you as the buy the therapist […] there’ll be a real need to, to book 
sessions in advance and, and pay for sessions in advance so that they feel they can 
own you in that time” (Ellis, 602-610). 
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 In these extracts above, participants seem to resource their expert clinical 
knowledge from the psychoanalytic perspective and more particularly the object 
relational thinking. This discourse is reminiscent of the object relations expert 
knowledge, which was discussed in the literature review (see Chapter Two, section: 
2.3.1b). This is demonstrated in Excerpt 22, where Jane refers to the idea of ‘objects’ 
(“other people aren’t really people in their world, they’re objects to be used”, lines 398-
399) to highlight the particular psychoanalytic psychopathology of the “White Collar 
Psychopath”. She further valorises this point by arguing that these particular clients 
“come with a particular agenda” (Excerpt 22: line 404) and thus implying that perhaps 
she herself as a therapist has been used as an object by “The White Collar 
Psychopath” in therapeutic interactions.  
Additionally, Lisa, in Excerpt 23, resourced by object relational thinking, deploys 
the idea of the therapist being ‘taken over’ by these clients who leave “no room for 
another point of view, and this is the way it is going to be done, and they are gonna 
talk over you, and they’re gonna make it done” (lines 300-302), constructing these 
clients as domineering ‘others’. Similarly, Ellis using the idea of the ‘traumatising 
narcissist’, also referred to in the psychoanalytic literature as ‘malignant narcissism’ 
(Kernberg, 1989) (see Chapter Two, section 2.3.1b), objectifies these clients as 
domineering ‘others’ exemplified in his statement “they need to possess your mind in 
a sense […] they need to be in control of all the sessions”.  
By privileging an object relational ‘expert’ understanding of “The White Collar 
Psychopath”, these PPs seemed to position themselves as an expert authority that 
produces uncontested ‘truth claims’ about such clients. They seemed to be 
unreflexively dominated by the psychoanalytic object relational discourse and to assert 
their expertise by making definite claims about the clients in discussion. This 
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therapeutic subject-positioning is suggestive of a ‘top-down’ power differential 
(Foucault, 1977) in the therapeutic relationship and may suggest an unequal power 
dynamic between the client and the therapist.  
It is also proposed that the talk produced by these PPs further constructs a 
particular kind of distance between such clients and psychological practitioners. Here, 
“The White Collar Psychopath” is discursively produced as high powered and self-
centred client that hegemonises the therapeutic encounter by imposing his/her own 
therapeutic desires and wants. It could be argued that these participants constructed 
themselves as passive practitioners described by inference as used and dominated 
by “The White Collar Psychopath”. Hence, it is suggested that by taking up such 
positioning PPs seemed to abdicate their own influence on therapeutic encounters 
with these clients.  
 
To recapitulate, in this therapeutic subject-position PPs identified and defined 
a particular form of ASPD, that of “The White Collar Psychopath”. “The White Collar 
Psychopath” was objectified as a particular ‘psychological species’ enabled in high 
powered positions. In accounts of clinical practice, PPs resourced themselves from 
the object relational thinking and seemed to be positioned discursively as ‘experts’ 
dominated by “The White Collar Psychopath” in therapeutic encounters disowning in 
a sense their own influence in therapeutic encounters with such clients. This 
therapeutic subject-position is influenced by the specific context of private practice and 
corporate environments, which seems to highlight the particular set of power relations 
as discussed above.  
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4.3 Diverse forms of resistance practices to extant expert knowledges 
            The final two therapeutic subject-positions exemplify two distinct sets of power 
relations identified in Foucault’s power as resistance in his middle and later work (see 
Chapter One: 1.4.2). As discussed in Chapter One, from a Foucauldian perspective, 
the capacity for resistance is an integral property of power relations (Schirato et al, 
2012) (see Chapter One, section 1.4.2). In this analytic section two forms of 
Foucauldian resistance are discussed and demonstrated through the data. The 
resistance practice of ‘tactical reversal’ (Foucault, 1978; Thompson, 2003) (see 
Chapter One, section 1.4.2), is discussed in relation to the therapeutic subject-position 
of “Resisting to Psychiatric Norms” whilst the form of resistance as ‘technology of the 
self’ (Foucault, 1988) (see also Chapter One, section 1.4.2) will be employed to 
explore the fifth and final therapeutic subject-position “Critical Questioning”.  
 
4.3.1 The therapeutic subject-position of “Resisting to Psychiatric Norms” 
 The fourth therapeutic subject-position was entitled “Resisting to Psychiatric 
Norms”. In contrast to the therapeutic subject-positions described in the analytic 
section 4a, here the ASPD construct was questioned and these PPs produced 
accounts of resistance opposing to this diagnostic category. Some of the participants 
who spoke from this therapeutic subject-position opposed themselves to the ambiguity 
of ASDP by valorising the construct of psychopathy, whilst one participant produced 
herself as defiant to the ASPD diagnosis in her clinical practice.  
 Furthermore, this therapeutic subject-position seems to highlight professional 
power and conflict issues. The participants who spoke from this therapeutic subject-
position seem to implicitly oppose themselves to the hierarchical power dynamics that 
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circulate in medium secure unit contexts. In such contexts, the psychiatric power is 
located at the top of the clinical hierarchy and influences greatly clinical decisions. 
Thus, the PPs seem to discursively ‘fight against’ the oppressions of hierarchical 
power by employing their own psychological expertise.  
 
Table 5: The therapeutic subject-positions of “Resisting to Psychiatric Norms”. 
Therapeutic 
Subject-position 






• Resistance accounts against the psychiatric norms. 
• Accounts of resistance through the employment of 
expertise. 
• Clinical practice accounts of ‘fighting back’ against the 
ASPD diagnosis.  
 
 
4.3.1.1: Resistance accounts against the psychiatric norms. 
 
In the illustrative discourse exemplified below, participants mobilised accounts 





“… It’s a category that even if you try to box it up […] it’ll just escape […] and bleed 









“…I don’t really think that ASPD exists” (Aga, 997). 
 
Excerpt 28: 




“…ASPD is just applied very widely” (Nick, 467). 
 
In the extracts above, PPs seemed to position themselves as defiant against 
the psychiatric norms, through ‘fighting back’ discursively against the ASPD diagnostic 
label.  This form of resistance that PPs seemed to employ, exemplifies a reaction to 
top-down expert power, known in Foucauldian (1978) terms as ‘tactical reversal’ 
(Thompson, 2003). For example, in Excerpts 25, Craig seems to inherit a recalcitrant 
stance against the diagnostic regime. He opposes himself to the ASPD diagnostic 
label by stating that it is “such a lazy label” (Excerpt 18: line 1115). Similarly, in Excerpt 
26, Aga produces herself as defiant against ASPD by expressing strongly that “…it’s 
a stupid diagnosis cause it doesn’t make any sense […] it’s just nonsense” (lines 290-
293) and by questioning its very existence, “…I don’t really think that ASPD exists”, 
(Excerpt 27: line 997). Furthermore, in Excerpts 28 and 29, Eddie and Nick 
respectively, challenge the vagueness, broadness and unhelpfulness of the ASPD 
diagnostic label.  
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Thus, the PPs who spoke from this therapeutic subject-position seemed to 
locate themselves in terms of power, as ‘fighting back’ against the ASPD label and 
thereby still caught in a ‘tactical reversal’ (Foucault, 1978; Thompson, 2003). By 
employing resistant and reactive accounts in relation to the psychiatric expertise of 
diagnostic labelling, these PPs were subjected to power games of domination. 
Although these participants, who resourced this defiant discourse, attempted to 
challenge the diagnosis, and therefore indirectly the dominant psychiatric regime, they 
seemed to engage in a ‘battle’ with diagnosis rather than reflect critically. Hence, it is 
argued that these PPs seemed to construct a position of ‘tactical reversal’ (Foucault, 
1978; Thompson, 2003) instead of rising above.  
 
4.3.1.2: Accounts of resistance through the employment of expertise. 
 
 
The participants who deployed this “Resisting to Psychiatric Norms” therapeutic 
subject-position, offered an alternative option to construct of ASPD, that of 
psychopathy. This is exemplified in the extracts below.  
 
Excerpt 30: 
“…I actually I don’t have the same feeling about, erm, about psychopathy, […] or 
psychopathic personality disorder. […] And mainly it’s because, (cough), the 
assessment process […] the PCL-R […] the assessment process makes more 
sense […] it captures something about the kind of superficial charm and the glib and 
grandiosity and, erm, kind of the ease of forming relationship to impress people and 
the need to control and dominate and actually, you, you could see, you could 
definitely, there is evidence for that, […] when interacting with people and, erm, and 
it would be more, I think, useful clinical category” (Aga, 130-157). 
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Excerpt 31:  
“…psychopathy to me seems a bit clearer in the kind of cold, callous, unemotional 
trait, its lack of empathy, erm, (.) and that’s kind of measurable and you could look 
at change from it, and somehow that’s become part of this Antisocial Personality 
Disorder and almost lost in, in it really” (Eddie, 174-177). 
 
Excerpt 32: 
“…I see Antisocial Personality Disorder (smiles), as having a certain degree of 
validity about it as applied to population of people with certain traits in, in common. 
[…] but I see psychopathy as having far more validity to it […] for my chap who had 
Antisocial, Borderline and he was also kind of psychopathic, he was on Psychopathy 
Check(list), high on the Psychopathy Checklist, erm, even though (laughter), erm, 
he may not later on may not classify as kind of antisocial he will always classify as 
psychopathic” (Nick, 439-456) 
 
 Here, psychopathy was constructed by these PPs as more scientifically valid, 
hence in a sense more ‘truthful’, clinical category. Whilst in the previous illustrative 
discourse above PPs positioned themselves as defiant against the psychiatric regime, 
interestingly here they worked up a contradictory position by re-embracing psychiatric 
and psychological expert knowledges evident in their talk.  
For example, in Excerpt 30, Aga using expert language seems to resource her 
knowledge from the work of Robert Hare, who has defined psychopathy as 
categorically separate to ASPD (Babiak & Hare, 2006) (see Chapter Two, 2.1.2). Aga’s 
talk valorises the Psychopathic Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) (Hare, 2003) (see Chapter 
Two, section 2.3.3) as an accurate scientific measure for assessing psychopathy 
(Excerpt 30: lines 139-140) and glorifies psychopathy as scientifically superior to 
ASPD (Excerpt 30: lines 153-157). Thus, she seems to accept uncritically the 
existence of psychopathy. Similarly, Excerpt 31, Eddie also using expert positivistic 
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language constructs psychopathy as a ‘clearer’ (line 174), more ‘measurable’ (line 
175) clinical category, whilst, Nick, in Excerpt 32, describes psychopathy as a more 
‘valid’ (line 441) clinical construct producing essentialist claims in relation to 
psychopathy.  
These rigid claims about the existence of psychopathy and its scientific 
superiority in comparison to ASPD are further illustrated in Nick’s client account 
(Excerpt 32).  For example, in his client talk, Nick produces himself as an ‘expert’ 
(Foucault, 1961) who is legitimised to make expert truth claims about his client’s 
predicament.  It seems to me that Nick (Excerpt 32: lines 452-456) asserts his expert 
positioning by employing psychiatric language and describing his client in relation to 
diagnostic labels.  
It is suggested that this kind of expert talk, forms a distinct contradictory set of 
power relations. Although the same participants further above produced themselves 
as defiant to ASPD label ‘fighting back’ the psychiatric regime, they now repositioned 
themselves discursively as ‘experts’ and re-embraced unknowingly the psychiatric 
regime through the use expert language. Hence, they seemed to produce discursively 
themselves as ‘the expert’ (Foucault, 1961) and asserted their expertise by producing 
uncontested scientific claims with regards to the existence and the validity of ASPD 
and psychopathy.  
 
4.3.1.3: Clinical practice accounts of ‘fighting back’ against the ASPD diagnosis.  
Considering the therapeutic subject-position of “Resisting to Psychiatric Norms” 
attention is drawn to how Aga talked about her practice in relation to ‘fighting back’ 
against the diagnostic norms. Aga mobilised an account of opposition against the 
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ASPD diagnosis by challenging openly the psychiatric regime in her clinical practice. 
While other participants had similar concerns Aga’s account was chosen because it 
seemed to capture more succinctly this positioning.  
Excerpt 33: 
“…at the moment I work with this woman who’s got diagnosis of Antisocial 
Personality Disorder, and I’ve been trying to fight this, I actually challenge this, […] 
the psychiatrist […] couldn’t actually answer […] why she had this diagnosis […] if 
we were to give this woman a personality disorder diagnosis […] then it probably will 
be borderline personality disorder, cause she’s got history of self-harming, unstable 
attachments, […] and the antisocial bit […] she does have a history of violence of 
erm, but it’s all in the services” (Aga, 221-233). 
 
Excerpt 34: 
“…as another person I think, it’s just bullshit to treat someone like that and […] to 
give them sort of ‘well actually you are antisocial’ […] an ASPD diagnosis […] it gives 
people almost like a licence, not to try, not to ask these questions, like ‘why is 
somebody doing this?’, because it’s an easy answer ‘they’re doing this because they 
have an Antisocial Personality Disorder” (Aga 328-344).  
 
 
 It is suggested that, in the Excerpt 33, Aga produced an account of active 
resistance in her role as a psychological practitioner, ‘fighting-back’ the domination of 
the psychiatric regulatory power. Aga provides a client example and questions openly 
the ASPD diagnosis by interrogating directly the expert psychiatrist. She states, “I 
actually challenge this, […] the psychiatrist […] couldn’t actually answer […] why she 
had this diagnosis” (lines 225-228). In taking up this positioning, Aga positions herself 
as recalcitrant against the psychiatric power. Aga further uses her own psychological 
‘expert’ knowledge to challenge the diagnosis by justifying why other diagnostic labels 
would be more accurate hence more truthful (lines 228-233). By using psychiatric 
 122 
language Aga seems to position herself as ‘equal’ to the psychiatric power, and at the 
same time, she ‘fights back’ the psychiatric regime.   
Aga’s account of resistance seems to further highlight issues of hierarchical 
power in the context of medium secure units. In this context psychiatrists are 
positioned at the top of the clinical power by being authorised to assign diagnostic 
labels as well as to finalise treatment decisions, whilst clinical or counselling 
psychologists are positioned hierarchically below psychiatrists in terms of clinical 
power and responsibility.   
Furthermore, in Excerpt 33, Aga’s client seems to be positioned as a victim of 
the psychiatric system whilst Aga seems to produce herself as the ‘expert-rescuer’ 
who is invested in salvaging the client from the system. This discourse seems to be 
reminiscent of the Foucauldian understanding of ‘Salvation’ (Foucault, 1982) which is 
“strongly informed by a binary logic, always referring to some kind of movement from 
a fallen, abject, ignorant or corrupted state (identified with sin, death, morality, despair, 
evil) to something finer and better (grace, ever-lasting life, certainty, goodness)” 
(Schirato et al, 2012: 26).  
Finally, in Excerpt 34, Aga employs vernacular language, speaking “as another 
person” (line 328) rejecting the ASPD by stating “I think this is bullshit, because, it’s 
just bullshit to treat someone like that and […] to give them sort of ‘well actually you 
are antisocial’” (line 328-330), hence taking up a position of defiance. Aga further 
proposes that labelling is employed as an easy solution to a complicated matter, as a 
convenient silencing to enquiring what is actually going on (lines 341-344). However, 
it is suggested that although Aga attempts to contest the power games implicated in 
psychiatric and psychological practices she remains caught up in a ‘fighting-back’ set 
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of power relations rather ‘rising above’ and critically reflecting on these power 
dynamics.   
 
Overall, the participants speaking from the therapeutic subjection-position of 
“Resisting to Psychiatric Norms” seemed to be aware of the power games implicated 
within the diagnostic practices. However, their accounts seemed to be discursively 
resourced by the very expert psychiatric knowledge which they are opposed to. The 
use of ‘expert’ language and their proposition of psychopathy as a more valid clinical 
category in comparison to ASPD revealed their uncontested reductive ‘truth claims’. 
Hence, although these PPs worked up a defiant position in relation to the dominant 
psychiatric discourse they seemed to revert to the psychiatric knowledge in order to 
justify their ‘expert’ claims. This positioning unravels a contradictory subject positioning 
of defiance and subjugation to the psychiatric regime. 
 
4.3.2 The therapeutic subject-position of “Critical Questioning” 
          By contrast to “Resisting to Psychiatric Norms” as discussed above, the fifth and 
final therapeutic subject-position, entitled as “Critical Questioning”, positioned 
participants as resisting by ‘rising above’ the ASPD label and thereby escaping the 






Table 6: The therapeutic subject-position of “Critical Questioning”. 
Therapeutic 
Subject-position 







• “Critical Questioning” of notions of badness.  
• “Critical Questioning”: Who does more harm? 
• “Critical Questioning” of therapy norms. 
• “Critical Questioning” in clinical practice accounts. 
 
4.3.2.1: “Critical Questioning” of notions of badness. 
 In contrast to previous reductive constructions of ASPD in binary 
understandings, here PPs critically reflected on the complex contextual and societal 
influences on shaping notions of ‘goodness’ and ‘badness’ in relation to ASPD. 
 
Excerpt 35: 
“…violence and the kind of the behaviour has existed throughout history, people are 
not born good or are not born bad. They have a set of experiences which leads to 
behaviour, and if we can understand that, then we can understand actually that all 
of us are capable of doing good or doing bad” (Samantha, 591-594). 
Excerpt 36:  
“…particularly with ASPD when it’s so linked to antisocial behaviour is it just a way 
of labelling behaviour that we as a society might not like? And might not approve of 
and actually might find quite frustrating, […] maybe it’s a way for us as a society to 
kind of almost split of this bad element and give it a label and then we’d quite like 
just to stick it in a jail somewhere and forget about it […] it’s a way of labelling 
something and the giving us as a society or clinicians an opt out close, ‘yes but, it’s 
really hard to treat, so we, we won’t’” (Claire, lines 493-501). 
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 In the illustrative extracts above, both participants who spoke from this 
therapeutic subject-position seem to take up a reflectively critical meta-stance by 
interrogating historical and societal influences on the construction of notions of 
‘badness’ and ‘dangerousness’ in relation to ASPD. This kind of discourse seems to 
link back to historic social approaches to ASPD (Henderson, 1939) (see Chapter Two, 
section 2.2.5) as well as contemporary social constructionist thinking (see Chapter 
Two, section 2.3.5).  For example, in Excerpt 35, Samantha produces herself as ‘rising 
above’ the essentialist binaries of good-bad by arguing that violence is a historically 
influenced concept (line 591-593). Samantha further challenges the ‘othering’ that 
occurs through labelling by asserting that “all of us are capable of doing good or doing 
bad” (lines 592-593). By including herself in that statement Samantha works up a 
critical reflexive position acknowledging the societal power games she is subjected to. 
 Similarly, in Excerpt 36, Claire contests the wider socio-political games with 
regards to ASPD. Claire attempts to ‘rise above’ these socio-political power games by 
unsettling ASPD essentialist truths. She asks, “is it just a way of labelling behaviour 
that we as a society might not like?” (lines 492-493) and further suggests that labelling 
provides a way out from the ASPD problem for society as a whole, including 
psychological practitioners.  In embracing a critical positioning that escapes the 
oppression of diagnostic norms, Claire continues ‘rising above’ by questioning what 
interests sticking the “bad element” (line 497) “in a jail somewhere and forget about it” 
(line 497) serves.  
 Both participants who spoke from this therapeutic subject-position, mobilised 
critical and reflexive accounts and attempted to move beyond essentialist ‘truth claims’ 
in relation to ASPD. These PPs demonstrated the capacity to think differently 
(Foucault, 1984) and encouraged a reflective space where questioning and critiquing 
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mainstream ASPD norms was enabled. Furthermore, they attempted to challenge the 
wider ASPD ‘truths’ they have become subjected to and unsettle wider ‘truth game’s 
by disputing whose interests the process of identifying, labelling and confining 
‘badness’ serves.  
 
4.3.2.2: “Critical Questioning”: Who does more harm?  
 
Following, the focus is turned to Craig’s account who reflected critically on the 
distinct construction of “The White Collar Psychopath”. This is exemplified in the 
illustrative extracts below. 
 
Excerpt 37: 
“…in society when we’re talking about psychiatric patients […] of one sort or another 
or prisoners of one sort or another, when we talk about antisocial personality 
disorder, we don’t talk about bankers, politicians […] gangsters of all other kinds, 
using the same descriptions, but I think that we could and perhaps that we should 
[…] So who does more damage to society? […] bankers in Canary Wharf who ruin 
the lives of millions […] or the burglar that climbs and steals my video camera, or 
something? In terms of where the real damage is done to society, erm, there are far 




“…some of the leaders and people that, you know, running the place, are probably 
more disturbed than the, you know, than some of the people in the hospitals. But 
they’ve got the social advantage, or the intelligence […] whatever it is to not get 
caught” (Craig, 1015-1020).   
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Here, Craig mobilised a politically charged account, ‘rising above’ and reflecting 
critically on the construction of “The White Collar Psychopath” and thus challenging 
wider socio-political discourses of antisociality and dangerousness. More particularly, 
he seems to work up a positioning that questions the wider society’s inability to ‘talk’ 
about “The White Collar Psychopath”, who is personified by “bankers, politicians […] 
gangsters of all other kinds” (Excerpt 37: line 45-47). In this critical inquiry, Craig uses 
‘we’ to include himself and in a sense to admit that he himself is also subjected to the 
wider discourses that obscure critical reflection of the phenomenon in discussion.   
Furthermore, Craig seemed to take up a ‘political’ stance by highlighting in his 
talk issues of social justice. Craig strongly urges that “we could and perhaps that we 
should’ (Excerpt 37: line 48) to talk critically in relation to “The White Collar 
Psychopath”. It is proposed that Craig questions the wider society that silences the 
questioning of high powered figures as potentially antisocial and thereby ‘rises above’ 
these power games.  This positioning is highlighted further in Craig’s questioning, “So 
who does more damage to society?” (Excerpt 37: line 50). Craig’s attempt to critique 
mainstream societal views mobilising the idea that ‘bad’, ‘dangerous’ individuals are 
not necessarily those labelled as such or locked away in institutions (Excerpt 38: lines 
1015-1016). Thus, it is suggested that Craig’s account could be understood as an 
attempt to interrogate wider socio-political games that are implicated in constructing 
notions of dangerousness and ‘antisosiality’. Such positioning seems to liberate a 
critical voice that allows Craig to critique and ‘rise above’ the domination of such wider 




4.3.2.3: “Critical Questioning” of therapy norms. 
 
 The participants who spoke from the therapeutic subject-position “Critical 
Questioning” further resourced themselves from a social constructionist discourse 
(see Chapter Two 2.3.5) and proposed a ‘necessary’ expansion of therapy as a 
concept to consider the wider societal influences. 
Excerpt 39:  
“…it’s really unhelpful just to view it as a mental disorder because it’s so much a part 
of a cause and then an effect in society. Actually, there’s need to be a societal 




“I just think for things to change there needs to be a different approach and that 
needs to include looking at, erm, a societal intervention” (Claire, lines 587-588). 
 
Excerpt 41:  
“…we need to kind of make wider changes in society if we want to kind of make 
leaps forward and I suppose reduce the violent acts” (Samantha, lines 594-595). 
 
          In this illustrative discourse of “Critical Questioning”, these PPs seemed to 
produce themselves as ‘suspicious’ in relation to how the ASPD problem is 
therapeutically ‘managed’. A distinct facet seems to be a discursive shift from focusing 
on the individual to the societal context. It is proposed that this discursive shift enables 
these participants’ to critically gaze the wider societal power games. For example, in 
Excerpt 39, Claire challenges normative understanding of ASPD and implicates in her 
talk society’s influence on the construction of ASPD (lines: 523-525). She further 
produces herself as reflectively critical by stating that “psychological therapy alone is 
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not enough” (lines: 526-527) and calling for a for “societal intervention” (Excerpt line 
40: 588). Similarly, in Excerpt 41, Samantha seems to produce herself as a critical 
practitioner and she embraces this critical positioning by suggesting “wider changes 
in society if we want to kind of make leaps forward” (lines: 594-595).  
          These PPs seemed to form themselves by mobilising a critical perspective 
(Foucault, 1978b) that contests and challenges the extant therapeutic norms and 
practices, resourcing a critical gaze on the wider societal ‘truth games’ in relation to 
ASPD. By questioning the sufficiency of psychological therapy as a solution to the 
ASPD problem, and thus in a sense questioning their role as psychological 
practitioners, Samantha and Claire seem to be enabled to surmount the domination 
and oppression of wider ASPD therapeutic ‘truth games’.  
 
4.3.2.4: “Critical Questioning” in clinical practice accounts. 
 
 In talking about clinical practice, the PPs speaking from the therapeutic subject-
position “Critical Questioning” seemed to remove themselves from being fully 
subjugated by the oppression of the ASPD label in their therapeutic work. This is 
exemplified in the Excerpts below. 
Excerpt 42: 
‘I just work with the person really and I think you know all of us yeah look what the 
diagnosis is, and then look what offence they committed but I will work with whatever 
presents itself in, in the room […] whether that’s acting out behaviours or somebody 
who is at a point of which, you know, maybe thinking of changing their lives […] 
That’s what I go with, I am not rigid in terms of ‘right that’s the diagnosis, what’s the 




“actually what you’re working with it’s just a, an individual person who has a 
particular set of experiences, which’s led to a particular way of viewing the world […] 
people get to big debates about are we treating mental illness or are we treating 
personality disorder? And really I would rather throw all that out of the window and 
have kind of a (laughter), a psychological formulation for each person, because you 
then don’t have to get into that argument about ‘oh which is the correct diagnosis?’ 
[…] None of them, none of them describe the person and how they, how they’re 
relating to you, one person with schizophrenia is not the same with the next person 
with schizophrenia and it’s the same with personality disorder” (Samantha, 523-
535). 
 
 Here, in the Excerpt 42 above, Claire seems to take up a critical stance in 
relation to her own clinical practice with ASPD. Her talk emphasises working with “the 
person” (Excerpt 42: line 109) refuting as such the hegemony of the diagnostic 
practices. Whilst working with the person she is able to access her expert knowledge, 
(“I think you know all of us yeah look what the diagnosis is, and then look what offence 
they committed”, lines 109-110) without being hegemonised and oppressed by it (“I 
will work with whatever presents itself in, in the room”, lines 110-111). Claire seems to 
produce herself as a critical reflexive practitioner who is open to thinking about each 
client’s personal needs (lines 113-114) and to adapt her clinical practice accordingly.  
 Similarly, Samantha seems to also repudiate the hegemonic oppression of 
labelling in her practice. This is evident in Samantha’s statement “actually what you’re 
working with it’s just a, an individual person” (Excerpt 43, lines 523-524) enabling her 
to unsettle diagnostic power games. Furthermore, Samantha by employing the 
practice of “psychological formulation” (Excerpt 43, line 530) she seems to allow 
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herself to escape the oppression of diagnostic power games in her practice and to 
form herself as a reflectively critical practitioner.  
It could be argued that these PPs produced themselves as self-crafted 
(Foucault, 1988) practitioners who demonstrated the ability to ‘stand back’ and 
question reflexively their own clinical practice. Hence, these PPs seem to form a 
resistance practice as ‘technology of the self’ (Foucault, 1988), whereby they come to 
engage in a relation to themselves as practitioners without devolving to a state of 
domination (Schirato et al, 2012). Finally, it is proposed that such positioning reveals 
the complex wider power games that may implicated in scientist-practitioner and 
reflective-practitioner models (Strawbridge & Woofle, 2010) as discussed in Chapter 
One (see subsection 1.3) in relation to psychological knowledge and practice.  
 
 To summarise, PPs who spoke from the therapeutic subject-position “Critical 
Questioning” seem to ‘rise above’ the oppression of the ASPD construct and its clinical 
applications. They seemed to contest essentialist ASPD claims and to be more aware 
of the multiple complexities of the ASPD phenomenon. Finally, it is suggested that in 
practice accounts, these PPs formed a resistance practice as ‘technology of the self’ 
(Foucault, 1988), promoting a critical and reflective gaze in relation to the power 






4.4 Summary of the Analysis Chapter  
 In this analysis, five therapeutic subject-positions were identified as indicating 
distinct sets of power relations in terms of what was worked up as ‘true’ about ASPD 
and its therapeutic applications in these participants’ accounts. Each therapeutic 
subject-position provided a unique perspective on ASPD in terms of theoretical 
understanding, ways of talking about clinical practice and reflexivity were evident. 
In summary, the first three therapeutic subject-positions, “Dangerous to Know”, 
“Damaged Goods” and “The White Collar Psychopath” seemed to produce diverse 
forms of compliance to extant expert knowledges. Here, clients were constructed as 
‘other’ (for example ‘other’ as dangerous/ ‘other’ as damaged’, ‘other’ as a successful 
psychopath), whilst the PPs who spoke from these therapeutic subject-positions, were 
positioned as ‘experts’. Contrary to the first three therapeutic subject-positions, the 
latter two therapeutic subject-positions of “Resisting to Psychiatric Norms” and “Critical 
Questioning” demonstrated how some PPs mobilised accounts of resistance to the 
extant expert knowledges. More specifically, the PPs who spoke from the “Resisting 
to Psychiatric Norms” produced themselves as defiantly reactant to ASPD as a clinical 
category and seemed to be caught up in Foucault’s view of resistant power as ‘tactical-
reversal’. By contrast, the PPs who positioned themselves in “Critical Questioning” 
seemed to ‘rise above’ the constrains of the ASPD label and instead spoke from a 
meta-position, critically reflecting on some of the complexities of this phenomenon.  
Overall after analysing critically these PPs’ accounts, I argue that ASPD is 
problematic as a clinical category. The analytic results highlighted the ways in which 
these participants produced multiple ‘truth claims’ about ASPD and its therapeutic 
applications, demonstrating a range of discursive power relations operating in these 
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PPs constructions. Thus, it is proposed that this critical analytic perspective may 
contribute to raising CoPs’ (as well as other psychological practitioners) awareness 
with regards to the discursive power relations in their ‘truth claims’ and practices in 
relation to ASPD.   
Finally, the importance of contextual influences has been highlighted in the 
analytic commentary as appropriate. The particular contexts of the medium secure 
units and also private practice were considered to inform the thinking and discursive 
positioning of the participants. These contextual influences will be further discussed in 

















5.1 Introduction to Chapter Five 
This final chapter discusses the findings produced to answer the research 
question, “How do psychological practitioners (PPs) construct ASPD and what are the 
discursive power relations, if any, in PPs therapeutic accounts regarding ASPD?”. By 
applying a Foucauldian Discourse Analysis to ten Psychological Practitioners’ 
therapeutic accounts of ASPD, three main findings were highlighted. Firstly, as 
discussed in Chapter Two, ASPD understood through a genealogical lens seems to 
be constructed through time in diverse, opaque and often contradictory ways. This 
opacity of ASPD was further indicated in the analytic findings. Secondly, the ways in 
which ASPD was constructed by these participants seemed to have implications for 
discursive power relations (Foucault, 1982). Lastly, the PPs’ ways of talking about 
ASPD were seen to produce five therapeutic subject-positions with distinct sets of 
power relations, which seemed to have implications for PPs subjectivity (Foucault, 
1982; Butler, 2005). 
 It is important to acknowledge that this research adopts and maintains a 
poststructuralist epistemology. Therefore, no actual, generic material ‘truth claims’ can 
be made regarding causal influences of these diverse therapeutic subject-positions 
identified. The main contribution of this research is concerned with raising the readers’ 
awareness in relation to the power games implicated in these diverse therapeutic 
accounts of ASPD by the rhetorical power of argument and the illustrative PPs’ quotes 
(O’Callaghan, 2010) presented in Chapter Four.  
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 In this final chapter, I will firstly discuss the possible contribution of the findings 
for Counselling Psychology. Secondly, I will evaluate the methodological limitations of 
FDA as well as the method, data collection and participants who took part in this study. 
In conclusion, I will present some suggestions for future research, explore my 
researcher’s reflexivity as a researcher and offer some final thoughts in relation to this 
research. 
 
5.2 The research findings and the possible contribution to Counselling 
Psychology  
 The main contribution of this thesis is that it offers to CoPs and other 
psychological practitioners a reflexive gaze (Finlay & Gough, 2003) by which to 
interrogate the discursive power games implication in their professional knowledges 
and ‘truth claims’ about ASPD. Furthermore, it highlights the discursive power games 
implicated in these diverse therapeutic accounts, and thus cautions practitioners to 
become more critically reflexive about the power relations in which they may be 
positioned discursively (Foucault, 1982; Butler, 2005). Therefore, this thesis urges the 
readers to think and think differently about how they negotiate their professional 
knowledges and practices within contemporary mental health contexts.  
To begin with, it is proposed that the findings of this study highlighted the 
opacity of ASPD as a clinical category and by doing so it illustrated some problematic 
uses of language as a discourse in relation to ASPD. The analytic account explored 
the diverse ways in which the participants constructed and objectified ASPD 
demonstrating that the ASPD phenomenon is multiple and mutable in meaning.  
Hence, the findings of this study challenge essentialist claim in relation to ASPD and 
 136 
propose that ASPD is not a scientific phenomenon that can be known empirically but 
rather a construct that is influenced and shaped by social processes.   
Furthermore, the analysis paid particular attention to the power relations that 
the participants became intertwined with knowingly or unknowingly. After critically 
analysing the participants’ accounts, five therapeutic subject-positions were identified 
and were illustrated in this thesis, highlighting some spaces that these PPs seemed to 
inhabit and vacate in relation to the ASPD as a discursive object. The therapeutic 
subject-positions identified were the following: “Dangerous to Know”, “Damaged 
Goods”, “The White Collar Psychopath”, “Resisting to Psychiatric Norms” and “Critical 
Questioning”. 
It is suggested that the therapeutic subject-positions of “Dangerous to Know”, 
“Damaged Goods”, “Resisting to Psychiatric Norms” and “Critical Questioning” could 
potentially be considered and deployed in other professional contexts when examining 
for example various diagnostic labels. Thus, these identified subject-positions could 
perhaps offer a way of interrogating how professionals position themselves when 
having to negotiate multiple knowledges in relation to diagnostic labels. Additionally, it 
is important to acknowledge that the therapeutic-subject position of “The White Collar 
Psychopath” and its distinct set of power relations identified is particular to the ASPD 
construct and also a unique contribution of this study. The construction of “The White 
Collar Psychopath” as a ‘domineering other’ authorised the PPs who spoke from this 
therapeutic subject-position to produce themselves as the ‘expert’ who was ‘done to’ 
and ‘used’ by such clients. This positioning seemed to abdicate PPs’ own influence 
and responsibility on the therapeutic encounter with these clients. This finding urges 
for raising awareness and critical thinking in terms of how such positioning may 
foreclose therapeutic possibilities with these clients.  
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More specifically, considering the first three therapeutic subject-positions, 
“Dangerous to Know”, “Damaged Goods” and “The White Collar Psychopath”, the 
participants who spoke from these therapeutic subject-positions seemed to produce 
diverse forms of compliance to extant expert knowledges. These participants seemed 
to construct ASPD clients as ‘dangerous other’, ‘damaged other’ and ‘domineering 
other’ respectively and, at the same time, they distanced themselves from such clients 
as ‘experts’. By taking up such positioning, these PPs seem to comply unknowingly 
with various extant expert knowledges and thus to get caught up in a ‘technology of 
domination’ (Foucault, 1977).  
Furthermore, in the final two therapeutic subject-positions these PPs seemed 
to mobilise various ‘resistances’ in their accounts (Foucault, 1977; 1988). Two forms 
of resistance to the extant expert knowledges were identified: ‘tactical reversal’ 
(Foucault, 1977) and ‘technology of the self’ (Foucault, 1988). More specifically, the 
participants who spoke from the therapeutic subject-position “Resisting to Psychiatric 
Norms” were seen to employ a ‘tactical resistance’ (Foucault, 1977, Thompson, 2003) 
by relating to ASPD in an adversarial way and by ‘fighting against’ the psychiatric 
regime. In contrast, the participants who spoke from the therapeutic subject-position 
of “Critical Questioning” seemed to utilise a type of a resistance that enabled them to 
avoid engaging with an antagonistic relationship to prevalent diagnostic norms. They 
rather produced themselves discursively as critical, reflexive and self-crafted 
practitioners, exemplifying Foucault’s (1988) ‘technology of the self’. These PPs 
seemed to avoid the subjection to rigid and singular accounts of ASPD and its 
therapeutic applications and enabled themselves to speak critically with the intention 
to move beyond the therapeutic norms.  
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Finally, these therapeutic subject-positions are not understood as rigid and 
essentialist, but rather as ever-changing and ever-fluctuating. Foucault (1982) 
suggested that subjectivity is not fixed, but it is mutable, positioning and re-positioning 
constantly in talk. As such, the therapeutic subject-positions illustrated in the analysis 
are understood as diverse ways by which the participants can be located variously by 
discourse. The analytic data reflected this fluctuation and indicated how PPs 
positioned themselves discursively and moved between therapeutic subject-positions. 
Most participants spoke at least from two therapeutic subject-positions and therefore 
were seen to occupy different positions at different times.  
overall, by identifying these therapeutic subject-positions and their distinct sets 
of power relations, this study encourages practitioners to become more aware of what 
is made visible or obscured by such ‘truth claims’ providing the means through which 
the participants’ talk can be interrogated. Such a critique (Foucault, 1978b) promotes 
a critical questioning and enables reflexive thinking in relation to one’s ‘truth claims’ 
about therapeutic practice by raising awareness of the power games implicated. 
  
5.3 Evaluation of this study 
 This section, evaluates the FDA methodology and its potential limitations to 
addressing the research question. Any methodology chosen by any research creates 
the parameters of what it is made visible with regards to the specific subject studied. 
Hence, the discourse produced by employing FDA in this study could be considered 
a limiting discourse in itself. Following this, I will provide a critique of the FDA 
methodology, the relevance of this study, the method of data collection and finally the 
researcher’s reflexivity.  
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5.3.1 A critique of Foucauldian Discourse Analysis  
Foucauldian Discourse Analysis has been questioned by some for its very 
methodological existence (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008). More specifically, FDA 
has been critiqued fiercely for the reluctance to delineate a research method, 
particularly with respect to Genealogy (Wetherell, 1998; Graham, 2005; Harwood, 
2000). Foucault (1994) himself stated “I take care not to dictate how things should be” 
(p. 288) and wrote provocatively to challenge certainty, so that “all those who speak 
for others or to others” (Foucault, 1994: 288) no longer know what to do (Graham, 
2005). As Harwood (2000) writes “if Foucault had prescribed specific methodology, he 
would have fallen foul of his own critique of truth and science” (p. 42). Thus, an 
awkward Foucauldian predicament arises: declaring a method poses a ‘danger’ of 
becoming prescriptive and essentialist or not doing so may trigger accusations of 
unsystematic speculation and lack of rigor (Graham 2005).  
Considering this criticism of FDA with regards to the lack of clear guidelines for 
a methodological framework, it is important to acknowledge how this study has dealt 
with this methodological challenge. There is no doubt that this dilemma becomes a 
precarious scenario of “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” (Graham, 2005: 5). 
However, Willig (2008) suggests that this methodological flexibility enables space for 
the subject in question, its complexities and the analysis to emerge. Bearing this in 
mind, this study employed Willig’s (2013) six-step guidance (see Chapter Three, 3.4) 
to the support the analytic process, which felt appropriate but not constraining.  
 Furthermore, FDA has been criticised for its failure to acknowledge the reality 
of existence (Hanna, 2014). The suggestion that truth is seen as “always contingent 
or relative to some discursive and cultural frame of reference” (Wetherall, 2001: 393) 
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positions the non-discursive as subordinate. Thus, one possible FDA limitation is its 
inability to identify power dynamics that might unfold in non-discursive experience 
(Willig, 2013). Whilst this study can comment on the participants’ accounts, no general 
or essentialist claims can be made with regards to how the identified discourses may 
affect therapeutic practice. As it has been argued throughout, this thesis does not 
embrace a positivistic stance, hence has no intention in reaching an objective absolute 
‘truth’ (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008). Instead, the analytic focus is on the social 
production of knowledge, particularly in relation to ASPD.  
 In addition, some contemporary theorists have argued that FDA is theoretically 
rich but data thin (Dickerson, 2012). However, I suggest that this study generated a 
large and rich quantity of data through the interviews and the analytic process, yet a 
small number of extracts have been chosen to succinctly substantiate an argument. 
Perhaps selecting different extracts would have inevitably led to a different argument. 
Nonetheless, it is up to the reader to decide whether the suggested presentation 
substantiates a compelling argument or has rhetorical power (Willig, 2013).  
Moreover, FDA has been accused of offering only a nihilistic understanding of 
the subject (Hanna, 2014), which is seen as passive and controlled by the 
power/knowledge nexus. Thus, people   
are not free agents who make their own meanings and control their lives; 
rather, they have their lives, thoughts and activities ‘scripted’ for them by 
social forces and institutions (Schirato et al, 2000: 117). 
 
Although, one might argue, that there is an implied criticism of the participants 
as not being actively aware of the therapeutic subject-positions they occupy, my 
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intention was not to undermine the participants’ knowledge and experience. 
Nonetheless, this study maintaining a poststructuralist epistemology influence by 
Foucault, suggests that the participants as well as the researcher (see section 5.3.4), 
are unavoidably influenced by wider circulating discourses by which they resource 
their knowledge. Hence, the analytic motivation is concerned with shedding light on 
what is enabled or constrained through talk and its effects on how speaking subjects 
position themselves or are positioned discursively.  
 A final criticism of FDA comes from psychoanalytic thinking particularly about 
its conception of subjectivity. Some psychoanalytic thinkers challenge FDA for offering 
a ‘thin’ description of subjectivity and for assuming that discourse is at the heart of self-
formation processes (Hollway, 1989), which may limit the possibility to consider self-
formation as constructed around emotional investment and attachment (Willig, 2001). 
Hence this perspective suggests that subject positions are understood as constructed 
as personal investment or motivation (Hollway, 1989) rather than related to knowledge 
and power (Willig, 2001). However, it is acknowledged that such an exploration was 
beyond the remits of this particular analytic methodology. 
 
5.3.2 The relevance of this study to Counselling Psychology 
 Whilst there is arguably a diversity of theoretical, psychological, psychiatric and 
psychological writings and studies on ASPD, there has not been a specific study 
interrogating how psychological practitioners position themselves or are positioned 
discursively in relation to these various discourses. Hence, this study is highly relevant 
to Counselling Psychology as it sheds light on the multiple constructions of ASPD and 
the discursive power relations implicated in professional therapeutic accounts. More 
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particularly, the literature review (see Chapter Two) revealed the multiple theoretical 
understandings of ASPD highlighting the competing ideologies that shaped 
contemporary ASPD knowledges and psychological practices. The influence of these 
competing ideologies on psychological knowledge production was further evident in 
the identified therapeutic subject-positions (see Chapter Four), where the participants 
were seen to negotiate variable ASPD understandings which seemed to have some 
implications for their clinical practice. 
 Furthermore, the movement to include Critical Psychology and Social Injustice 
issues in contemporary Counselling Psychology programmes has been a central 
development of the profession. This study embraces this movement and merits the 
cultivation of a critical and reflexive space where multiple perspectives are welcomed 
and considered. This is highly relevant not only to the ASPD construct but also any 
diagnostic category and their related therapeutic practices. It is suggested that 
applying widely this critical Foucauldian gaze in the Counselling Psychology domain, 
may benefit CoPs who are expected to navigate multiple and often competing 
knowledges, ideologies and practices (Woolfe et al, 2010). Thus, this study suggests 
that encouraging critical reflexivity in Counselling Psychology may offer the opportunity 
to consider alternative ways of thinking about psychological theories and practices and 
invite practitioners to think again and think differently about their knowledge and 






5.3.3 A critical evaluation of the method of the data collection 
 This study recruited ten Psychological Practitioners (PPs) in order to collect 
sufficient data for the analytic purposes. Recruiting participants and generating data 
via opportunistic sampling could pose a number of limitations for research. It is 
acknowledged that the findings of this study represent only ten PPs who chose to 
participate and offer their individual contributions. Inevitably, a different sample may 
have produced different accounts. Additionally, different methods of collecting data 
have their advantages and disadvantages. This study, in employing a post-structuralist 
stance, suggests that any talk can potentially offer an analytic contribution. Thus, the 
analysis would be different each time as it is seen as a co-created dialogue between 
the interviewer and the participant (Willig & Stainton-Rogers, 2001). 
 Although small studies such as this attempt to recruit a homogeneous group of 
participants, due to the dearth of CoPs working with ASPD, pragmatically I recruited 
other psychological practitioners (see also Chapter Three, section 3.3.3). Therefore, 
a more heterogenous volunteer group of ten PPs was recruited. The demographics of 
the participants were introduced in Chapter Three (see Chapter Three, section 3.3.3), 
were presented in a table in the appendix (see Appendix 8) and will be further 
discussed here. It is important to acknowledge that due to the poststructuralist position 
taken up by this study the demographic categories are not seen as prescriptive. Whilst 
demographic categories may influence what is made discursively available for 
particular participants in particular times and contexts, they are still understood as 
social constructs that are inherently changeable.  
 The participant sample was diverse in terms of age, gender, ethnicity, training, 
and clinical experience. Six out of ten participants were women and four were men. 
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Although the gender categories were considered they were not addressed in the 
analysis as gender did not seem to influence participants’ positioning. Female and 
male participants spoke variously from the all five therapeutic-subject positions. I 
would suggest that perhaps further research would be useful in exploring more 
systematically the issue of gender in therapeutic accounts of ASPD.  
Seven out of ten participants identified as white British, one as black British 
Caribbean, one as white Eastern European with a Polish decent, and one as white 
Irish. Participants’ ethnicity and nationality did not seem to be relevant to the analysis. 
Interestingly, race in relation to ASPD was only briefly discussed by Aga during her 
interview, but this account was not included in the analytic findings as there was not 
enough data. 
 Additionally, the research participants have been trained and have been 
qualified at least at a master level in UK institutions. Three out of ten participants were 
qualified as Counselling Psychologists, four out of ten were qualified as Clinical 
Psychologists and the remaining three as psychotherapists. Seven of these 
participants identified as integrative practitioners drawing mainly from psychodynamic, 
CBT and humanistic perspectives in their practice whilst the remaining three, all 
psychotherapists, identified as psychodynamic practitioners. Lisa and Nick who mainly 
spoke from the therapeutic subject-position “Dangerous to Know” and “Damaged 
Goods” were trained as Clinical Psychologists. Perhaps this is somewhat suggestive 
of the influence of different trainings of ASPD therapeutic understandings and further 
research into to training differences in terms of ASPD may be useful. Additionally, the 
three Counselling Psychologists Jane, Aga and Claire spoke variously from the five 
different therapeutic subject positions. It is of interest that Aga and Claire mainly spoke 
from the therapeutic subject-positions of “Resisting to Psychiatric Norms” and “Critical 
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Questioning” respectively, that formed resistance practices against the extant expert 
knowledges.  
Furthermore, all participants self-identified as having had clinical experience 
with ASPD. All participants worked in NHS medium secure units and/or prison settings 
and some participants had also experience working in community services, 
universities, corporate environments as well as private practice. The context of 
medium secure units was found to be of great significance in terms of influencing the 
participants’ accounts who spoke from certain therapeutic subject positions. For 
example, the context of medium secure units seemed to be highly influential in the 
discursive production of “Dangerous to Know” as well as “Resisting to Psychiatric 
Norms” highlighting the particular power relations that were discussed in Chapter Four. 
Another significant contextual influence identified was related to the therapeutic 
subject-position of “The White Collar Psychopath” and was highlighted as appropriate 
in the analytic account. Lisa, Jane and Ellis who spoke strongly from this therapeutic 
subject-position drew from private practice and their work in corporate environments. 
Finally, in terms of post-qualification experience the sample encompassed 
participants with one to twenty-five years of experience. However, no influence of the 
post-qualification years of clinical experience was noted in the analytic findings. This 
does not mean that there would not be no differences between newly qualified and 
experienced practitioners in terms of their positioning in relation to ASPD knowledges 
and practices, but may be the focus of this study did not allow those to emerge. 
Perhaps further systematic exploration may reveal some differences, if any, based on 
post-qualification clinical experience.  
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5.3.4 Researcher’s Reflexivity 
 It is acknowledged that in this research, my influence as a researcher, a trainee 
Counselling Psychologist and a person was an inevitable aspect of the interpretative 
process. Hence, the choice of the research subject, research question, data collection, 
interviews and the analysis have been variously influenced by the researcher (Harper, 
2003). However, from a poststructuralist perspective, the researcher’s influence on the 
interpretive process is unavoidable and is seen to operate regardless of the 
methodology or method (Finlay & Gough, 2003). For example, some specific 
phenomena captured my interest and thus I decided to include or exclude certain 
information based on my knowledge of ASPD, my professional training, my previous 
clinical experience and what I thought would be most relevant to the Counselling 
Psychology as a profession.  
 As it was discussed in Chapter Three (see section 3.5), in the poststructuralist 
paradigm, reflexivity is a form of critique that attempts to challenge the available 
discursive norms and uncover what is enabled or constrained from one’s 
understanding of oneself and one’s subject positioning (Finlay & Gough, 2003; Butler, 
2005). Thus, in contrast to traditional forms of reflexivity that mainly focus on a 
person’s demographics and their cultural or theoretical influences, poststructuralist 
reflexivity acknowledges that one is not bound to a singular, rigid position, but can 
constantly reposition within the parameters of what is available (Butler, 2005). Hence, 
one’s identity is multiple, mutable and ever fluctuating (O’Callaghan, 2010).   
 This study convinced me to scrutinise my own knowledges and examine how I 
positioned myself (or was positioned) as a researcher and a trainee Counselling 
Psychologist. During the interviews, as I listened to the participants talking about 
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ASPD, I could hear myself positioning within certain discourses rather than others. 
This became even more apparent during the analysis, where I found myself endorsing 
unknowingly certain ways of ‘doing’ ASPD becoming subjected to the discursive power 
relations circulating. On reflection, my own attraction to the social constructionist 
discourse may have impacted on the analytic comments in the therapeutic subject-
position of “Critical Questioning”. Although FDA suggests that any subject-position 
enables certain ways of thinking, feeling and relating whilst it forecloses others (Willig, 
2013), my analytic commentary in “Critical Questioning” mainly focused on what is 
enabled rather than including what is also constrained in this particular therapeutic 
subject-position. For example, additionally it could have been also argued that in this 
therapeutic subject-position the resistance as ‘rising above’ could be seen as an 
avoidance or defence against clinical responsibility. Perhaps, the emphasis on what 
is enabled is ‘evidence’ of my own discursive limitations as a researcher and a trainee 
Counselling Psychologist. 
Finally, overall this study not only initiated the questioning of my own 
assumptions about ASPD and its therapeutic applications but also contributed to 
developing a critical stance towards my training, my clinical practice as well as 
psychological therapy as a discipline in general. Contesting my own ‘truth claims’ and 
discursive positions, I seem to deploy as a researcher and a trainee, enabled me to 
think and thinking differently. Hence this thesis is a testament of my attempt to develop 
a critical ‘mind’, an aspect that has undoubtedly become central to my identity as a 




5.4 Suggestions for future research 
Some suggestions for further research has been noted above (see section 
5.3.3). Here I specifically propose two additional studies inspired by this research and 
the present findings. Firstly, widening the participant group to include various mental 
health professionals such as psychiatrists, psychiatric nurses, forensic psychologists, 
probation officers, forensic support workers as well as law enforcement officers or 
police staff that work with this particular ASPD group may further shed light on the 
opacity of the ASPD construct and the diverse discursive resources further enhancing 
the present findings. Exploring different perspectives on ASPD conceptualisations 
may further unmask complex discourses and power relations. This may lead to 
interrogating diverse ‘truth’ claims related to ASPD and encourage critical and reflexive 
thinking within different professional contexts. 
Secondly, interviewing clients that have been labelled as ASPD may offer a 
unique and extremely valuable perspective for Counselling Psychology and other 
therapeutic disciplines. Exploring how clients understand the diagnostic label of ASPD 
as well as any implications this may have for their subjective experience and identity 
can be of great importance. Furthermore, an FDA study into clients’ construction of 
ASPD may uncover how clients come to form themselves as well as position 
themselves in relation to being identified as a problem. This may further give way to 
uncovering how clients position themselves in therapy and any possible implications 





5.5 Final thoughts 
I would like to acknowledge that this research has produced one reading of 
many possible. I do hope that this thesis has contributed to the creation of a critical 
and reflexive space for psychological practitioners to consider their knowledge and 
therapeutic practices with ASPD. My aim was to invite psychological practitioners to 
foster curiosity about their own ‘truth claims’ in relation to ASPD and become open to 
the possibility of thinking critically and differently about their therapeutic work.  
 Additionally, remaining faithful to the FDA analytic interest it is acknowledged 
that the participants’ accounts have been subjected to interpretation and critique. It is 
important to mention that I hold a profound respect for the research participants, their 
knowledge and therapeutic work.  This study had no intention to repudiate or desert 
the valuable therapeutic work these PPs conduct with ASPD clients, nor to suggest 
that they are naïve practitioners unaware of the complex processes that embed 
therapeutic practices with ASPD. The therapeutic subject-positions and their 
illustrative discourses merely offer alternative ways for all psychological practitioners 
to interrogate and critique ASPD knowledges and practices that may have been 
overlooked. This consideration, I believe it to be an ethical responsibility of any 
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APPENDIX 1: DSM-5 Diagnostic Criteria for ASPD (APA, 2013: 659) 
 
Diagnostic Criteria                                                                                           301.7 (F60.2) 
A. A pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others, occurring since age 
15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of the following: 
1. Failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviours as indicated by 
repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest 
2. Deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others for personal 
profit or pleasure 
3. Impulsivity or failure to plan ahead 
4. Irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults 
5. Reckless disregard for safety of self or others 
6. Consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent work 
behaviour or honour financial obligations 
7. Lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, 
mistreated, or stolen from another 
B. The individual is at least 18 years. 
C. There is evidence of conduct disorder with the onset before the age 15 years. 
D. The occurrence of antisocial behaviour is not exclusively during the course of 





APPENDIX 2: ICD-10 Diagnostic Criteria for Dissocial Personality Disorder 
(WHO, 1994) 
 
Diagnostic Criteria                                                                                           F60.2 
Dissocial (Antisocial) Personality Disorder, usually coming to attention because of a gross disparity 
between behaviour and the prevailing social norms, and characterised by at least 3 of the following: 
 
a. Callous unconcern for the feelings of others; 
b. Gross and persistent attitude of irresponsibility and disregard for social norms, rules and 
obligations; 
c. Incapacity to maintain enduring relationships, though having no difficulty in establishing them; 
d. Very low tolerance to frustration and a low threshold for discharge of aggression, including 
violence; 
e. Incapacity to experience guilt and to profit from experience, particularly punishment; 
f. Marked proneness to blame others, or to offer plausible rationalisations, for the behaviour that 
has brought the patient into conflict with society. 
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To whom it may concern,  
 
I am a Trainee Counselling Psychologist on the Doctoral programme at Roehampton 
University. I am researching Psychological Practitioner’s views, knowledge and clinical 
experience of Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD). This study has been approved 
under the procedures of the University of Roehampton’s Ethics Committee. 
 
I am looking to recruit ten qualified and experienced psychological practitioners with 
self-identified experience of working with ASPD to participate in my research. I would 
like to interview these practitioners for 60 to 90 minutes about their knowledge of and 
experience of working therapeutically with ASPD.  
 
If you are willing to advertise this research in your organisation please use the leaflet 
attached to post on any noticeboards or give out in team meetings. If you know of any 
psychological practitioners who may be willing to take part in this research please 
contact me or the Director of Studies at the address below. If you have any further 
questions please do not hesitate to contact me or the Director of Studies (see contact 
details at page 2).  
 
I believe that the proposed study will add to the existing knowledge of Antisocial 
Personality Disorder and its clinical applications and this may be beneficial for 
psychological practitioners and the wider clinical field they practice in as well as people 
who may use the relevant services. I would be grateful if you would consider helping 
me recruit for this research.  
 
Thank you in advance for your time and help. 
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Are you a qualified psychological practitioner who has clinical 
experience working with Antisocial Personality Disorder? 
 
 
I am conducting a study on psychological practitioners’ views, knowledge and 
clinical experience with Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD). 
 
I am a Counselling Psychologist in training on a Doctorate Counselling Psychology 
programme at Roehampton University. I would like to interview qualified and 
experienced psychological practitioners (clinical/counselling psychologists, 
psychoanalysts, psychotherapists, counsellors) who have worked therapeutically with 
Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD). I believe that psychological practitioners’ 
knowledge and experience of working therapeutically with ASPD is valuable and could 
contribute significantly in the under-researched domain of ASPD. Developing our 
understanding of ASPD and its clinical applications may benefit not only the clinicians 
and the services they practice in but also the people who are using the relevant 
services. 
 
If you think you or anyone you know might be interested in participating in this research 
or if you would like more information then please contact me in confidence at: 
 
Maria Pournara 
Trainee Counselling Psychologist 
Department of Psychology 
University of Roehampton 
Whitelands College 
Holybourne Ave 













PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FORM 
 
 
Title of Research Project: How do Psychological Practitioners construct and work 
therapeutically with Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD). 
 
 
Thank you for considering participating in this research. Please take time to read the 
information below. Do not hesitate to contact me if you have any further queries. 
 
 
Brief Description of Research Project:  
 
This research study aims to investigate the participants’ knowledge, views and clinical 
practices in relation to Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) hoping to highlight a 
multi-level understanding of this mental health diagnostic category and its clinical 
applications. The participants will be qualified and experienced psychological 
practitioners with self-identified experience of working therapeutically with ASPD. 
 
In this study, you will take part in an interview that will last between 60 to 90 minutes. 
There will be four broad areas of exploration related to your knowledge, understanding 
and clinical experience of ASPD.    
 
Right to withdraw: 
 
You can withdraw from participation in this study at any point without needing to justify 
your decision. In order to do this, please contact the researcher with your participant 
number, which you will find on the Debrief Form. Please be aware that although you 








Confidentiality and anonymity: 
 
All data will be held securely in password protected computer files and locked filing 
cabinets. No one outside of the research team will have access to your individual data, 
and anonymity will be protected at all times. People within the research team will be 
unaware of any links between your identity and the data collected. Signed consent 
forms will be kept separately from all other data. Your identity is not traceable and will 
not be passed on to anyone who is not involved in this study, and will be protected in 
the publication of any findings. Confidentiality will be kept at all times unless there is a 
real concern about your safety or others’ safety. 
Thank you for taking the time to read the research information and your consideration 
to take part in this research. Your participation in this study will be immensely valuable.  
 




Investigator Contact Details: 
 
Maria Pournara 
Trainee Counselling Psychologist  
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Participant ID Number:  
 
 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM  
 
Title of Research Project: How do Psychological Practitioners construct and work 
therapeutically with Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD). 
 
Brief Description of Research Project, and What Participation Involves:  
 
This research study aims to investigate the participants’ knowledge, views and clinical 
practices in relation to Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) hoping to highlight a 
multi-level understanding of this mental health diagnostic category and its clinical 
applications. The participants will be qualified and experienced psychological 
practitioners with self-identified experience of working therapeutically with ASPD. 
 
Ten participants will take part in this study. Each participant will participate in an 
interview that will last between 60 to 90 minutes. There will be four broad areas of 
exploration related to the participants’ knowledge, understanding and clinical 
experience of ASPD. The interviews will be audio recorded and will take place at the 
participants’ work place or at accessible and appropriate professional space that will 
be arranged by the researcher. Confidentiality will be kept at all times unless there is a 
concern for the safety of participants or others. 
 
Investigator Contact Details: 
Maria Pournara 
Department of Psychology 
University of Roehampton 
Whitelands College 
Holybourne Avenue 
London SW15 4JD 




I agree to take part in this research, and am aware that I am free to withdraw at any 
point without giving a reason, although if I do so I understand that my data might still 
be used in a collated form. I understand that the information I provide will be treated 
in confidence by the investigator and that my identity will be protected in the publication 
of any findings, and that data will be collected and processed in accordance with the 







Please note: if you have a concern about any aspect of your participation or any other 
queries please raise this with the investigator (or if the researcher is a student you can 
also contact the Director of Studies.) However, if you would like to contact an 
independent party please contact the Head of Department.  
 
 
Director of Studies Contact Details:  Head of Department Contact Details: 
  
Dr Anastasios Gaitanidis        Dr Dianne Bray 
Department of Psychology         Department of Psychology 
University of Roehampton        University of Roehampton 
Whitelands College         Whitelands College 
Holybourne Avenue         Holybourne Avenue 
London SW15 4JD                                                     London SW15 4JD 
Email:anastasios.gaitanidis@roehampton.ac.uk       Email:d.bray@roehampton.ac.uk  









APPENDIX 7: PARTICIPANT DEBRIEF 
 
 
Participant ID Number: 
 
        
PARTICIPANT DEBRIEF 
 
Title of Research Project: How do Psychological Practitioners construct and work 
therapeutically with Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD). 
 
Thank you very much for taking part in this study, we appreciate your valuable 
contribution. 
 
This study was aiming to examine how psychological practitioners understand ASPD 
and work with it therapeutically. For this study, we used interviews to collect the 
appropriate data as this will allow to materialise the research objectives.  
 
• I agree that the interviews have been conducted professionally and ethically. 
• A copy of the transcription will be send to me within a month and a half after the 
interview. 
• My anonymity is ensured in this project and in all future publications that may 
derive from this thesis. 
• Confidentiality will be kept unless there is a concern for the safety of participants 
or others. 
 
Participant: ………………………………….       Researcher:…………………………… 
Signature: ……………………………………     Signature:.……………………………… 
Date: ………………………………………….     Date: …………………………………… 
Please note: if you have a concern about any aspect of your participation or any other 
queries please raise this with the investigator. However, if you would like to contact an 
independent party please contact the Head of Department (or if the researcher is a 






Investigator Contact Details: 
Maria Pournara 
Trainee Counselling Psychologist  




London, SW15 4JD 
Email: pournarm@roehampton.ac.uk 
 
Director of Studies:  Head of Psychology: 
 
Dr Anastasios Gaitanidis       Dr Dianne Bray 
Department of Psychology        Department of Psychology 
University of Roehampton       University of Roehampton 
Whitelands College        Whitelands College 
Holybourne Avenue        Holybourne Avenue 
London SW15 4JD        London SW15 4JD 
Email:anastasios.gaitanidis@roehampton.ac.uk      Email:d.bray@roehampton.ac.uk  
Tel: 020 8392 4529       Tel: 020 8392 3627 
 
 
If the interview causes emotional distress or discomfort please speak to your clinical 
supervisor. Alternatively, if you would like to access an independent source of support 
you may find useful approaching any of the following professional bodies: 
 
 
BPS                                                 UKCP                                         BACP                
www.bps.org.uk                             www.ukcp.org.uk                       www.bacp.co.uk  
Tel: 0116 254 9568                        Tel: 020 7014 9955                    Tel: 01455 883300 












































One participant got in contact. 
Participant was excluded 
because she had experience 
with ASPD mainly as a support 
worker. 
Three participants got in contact. All three 
of them were excluded because they were 
qualified as Forensic Psychologists and did 





A number of different 
services were approached 
by email but no 
participants came through. 
No Participants recruited 
via this route. 
A small presentation was given on 
my research and the inclusion 
criteria for participation. Four 
participants signed up all of them 
satisfied the inclusion criteria. 
A small presentation was given on my 
research and the inclusion criteria for 
participation. One participant singed up 
who satisfied the inclusion criteria. 
Five more participants were 
recruited through snowballing. 
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